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Abstract
In July 2010, the New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene began requir-
ing restaurants to post letter grades summarizing their health inspection scores (the “grade
law”). The grade law is an example of a mandatory disclosure policy, requiring firms to
publicly reveal information about the quality (in this case, hygiene quality) of their prod-
ucts. Policymakers typically use mandatory disclosure policies in order to improve health
and safety (quality) outcomes and increase consumer welfare. These laws can potentially
prevent health and safety crises from occurring. For example, in December 2015, an E. Coli
outbreak at a local Chipotle restaurant near the Boston College campus infected nearly
150 students with norovirus. A local news report noted that the Chipotle in question was
closed with three serious health violations shortly after the cases were reported, and health
inspectors found multiple health code violations.1
1See www.boston.com/news/local-news/2015/12/08/bc-official-theres-now-more-than-140-students-likely-
sick-with-norovirus
Policymakers in cities such as Los Angeles, NYC, and Seattle, have developed restaurant
grading policies with the hopes of preventing these types of events from occurring. These
policies target health and safety outcomes by providing incentives for firms to improve
their product qualities. Typically, mandatory disclosure policies do this by increasing the
information available to consumers, and allowing the demand side of the market to provide
these incentives to firms. For example, the stated goal of the NYC grade law was to inform
the public about restaurant hygiene quality, and to improve sanitary conditions and food
safety practices in restaurants. Consumers can use the new information on quality to select
which products they consume, which can lead to sorting on quality, assuming consumers can
agree that, holding other factors constant, a healthier or safer product is better. Ideally,
this sorting on quality by consumers and subsequent competition would induce firms to
provide the highest level of quality. Policymakers implicitly rely on this consumer sorting
and subsequent competition on quality when using mandatory disclosure policies to improve
health and safety in an industry. The evidence so far suggests that the NYC grade law has
been working. Many restaurants in NYC now operate with an “A” grade. By the end of
2013, the proportion of “A” graded firms had nearly doubled from pre-grade law levels. And
yet, there are still some non-“A” firms in operation, all over the city. Though the grade
law has largely reduced the proportion of non-“A” firms, by the end of 2013, approximately
one-third of the restaurants operating in NYC did not have an “A” grade.
What factors determine the evolution of hygiene quality? Why would we not expect a
uniform convergence to “A” quality, with lower quality firms either improving their quality
or exiting the market? How is it that some firms can continue to operate with lower levels
of quality? What implications does this have for prices and competitive dynamics? In other
words, do mandatory disclosure policies provide adequate incentives for firms to improve
hygiene quality? Is the lack of information available to consumers in the pre-grade law
period the only factor keeping quality below its highest level? In this dissertation, I posit
that one reason mandatory disclosure policies may not automatically lead to an increase in
the quality supplied by firms is that obtaining and maintaining a certain level of hygiene
quality involves an investment decision on the part of the firm, which is subject to fixed
and sunk costs. These costs are present both before and after the grade law, and may affect
quality decision making in both periods. Therefore, these costs may lead to a lack of quality
improvement prior to the grade law, and may continue to constrain a full convergence to
“A” quality across all firms even after the grade law.
The effectiveness of mandatory disclosure policies at inducing quality improvement may
also depend on the nature of the firms in question. For firms supplying differentiated
products prior to mandatory disclosure, introducing an additional dimension of product
quality to consumer preferences may not shift demand sufficiently for the firm to be willing
to incur the costs of providing better hygiene quality.
This is because consumers may be willing to accept a firm having a lower quality char-
acteristic on one dimension (e.g. hygiene) if they have a higher quality characteristic on
another dimension (e.g. food quality). Thus, differentiated product firms may respond
to the introduction of the new information in alternative ways. For example, rather than
choosing to invest in hygiene quality, they may instead invest in alternative quality char-
acteristics. In this way, a “C” graded restaurant can still receive Yelp reviews as having
the “best soup dumplings” in the city, and can still generate healthy volume that obviates
the need for them to make any additional quality investments. However, low quality firms
may also need to charge lower prices to compensate consumers for the “risk” incurred by
consuming at a lower hygiene quality restaurant. Nevertheless, it may be that low quality
still comes at an implicit “cost” to the firm, in that they need to lower their price in order
to maintain the same level of volume as prior to information disclosure.
Conversely, if prior to the grade law there is no definition of product quality that can be
used to rank firms, consumers may not agree on a product’s intrinsic quality. In this case,
mandatory disclosure can have an important influence on firms’ decision to invest in hygiene
quality. It may be that firms are more willing to incur the costs of quality investment in
these cases, because hygiene quality becomes an important means of attracting consumers
and stealing share from rivals. Hence, competition with other firms becomes an important
channel through which information disclosure incentivizes firms to invest more in their
product quality.
This dissertation estimates the impacts of a mandatory disclosure policy (the New York
City grade law) on hygiene quality choices, prices, and competition. In the first and third
chapters of my dissertation, I estimate a dynamic structural model to recover the implied
costs underlying quality choice decisions. Though the researcher may not observe these
costs in the data, they can be recovered empirically by considering how firm decision mak-
ing changes depending on the conditions in play at the firm and in the market over time.
Having a structural model also enables me to conduct counterfactual experiments, which
show that several key parameters, such as sunk entry costs, or the value from competing in
certain types of markets, can have a meaningful impact on the policy outcomes.
My first chapter examines whether the grade law leads to increased product quality pro-
vision by firms selling differentiated products. I focus on Zagat rated restaurants, which
prior to the grade law have many pre-existing quality characteristics valued by consumers
that can differentiate them from other firms. I estimate a dynamic model of entry, exit and
investment in hygiene quality, incorporating permanent firm-level unobserved heterogene-
ity, and find that the grade law increased payoffs from entering with, operating with, and
investing in higher quality. However, I also show that underlying costs of providing quality
affect firm decision making in the absence of mandatory disclosure, and that altering these
costs can shift the distribution of quality types towards higher quality. I derive a counter-
factual tax policy that directly targets these costs and leads to higher percentages of high
quality firms across markets than the mandatory disclosure policy.
My second chapter uses the same panel of Zagat restaurants as in Chapter 1, and estimates
how the grade law affects the pricing decisions of restaurants with different hygiene qualities.
Since the grade law introduces a new dimension of product quality, firms may be able to
charge higher prices for access to high quality. However, because firms in this setting are
already selling differentiated products, it is possible that prices do not change. Furthermore,
prices charged by lower quality firms may fall, because consumers would not consume at
a low quality firms without being compensated with a lower price, or the prices may not
change or even rise, partially because consumers are still willing to pay for the firm’s other
quality characteristics. Controlling for firm characteristics and market conditions, I find
that the introduction of the law led to a decrease in prices charged by lower quality firms
relative to those charged by high quality firms. The results suggest that as quality levels
increase in the market, consumers may benefit due to the decreased ability of firms to price
discriminate as they would if there were asymmetric information on quality. However, I
also find evidence that, as a result of the grade law, firms pass-through some of the costs
of improving quality to consumers in the form of higher prices.
My third chapter presents preliminary findings suggesting how the grade law impacts the
hygiene quality choices of firms with few observable quality characteristics prior to manda-
tory disclosure. Using the same dynamic model framework as in Chapter 1, I estimate the
effects of the grade law on the hygiene quality choices of bagel shops, and show how these
choices relate to market competition. While most of the model results and predictions from
this chapter are sensitive and should be interpreted with caution as they likely do not fully
identify the parameters of interest, I do estimate a positive relationship between competi-
tion with high quality firms and choice of high quality after the grade law; however, I also
find evidence that entry costs are increasing in quality. Counterfactuals show that lowering
the costs of entry with high quality both before and after the grade law could increase the
proportion of firms choosing high quality. Additionally, I find that the competitive inter-
action between firms provides an important incentive to investing in higher quality under
mandatory disclosure. I interpret this finding as evidence that the effects of mandatory
disclosure are primarily transmitted through competition, and that removing these effects
of competition would significantly reduce the gains from mandatory disclosure.
This research contributes to a growing literature on the efficacy and importance of manda-
tory disclosure policies. Mandatory disclosure can be a valuable policy tool used to target
an inefficiency or social harm such as a high incidence of food poisoning at restaurants.
However, the effect of these policies on the choices made by firms should also be considered.
Firm quality choices after mandatory disclosure will be determined by consumer demand for
the new dimension of product quality, competition with market rivals, and costs. Consumer
demand for hygiene quality may depend on factors such as how much they pay for a meal,
meaning that demand for hygiene quality may be different for limited-service restaurants
than for full-service restaurants.
However, allowing consumers, who may consider multiple characteristics of quality, not
just hygiene, to provide the sole incentives for firms to improve their quality, may under-
incentivize quality improvement of some firms. Furthermore, market conditions such as
competition can be important, and may not be addressed at all by the consumer response.
Policies that use cost-based incentives to firms, or target firms operating under certain
market conditions, could be used as a replacement or supplement to the workings on the
demand-side. My results suggest that such alternative policies which, rather than asking
consumers to enforce product quality improvement via their consumption decisions, directly
target the incentives faced by firms when making product quality choices, merit considera-
tion.
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Chapter 1
Mandatory Disclosure and the Quality
Choices of Differentiated Firms
1.1 Introduction
In July 2010, the New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene (DOHMH)
began requiring restaurants in all five boroughs to post letter grades summarizing their
sanitary inspection scores (the “NYC grade law” or “grade law”). The stated goal of the
grade law was to inform the public about restaurant hygiene quality in a simple, accessible
way, and to improve sanitary conditions and food safety practices in restaurants.1
The NYC grade law is an example of a mandatory disclosure policy, in that it requires
1See www.nyc.gov/html/doh/downloads/pdf/rii/restaurant-grade-18-month-report.pdf.
1
Chapter 1 Mandatory Disclosure and the Quality Choices of Differentiated Firms
firms to publicly disclose information about the quality of their products.2 These policies
solve an asymmetric information problem (Akerlof 1970) and may induce consumers to sort
over products based on the increased information on product quality, what I refer to as
“demand response”. This increase in demand for quality provides an incentive for firms in
the same market to compete on quality type, a “competitive response”. However, there is
an ongoing debate in policy circles as to whether these mandatory disclosure laws actually
impact consumption choices, benefit consumers, incentivize firms to improve their product
qualities, or improve market operations as a whole.3
Do mandatory disclosure policies provide adequate incentives for firms to improve hygiene
quality? Laws such as the NYC grade law increase the information available to consumers,
which can impact the optimal product quality choice of the firm if these changes affect the
payoffs to quality provision for firms via changes in demand. However, the overall impact
of these laws on firm behavior may depend on demand for product quality, market hetero-
geneity, differences in competition within different markets, and costs.4 In this chapter, I
estimate the drivers of product quality decisions of firms before and after the introduction of
the grade law, and show how firm decisions relate to the costs of supplying product quality
under different market conditions.
2Other examples of these policies include nutritional labeling on food products, hospital quality ratings,
and energy efficiency ratings on appliances.
3See “The Limits of Mandatory Disclosure Laws”, Bloomberg Businessweek, May 15, 2014, available at
www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-05-15/the-limits-of-mandatory-disclosure-laws
4See Dranove and Jin (2010) for an excellent overview of the literature on mandatory disclosure policies.
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Mandatory disclosure policies may not automatically lead to an increase in the quality
supplied by firms, due to the presence of sunk and fixed costs of entry as well as improving
and maintaining quality levels. Sutton (1991) shows that the presence of endogenous sunk
costs in different industries is related to market structure outcomes and firm competition.
Furthermore, if these costs are present both before and after the grade law, they will af-
fect quality decision making in both periods. Therefore, these costs may lead to a lack of
quality improvement prior to the grade law, and may continue to constrain all firms from
investing in the highest level of quality even after the grade law. Also, in cases where firms
are supplying differentiated products, introducing information on an additional dimension
of quality to consumers may not sufficiently incentivize the firm to incur the costs of quality
provision. Ignoring the presence of these costs when analyzing firm decision making could
misstate the effectiveness of these policies on incentivizing quality improvement.
Previous evaluations of mandatory disclosure policies have focused on quantifying the
demand response to increases in quality information, and how this affects firm behavior.
Mathios (2000), Hastings and Weinstein (2008), Bennear and Olmstead (2008), Bollinger et
al. (2011), and others have shown that mandatory disclosure laws can influence consumer
decision making. Jin and Leslie (2003) show that mandatory disclosure policies related to
firm hygiene induces sorting by consumers on quality, and led to firms supplying higher
levels of product quality. Kwok and Studart (2015) provide evidence suggesting that firm
investments in quality may be driven by competition. In general, these studies focus on
3
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how firms respond to the shift in their payoffs to providing quality as a result of the in-
creased information available to consumers. However, no study to my knowledge focuses on
formally modeling how the grade law affects firm payoffs, and how that relates to the costs
of improving quality and affects firms’ equilibrium choices of product quality.
This study estimates a dynamic model of entry, exit and quality choice before and after
the grade law, comparing firm payoff parameters under the two information environments.
In the model, firms make forward looking decisions that are subject to fixed and sunk costs,
and quality evolves dynamically based on firm entry, exit and quality adjustment decisions.5
Recent applications of dynamic models to various industries include Ryan (2012), Collard-
Wexler (2013), Yang and Igami (2015), Suzuki (2013), Sweeting (2013), and Beauchamp
(2015). Lin (2015) estimates a dynamic discrete choice model of nursing home quality,
where she recovers sunk entry costs and fixed costs of operating at “high” and “low” qual-
ity. Hollenbeck (2015) explores how the information environment in a market drives the
decision of firms to organize into chains. This study contributes to the recent literature
on dynamic games by exploring drivers of product quality in the market under different
information environments, leveraging the natural experiment of the NYC grade law.
Data on costs or investment expenditures are typically not available for firms in most
5Such an empirical approach has been recommended in the theory literature to fully test the implications
of mandatory disclosure policies. See, for example, Janssen and Roy (2013).
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industries. Furthermore, data on restaurant revenues are increasingly difficult to obtain.6
However, I set up a dynamic framework that builds off the static product quality choice
framework used in the entry games literature by Berry (1992) and Mazzeo (2002a), and
allows me to estimate payoffs from entry, operation and hygiene quality investment, even
without data on revenues or costs. These estimated payoffs are assumed to contain both
revenue and cost components. However, the sign of these payoffs allows me to infer whether
the cost component or revenue component of payoffs is larger. Furthermore, by comparing
the pre-grade law (before July 2010) and post-grade law (after July 2010) payoffs, and as-
suming no change in the costs to provide quality across periods, I can interpret the change
in payoffs as due to demand, and therefore recover the implicit gains or losses to being of
different hygiene quality types as a result of the grade law. Utilizing this dynamic approach
to recover the implicit payoffs of improving quality, and estimating how the introduction of
the grade law affects firms’ quality provision decisions, is a key contribution of my research.
I use detailed restaurant health inspections data for the years 2007 through 2013, cover-
ing both the pre-grade law and post-grade law periods, and focus on restaurants that are
featured in the Zagat New York City restaurant guides over the same time period. Using
Zagat rated restaurants allows for a natural definition of the market in which firms compete
(I assume that Zagat rated firms in the same neighborhood tend to compete directly with
each other), as well as provides a rich set of characteristics that represent alternative mea-
6Some studies, such as Jin and Leslie (2003) and Luca (2012) use restaurant revenue derived from state
food and beverage sales tax data. These data were not available for this particular study.
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sures of product quality (the rating guides contain consumer ratings of firm’s (non-hygiene)
qualities as well as information on firm characteristics). Furthermore, focusing on Zagat
rated restaurants allows me to consider the incentives of differentiated product firms that
compete for consumers with a pre-defined notion of that firm’s quality. The Zagat ratings,
being a widely understood and recognized definition of restaurant quality, may be comple-
ments to the additional dimension of quality introduced through the grade law, for example
because firms can improve both decor quality and hygiene quality with the same invest-
ment, or because consumer demand for hygiene quality after the grade law is correlated
with their demand for the overall restaurant experience, which may include the quality of
service. On the other hand, some customers may see Zagat quality ratings as substitutes
for lower hygiene quality, for example because consumers are ambivalent with regards to
hygiene quality so long as the food tastes good.
Focusing on differentiated product firms offers insight into the effectiveness of mandatory
disclosure policies. Since Zagat rated firms have a set of alternative quality characteris-
tics that consumers value in their consumption decisions both before and after the grade
law, depending on these other characteristics as well as the characteristics of competitors,
firms may be able to maintain or even steal market share from their competitors even when
supplying a lower level of hygiene quality in the market. They may also offer lower prices
instead of higher hygiene quality to attract customers. Therefore, after the grade law, some
firms may not find it optimal to increase their hygiene quality, as the gains from information
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disclosure (increased demand for the new dimension of product quality) may not shift their
demand curve enough for quality improvement to be optimal, given the costs of producing
a higher quality product. This could diminish the effectiveness of a demand-side policy that
relies on consumers to sort on quality in order to maximize the incentive for firms to supply
high levels of hygiene quality. In other words, mandatory disclosure may under-incentivize
the hygiene quality improvements at certain firms, which can have welfare consequences.
Using an extension of the Markov perfect equilibrium framework initially developed by
Ericson and Pakes (1995), I estimate the payoffs from entering or operating with each grade,
as well as adjusting hygiene quality. The model allows the equilibrium strategies of firms
to vary depending on the information environment. The model also allows for different
cost structures and competition patterns between firms with different quality types, as well
as firm level unobserved heterogeneity using methods developed by Arcidiacono and Miller
(2011). I allow payoffs to entry and quality adjustment to differ depending on the firm’s
quality choice, and also estimate the competitive effects associated with the distribution of
firms of each quality type in the market. The model is estimated for the pre-grade law and
post-grade law periods, and the results are compared in order to determine the changes in
payoffs from the introduction of the information environment.
In the pre-grade law period, where there is no information on hygiene quality available
to consumers, I find that the fixed costs of operating are increasing in quality, and that
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changing quality is generally costly, regardless of whether quality is being increased and
decreased. Conversely, I find that the introduction of the grade law increases the payoffs to
entering, operating with, and adjusting to high (“A”) quality, which I interpret as evidence
of demand response.
The grade law is a demand-side policy that should benefit high quality firms and penal-
ize low quality firms. However, when firms are supplying differentiated products, a fully
demand-side policy may not provide adequate incentive for firms to improve hygiene quality.
Using the estimated parameters of the model, I estimate counterfactuals to explore alter-
native policies to mandatory disclosure. I experiment with different taxes and subsidies to
operating costs, entry costs, and adjustment costs, in the absence of the grade law (i.e. in
the pre-grade period).7 These policies shed light on the degree to which costs may constrain
quality improvement, and whether a more optimal equilibrium could be achieved through
alternative policies.
The results of the counterfactual experiments show that decreasing the operating costs,
entry or adjustment costs of high quality can result in a higher proportion of firms choosing
high quality relative to the model baseline. The results from the model show not only that
costs matter for the quality choices of firms, but also quantifies the magnitude of these costs
and the corresponding demand response or implicit tax policy represented by mandatory
7These experiments are related to past proposals in NYC to lower or eliminate costs for higher quality
firms, while increasing penalties for lower quality firms.
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disclosure. The counterfactual experiments show that alternative policies targeting these
costs directly could also lead to quality improvement. I find that a budget-neutral policy
which taxes operating costs of firms with “B” and “C” quality and subsidizes operating
costs of firms with “A” quality and adjustment costs to “A” quality can lead to a higher
proportion of firms with “A” quality in the market than mandatory disclosure, suggesting
that supply-side alternatives to mandatory disclosure may be a compelling option in certain
markets.
1.2 Industry and Data
1.2.1 The NYC Restaurant Industry
The food and beverage services industry represents a large contribution to New York City’s
economy and status as a tourist capital of the world. There are more than 24,000 eating-and-
drinking establishments in NYC overall. Over 54 million tourists visit NYC each year, with
going out to restaurants being a major part of visiting.8 NYC boasts the most Michelin-
starred restaurants in the United States, and some of the most acclaimed restaurants in the
world. According to the New York City Hospitality Alliance, food service establishments
are one of the largest private employers and account for nearly a quarter-of-a-million jobs
in NYC. Every dollar spent in NYC restaurants generates an additional $0.86 in sales for
the state economy, and every extra $1 million spent at NYC restaurants annually generates
8See, for example, the December 10, 2013 NYC.gov report “New York City will reach a record 54.3 million
visitors in 2013 - increase of nearly 20 million additional annual visitors from 2002”
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an additional 20.2 jobs in the state.9
The restaurant industry in NYC is highly competitive, with regular entry and exit of
firms. A 2011 report found that approximately 80% of entering restaurants in NYC go
out of business within five years.10 A recent report in the Wall Street Journal found that
since 2006, permits for restaurants, bars and cafes have increased by more than 27%. The
report also found that rising rents and increased competition have led to a wave of exits
for restaurants located in Manhattan, and increased entry by firms in outer boroughs such
as Brooklyn and Queens, where rents are lower. For example, Brooklyn has seen a 10%
growth in restaurants since 2009, compared to 6% growth in Manhattan.11 This suggests
that operating costs, as well as other market operating conditions such as rent prices and
competition from other firms can be an important determinate of firm entry and exit deci-
sions in NYC.
Policy makers in NYC are highly mindful of the importance of the revenue from restau-
rants to the city and state economy, as well as the importance of restaurant quality to the
city overall. To support restaurants in their operating procedures, NYC freely provides
regularly updated rules and guidelines for restaurant owners to follow concerning opera-
tions such as wages, hours of work, consumer protection, employment discrimination, and
9See www.thenycalliance.org/faq
10“80 % Fail Rate: Meet 13 of the many New York City Restaurants that closed last year”, Business Insider
(August 8, 2011).
11See: “City Restaurants Multiply, Despite High-Profile Closures”, The Wall Street Journal, October 6,
2014.
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workers health and safety laws.12
1.2.2 Data Source
Data on restaurant health inspections come from NYC DOHMH Hygiene inspections con-
ducted at eligible restaurants in business at any time between July 1, 2007 and December
31, 2013. The data are initially provided at the inspection violation level, where each viola-
tion has a corresponding score, but are aggregated to the inspection-year level as described
in the next section.
This study focuses on the specific quality choices of Zagatrated restaurants in NYC. The
Zagat survey was established in 1979 and is a premier restaurant rating guide. Published
annually, the NYC Zagat guide contains results from a survey of over 30,000 consumers,
covering restaurants across NYC’s five boroughs. Consumers in NYC both contribute to
the reviews data and consume based on it; firms regularly and prominently display their
Zagat ratings in their storefront doors and windows. Data were obtained through the guides
for years 2007 through 2013.
Focusing on Zagat restaurants allows for a natural definition of market competition. Za-
gat restaurants in the same market are theoretically more likely to compete with each other
12For example, since 2005 NYC has provided restaurant owners with an official “Restaurant Owners
Manual”, which educates owners on how to achieve operational compliance with NYC policies. See
www.nyc.gov/html/imm/downloads/pdf/ROM-2013Update.pdf for a recent (2013) version.
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than with other, non-Zagat firms.13 Zagat firms are also differentiated product firms, where
firms have other measures of product quality, even in the absence of mandatory disclosure
on hygiene quality. Jin and Leslie (2009) argue that Zagat firms’ reputations are based on
other quality characteristics than just hygiene quality. This can be important for deter-
mining the effectiveness of mandatory disclosure, as consumers may still value a firm for
its other quality characteristics, even if it supplies lower hygiene quality in the market. In
the estimation, I control for the firm’s other quality characteristics, as defined in the Zagat
data. The Zagat annual consumer survey collects information on the food, service, and
decor quality of the firm, all of which can be seen as alternative quality characteristics of
the firm. These characteristics may be important drivers of demand, and can be controlled
for in order to separately identify the payoffs of investing in hygiene quality from the payoffs
from exogenous firm characteristics.14
Finally, reputational incentives from hygiene quality are potentially different in the sub-
population of restaurants covered in the Zagat survey guide, potentially because consumers
care about the Zagat ratings as much or more than hygiene quality. The payoffs to firms
from these characteristics given their hygiene quality choice may change when more infor-
mation is introduced to consumers, as in the case of the NYC grade law. Jin and Leslie
13In the estimation, I control for the effect of the presence of additional non-Zagat firms in the market on
firm payoffs as a control for competition with “other” restaurants.
14The guidebooks also include information on firm prices in that year, measured as the average surveyed
cost of a main course plus a beverage. However, since I do not have data on market shares, I do not
explicitly model the price setting process in this chapter, and do not control for prices in the firm payoff
function since price shocks are likely correlated with shocks to hygiene quality choice. I explore the effect
of the grade law on prices in Chapter 2.
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(2009) find that among Zagat rated firms in Los Angeles County, quality does improve af-
ter the introduction of a mandatory disclosure policy, though less so than non-Zagat rated
restaurants, providing evidence for the reputation based theory, as well as for the notion
that these are differentiated products firms that may benefit from having alternative qual-
ity characteristics even with lower hygiene quality. I explore the relationship between other
quality characteristics and hygiene quality by estimating choice-specific payoffs to firms
from their Zagat characteristics.
Using restaurant names and addresses, I matched the DOHMH Inspections dataset to
the Zagat ratings dataset for all Zagat related firms from 2007-2013.15 After cleaning and
aggregating the data to the annual level, the data contain information on 2,889 unique
Zagat restaurants across the sample period.
1.2.3 The NYC Grade Law
In July 2010, NYC instituted a law requiring restaurants to publicly display letter grades
that correspond to their sanitary inspection scores: “A” (0-13 points); “B” (14-27 points);
“C” (28+ points). Every food service establishment is scheduled for at least one random
inspection per year. Not every inspection results in a grade, but every inspection receives a
score. If the initial inspection does not result in an “A”’ grade, this triggers a re-inspection
which will typically occur within a month and will be un-announced. Each inspection cycle
15Not all Zagat rated firms could be matched due to text mismatches, typos, and missing observations.
Overall, approximately 82% of the Zagat rated firms could be matched to the DOHMH Inspections data.
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is determined by the higher of the initial and re-inspection scores in the prior cycle. If
the initial score is less than 14 points, the next initial inspection occurs approximately 12
months later; if the higher of the scores is 14-27 points, the next initial will be approxi-
mately 6 months after re-inspection; if the higher score is 28 or more points, the next initial
inspection will occur approximately 4 months after re-inspection.
Thus, inspection frequency varies depending on previous inspection score and time since
last inspection. This implies that lower graded restaurants within a year will receive multiple
inspections, but not all of these inspection results may actually be seen by the consumer.16
Since firm decisions are assumed to be based partially off of anticipated consumer demand
for product quality, it is important to only use the information on product quality that the
consumer actually sees. Therefore, I focus on initial inspection results if that is the only
inspection in the cycle, but otherwise focus only on the re-inspection results and compute
the average inspection score for all the inspections conducted during that cycle.17 I then
average across the cycles to compute the average inspection score for the year.18 For the
purpose of the analysis, I assume that the grades corresponding to these averaged scores
represent the ex-ante decisions of firms in each period, an aggregation method similar to
16For example, a consumer will not see that the initial inspection of the firm was a “B” if a re-inspection
results in an “A”.
17There is usually only one re-inspection per cycle, however there are some instances in the data where
there can be multiple re-inspections during the cycle. In these cases, I average across those re-inspection
results.
18This aggregation method appears robust to alternative data cleaning choices. For example, a weighted
average score where weights are equal to the number of months the firm has had a particular grade
yields, on average, scores within 0.5 points of those given by the method used here, which should not
substantially affect the results.
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that employed by Jin and Leslie (2003).
Firms can appeal their inspection score to a tribunal. Once the final grade is determined
by tribunal (if a restaurant chooses to adjudicate) it is considered post-adjudicated, and the
restaurant must post the letter grade that is determined. Pre- and post-adjudicated inspec-
tion score fields are populated except when a restaurant was still waiting for adjudication,
as of February 24, 2014. Not all restaurants seek adjudication, in which case they post the
grade they are given at the time of inspection.19 For the purposes of this study, I focus on
post-adjudication grades and scores where applicable, since these may in some cases be a
better indicator of the actual quality of the firm, and also represent the final quality seen
by the consumer.20
According to DOHMH, inspections were scored in a non-comparable way prior to the
introduction of letter grading, and there are no comparable re-inspections prior to the
introduction of letter grading. Therefore, for the pre-grade law period, I only use the
results from the equivalent initial inspections, which can be identified from the data. A
closer examination of the pre-grade law and post-grade law data (when using only the
19According to DOHMH, restaurants that received “A” grades on their initial inspection no longer received
fines as of Jan. 19, 2011. Post-adjudicated initial scores are therefore likely to be higher, on average,
after this date, because there was no longer an incentive to adjudicate scores less than 14 points.
20Differences in post-adjudicated and pre-adjudicated grades may be due to inspector error; hence, the
post-adjudicated grade is used to best reflect the “true” investments in firm quality. Use of these post-
adjudicated results may result in the grades being biased upwards (i.e. towards better quality), however
these are the appropriate inspection results to look at, as they are what the consumer actually sees in
the post-grade law period.
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equivalent initial inspections for the pre-grade law period) shows that the distributions of
firm inspection scores for a given set of violations are similar in both periods. Therefore, I
assume that the inspection scores as they are captured in the data are accurate depictions
of firm quality setting behavior in both periods, and inspection scores from the pre-grade
law period are used to construct the hypothetical grade a firm would have received had the
grade law been in place.
1.2.4 Construction of Variables
Definition of Market
Geographic markets are defined at the zipcode level, following Kwok and Studart (2012),
who used a similar market definition in their study. There are 118 unique markets in the
sample, for a total of 826 market/years.
Definition of Quality
Quality choice is measured as the grade corresponding to the average inspection-year score
data (post-adjudication), which is calculated as discussed in the previous section. Each
grade corresponds to the firm’s average score within the ranges used by DOHMH (“A” =
0-13, “B”= 14-27, “C” = 27 and greater).
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Definition of Entry and Exit
Upon entry into the market, firms receive an initial inspection. Furthermore, incumbent
firms always exit with a particular grade level as their current “state”, which is equivalent to
the grade received in their last inspection. Entry and exit are defined in the data as follows.
Entry is defined by the Zagat guides (which indicate whether a restaurant is “New”), and
also from the inspections data, which indicate the first inspection received by a firm. Exit is
defined in the data as whenever a firm goes more than a full year without a new inspection,
and the last inspection in the data was prior to January 1, 2013 (since the sample period
ends December 31, 2013). Since all firms in the data receive at least one inspection per
year (both before and after the grade law), this is the best way to approximate firm exits in
the data. Since inspections data are used to define entry and exit, by construction I always
observe the quality type of the firm upon entry and exit.
Definition of State Variables
State variables include firm endogenous quality choices, and market level state variables.
Market state variables are represented by the number of rival firms’ of each quality type
(“A”, “B”, “C”) in each market/year. This is measured by taking the total number of
active firms that had each grade in each period.21
21An additional modification could be to allow payoffs from each quality type to vary with other differentiated
product characteristics of neighbors, such as their cuisine type or Zagat characteristics. I have not
incorporated this modification into the model, however, my examination of the reduced-form evidence
(not presented here) suggests that it is unlikely to make a large difference.
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I also allow market conditions to influence firm decision making. Market demand con-
ditions are measured by the number of potential meals consumed at median Zagat prices
in a given market/year. This variable is generated by dividing the total annual taxable
sales for full and limited service restaurants in each market/year by the median Zagat price
of active firms in that market/year.22 Data on taxable sales were provided by the NYS
Department of Taxation at the quarterly zipcode level originally quarterly for 2007-2012.23
Other market conditions are measured by the average home sales price in a year for each
zipcode. Data come from the NYC Department of Housing, and are publicly available.
Average home sale price may be a proxy for rental prices or in general the cost of operating
a brick and mortar storefront in a given market/year.24 However, these data may also con-
trol for demand conditions, as consumers residing or eating out in these markets may have
different preferences for hygiene quality. Property sales values may also be correlated with
factors such as the average square footage of restaurants, which can also affect the ability
to provide better hygiene quality.
Finally, an additional measure of market competition used is the number of non-Zagat
rated firms in the market receiving inspections each period. This variable is included to
capture the possibility that Zagat firms consider general competitive conditions in their
decision-making, and may benefit from being in market environments with more non-Zagat
22All dollar values are inflation adjusted to 2007 dollars.
232013 data are projected for each zipcode using an AR(1) regression on the 2007-2012 pooled data.
24This measure has been used in the previous literature to capture a factor influencing firm decision making;
for example. Blevins et al. (2015) use property values as a measure of market cost conditions in a paper
analyzing the dynamic entry and exit choices of fast-food restaurants.
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rated firms, due to reputation gains.25
Zagat firms are differentiated product firms, and so both pre-grade law and post-grade
law payoffs may vary with their other characteristics that represent alternative measures of
product quality. I focus on the Food, Decor, and Service ratings from the Zagat data, as
well as whether firm is affiliated with a Celebrity Chef, as my alternate measures of product
quality (besides hygiene quality type) that may influence demand.26 These variables are
assumed to be independent of the shocks to firm quality choice and I do not model the
choice process for these characteristics.27
1.2.5 Evolution of Quality Across Markets
Figure 1.1 describes how the average proportion of each hygiene quality type has evolved
over time, along with the trend in inspections results (the vertical line indicates when the
grade law was introduced). The proportion of “A” grades has been increasing steadily over
time. Upon the introduction of the grade law, “A” firms become more prevalent, with “B”
and “C” firms declining at approximately the same rate. However, “B” firms remain more
25I do not include the number of non-Zagat rated firms of each quality type, but only the overall counts, in
the set of state variables.
26The Zagat data are a rich source of firm characteristics data, and provide other data fields besides the
ones used here. For the sake of managing the state space, I initially elect to use the aforementioned
characteristics, but could explore using other characteristics (such as cuisine type) in future work.
27Firm exogenous characteristics are assumed in the model to evolve according to an AR(1) process. Effec-
tively, this assumes that firms enter the market with a random draw from the characteristics distribution,
and that each period they receive a new draw which stochastically updates their characteristics. That
is, characteristics are viewed as a firm endowment but not a control variable. While hygiene quality
and exogenous characteristics such as decor or service ratings are slightly negatively (with magnitudes
close to -0.1) correlated, implying that firms with better hygiene quality also tend to have higher Zagat
ratings, the assumption is innocuous as long as the random shocks which affect firms’ quality decisions
are unrelated to those which affect exogenous characteristics.
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prevalent than “C” firms, suggesting that some of the “C” firms may be improving their
quality to “B” and then potentially even “A” levels over time.
I interpret these gains in the fraction of firms choosing “A” quality as being driven by
demand-side effects, where new information on quality for consumers incentivizes firms to
improve their quality. However, the lack of a decline to zero by “B” or “C” firms or improve-
ment to 100% “A” quality on average suggests that costs to entering with, operating with,
or switching to “A” quality may constrain convergence to “A” quality across all markets.
Figure 1.2 shows how the percentage of “A” firms in a market has changed across differ-
ent markets over time.28 The figure shows the increase in the share of “A” firms in each
market/year as a move from low (red shading) to high (blue shading).29 There is very little
change in the proportion of high quality firms in the pre-grade law period. From 2007 to
2009, the percentage of “A” firms appears to decline for some markets, and mostly stay
constant in others.
Conversely, 2011 has far more markets with a high proportion of “A” firms, and the num-
ber of markets with high percentages of “A” firms increases from 2011 to 2013, suggesting
that in the post-grade law period, there are higher returns to investing in or operating with
28These graphs are only presented for markets with at least 2 active firms.
29The figure divides the distribution into 4 equal quartiles, where red is between zero and 25%, tan between
25% and 50%, etc.
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higher quality. From 2007 to 2013 there are certain markets that have consistently high or
low proportion of “A” firms, which suggests that market state variables such as demand or
cost conditions matter for whether firms choose high or low quality. A similar pattern (not
shown) is observed for the proportion of “B” and “C” firms by market.
1.3 Summary Statistics
To describe how firm decision making and the market environment changed after the in-
troduction of the grade law, Table 1.1 presents firm-level summary statistics for both the
pre-grade law and post-grade law periods. Average scores are lower in the post-grade law
period, suggesting that firms are investing in quality more after the grade period begins.
Also, the introduction of the grade law is associated with a large shift towards higher qual-
ity levels: there are more firms with “A” grades in the post-grade law period, on average,
while “B” and “C” grades are more common in the pre-grade law period. Though there are
more inspections in the post-grade law period, the trend towards “A” grades is not solely
driven by more firms receiving inspections, as the percentage of firms in the market with
“A” grades is also higher in the post-grade period (67% compared to 33%). Firms tend to
operate in markets with higher levels of potential meals and property sales values in the
post-grade law period.
Tables 1.2 and 1.3 show the average market conditions faced by incumbents and entrants
choosing different grades. The extent to which firm grade choices vary with the market
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conditions in the pre-grade law versus post-grade law periods serves to identify the firm
payoffs. This also applies to understanding entry dynamics, as it helps to understand the
opportunity cost of not entering in certain market environments.
On average, relative to the pre-grade law period, firms choosing higher quality in the post-
grade law period operate in markets with higher market demand (more potential meals) and
higher property sales prices (a proxy for higher rental costs as well as higher income cus-
tomers). Firms choosing higher quality tend to operate in markets with a higher percentage
of other high quality firms. A similar pattern holds for entrant firms in the post-grade law
period relative to the pre-grade law period. Firms choosing exit tend to operate in mar-
kets with higher demand and property sales prices, as well as higher quality firms. These
findings suggest that while demand response as a result of mandatory disclosure can drive
choice of higher quality, the law may also result in higher rates of exit.
Hygiene quality transition functions for the pre-grade law and post-grade law periods are
presented in Table 1.4 and Table 1.5. The tables show the probability that incumbent firms
will change quality type or exit in time t + 1, given their quality type at time t. Current
quality matters for the likelihood of quality investment/divestment. Firms with an “A” are
far more likely than any other quality type to retain their existing grade in the post-grade
period (76% of “A” firms retain their “A” quality).
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In the post-grade law period, “C” level firms are more likely to improve their quality,
suggesting that the payoffs to improving quality when current quality type is a “C” gener-
ally outweigh the costs of doing so. “B” level firms are most likely to retain their existing
grade in the pre-grade law period compared to switching to “A” levels (53% compared to
20%) and are approximately as likely to retain their existing grade as to switch to “A”
levels in the post-grade law period (42% compared to 46%), suggesting that the costs of
adjusting from “B” to “A” may be large enough that even the potential increase in payoffs
from having an “A” grade may not be substantial enough to cover the cost of adjustment.
Table 1.6 shows the distribution of “entry” grades prior to and after the introduction
of the grade law. Approximately half of entering firms in the pre-grade period have “A”
quality, compared to nearly 81% in the post-grade period, suggesting that under the grade
law, firms are willing to trade sunk costs of entry with “A” quality for the payoffs from
having an “A” in the next period. The relative frequencies of entry with different grade
types are substantially shifted with the introduction of the grade law: firms enter with an
“C” grade much less frequently once the grade law is introduced.
Controlling for market conditions, Table 1.7 shows that there are differences in firms’
likelihood of remaining active in the pre-grade period compared to the post-grade period.
In the post-grade period, firms with “A” or “B” quality are more likely to be active than
those with “C” quality; however, in the pre-grade period, the relationship is insignificant.
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The results suggest that there are different payoffs to quality investment depending on
the information environment. After the grade law, having higher quality appears far more
important and may be associated with larger payoffs.
1.4 Model
1.4.1 Model setup
In each market m in period t, there are i = 1, . . . , N firms which represent either potential
entrants or incumbents.30 For the sake of simplicity, I omit the market subscript in the
discussion that follows.
Each period, potential entrants choose whether or not to enter a market, and conditional
on entry, with what (hygiene) quality type. Incumbents choose whether to exit the market,
to keep their existing quality type, or to adjust their quality type. Quality choice is discrete,
where firms choose hygiene quality types corresponding to their grade in the next period,
such that ait ∈ A = {0, A,B,C}, where choice 0 implies exit/no entry.31 Throughout I
assume that actions today ait are their state in the next period, ait = xit+1. Let the vector
of all firms’ current actions be defined as at = (a1t, . . . , aNt).
30I assume throughout that firms are all single-product (that is, a firm is a single restaurant), so that even
for establishments that are part of a chain, each establishment is treated as its own firm competing
against all other firms.
31Exit is assumed to be a permanent action in the model, in that a firm does not re-enter after exiting the
market
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Define the incumbent firm’s observed state as xit, which represents the firm’s hygiene
quality chosen in the previous period. Incumbents and potential entrants both observe
the distribution of rival quality types in the market in each period. Let nAt , n
B
t , and n
C
t
denote the number of rival firms with “A”, “B” and “C” level quality that are active in
time t.32 Firms also observe the vector of the exogenous characteristics of active firms.
These characteristics, denoted Zt = (Z1t, . . . ,ZNt), are meant to capture the differentiated
quality (besides hygiene quality) offered by firms in the market, and are assumed to evolve
according to an exogenous first-order Markov process with transition probabilities given by
fZ(Zit+1|Zit).33 Additionally, firms observe exogenous market characteristics, denoted by
Mt, such as market demand and market cost shifters. Mt is assumed to evolve accord-
ing to an exogenous first-order Markov process, where transition probabilities are given by
D(Mt+1|Mt).
Finally, I also incorporate permanent firm-level unobserved heterogeneity (denoted by si)
using methods from Arcidiacono and Miller (2011). This measure of permanent unobserved
heterogeneity is assumed to be observable to firms in the market, but not to the econometri-
cian.34 I assume that si belongs to a finite mixture distribution si ∈ S = {1, 2, 3, ..., S}, and
32Given the timing of the game, below, these represent the number of firms that chose to remain active or
enter in the previous period (i.e. at time t− 1), with each corresponding grade.
33Potential entrants are assumed to not have any observable characteristics. These characteristics are
exogenously determined only once the firm enters the market.
34Incorporating permanent unobserved heterogeneity into the model permits me to control for observed or
unobserved time invariant factors, such as the type of food, whether the restaurant has a nice view, is a
neighborhood institution, has a large or small square footage, etc.
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for the purposes of the analysis set S = 2.35 I express the vector of permanent unobserved
states for each firm as s = (s1, . . . , sN ).
With a slight abuse of notation, denote the vector of observable (to the firm) state
variables by:
xt = (x1t, x2t, . . . , xNt,Zt,Mt, s)
Each period, firms receive a choice-specific private information shock, it(ait) which is
assumed to be distributed i.i.d, drawn from the Type 1 Extreme Value (logit) distribu-
tion. Denote the private-information state by t = {1t, 2t, . . . , Nt}. Each firm i can be
described by their firm-specific state {xit, it}. Assume that {xt, t} follows a controlled
Markov process with known transition probability p(xt+1, t+1|at,xt, t).
Each period, operating firms choose their hygiene quality types, pay fixed costs, and
compete in the product market, earning overall payoffs from choices. Actions are chosen by
firms to maximize expected discounted intertemporal payoffs:
E
[ ∞∑
τ=t
βτ−tΠ˜i(aτ ,xτ , iτ )|xt, it
]
(1.1)
35I follow Arcidiacono and Miller (2011) in setting S = 2. Beauchamp (2015) notes that models with S = 3
would fit the time series better, while models with S > 3 tend to be too computationally intensive. Due
to my relatively short time series, I determined that S = 2 was the most direct and computationally
feasible way of incorporating unobserved heterogeneity.
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The timing of the game closely follows Ryan (2012):
1. At the beginning of period t, incumbents and potential entrants receive draws of
private information shocks it for each potential quality choice. Each firm is inspected
and quality is updated to reflect that of their action in the previous period, that is,
xit = ait−1. All firms publicly observe the state vector xt.
2. Potential entrants and incumbents simultaneously make quality decisions ait, which
will represent their quality next period.
3. Incumbent firms compete in the market with their current quality xit, and pay ad-
justment costs if they decided to switch their quality type. Potential entrants pay
costs of entry, but do not compete until the next period. Firms exiting at the end of
the period pay an exit cost which is normalized to zero.
4. Incumbent firms who have chosen to exit leave the market. Potential entrants who
have chosen entry enter the market.
5. Exogenous states evolve according to an AR(1) process: Zt evolves to Zt+1, Mt evolves
to Mt+1, and the endogenous market distribution of quality types evolves according
to a process in the Appendix. Firm states xit evolve in the next period according to
the process in (1).
Exit decisions are assumed to be permanent in the model, while firms that do not choose
to enter this period are replaced by a new potential entrant in the next period.
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Following Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007), I assume the following:
1. Additive Separability: Π˜it(ait,xt, it(ait)) = Πit(ait,xt) + it(ait)
2. Conditional Independence: The transition probability factors as:
p(xt+1, t+1|at,xt, t) = p(t+1)f(xt+1|xt,at)
That is, given the firms’ decisions at period t, private information variables do not
affect the transition of common knowledge variables.
3. Independent Private Values: Private information shocks are assumed independently
distributed across players p =
∏N
i=1 gi(it), where for any player i, gi() is a density
function that is absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure (in this
application, the density function of the logistic distribution).
I define the payoff function according to a reduced-form specification similar to that used
by Berry (1992) and Mazzeo (2002a) in the static entry games literature, and extended to
the dynamic games literature by Collard-Wexler (2013) and Lin (2015).36
36A full structural model estimating demand and price competition is not implemented due to a lack of data
on firm market shares.
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Πit(ait,xt|θ) =
∑
α∈A,B,C
1(xit = α)×
(
θα1 + θ
α
2M
D
t + θ
α
3 n
A
t + θ
α
4 n
B
t + θ
α
5 n
C
t + θ
α
6M
NZ
t + θ
α
7M
C
t + Zitθ
Z,α
)
+
∑
α∈A,B,C
∑
k∈S
1(xit = α)× θαk 1(s = k) +
∑
l 6=m,m 6=0
θl,m8 1(xit = l, ait = m) (1.2)
Costs of not entering or exiting are normalized to zero.37 Note that the payoff function is
linear in parameters, which greatly simplifies the estimation.38 I interpret the parameters
of the payoff function as follows: for each quality type α, θα1 represents the fixed payoffs
of operating in the market with that quality α; θα2 represents quality-specific payoffs from
increased market size (as measured by the log number of potential meals in each market);
θα3 , θ
α
4 , θ
α
5 represent effects of different competitor quality types on payoffs; θ
α
6 represents
the effect of competition from additional non-Zagat rated firms on payoffs; θα7 represents
the effect of increased market costs (as measured by log average home sales price in each
market) on payoffs for firms; θl,m8 represents quality adjustment payoffs, including those
from entry with different quality types; and θZ,α represents the effects of firm exogenous
37Normalizing these costs to zero is a common technique in the dynamic games literature (see for example
Collard-Wexler (2013) or Lin (2015)) required for identification. Given this assumption, the counterfac-
tual experiments presented below are chosen so as to produce consistent estimates. See the discussion in
Aguirregabiria and Suzuki (2014).
38Since payoffs are specified as a reduced-form function, the parameters θ are not separately identified as
parameters related to revenues or costs, but rather, parameters that affect overall firm payoffs. However,
economic theory guides the interpretation of certain parameters, such as θ2, as demand parameters, and
others, such as θ1 and θ8, as cost parameters.
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characteristics on payoffs, which vary with hygiene quality type.39 Finally, the parameter
θαk allows for the effect of being in unobserved state k to vary by quality choice.
40
I model firm behavior as choosing quality prior to the grade law, but assume firms are
playing a different equilibrium prior to the law. The model is flexible in order to allow the
data to identify the levels of competition on quality prior to the grade law.41
1.4.2 Equilibrium concept
The solution to the game is characterized by a pure-strategy (stationary) Markov perfect
equilibrium (MPE), where each firm’s strategy only depends on its observed state and its
private shocks.42 Since I assume stationary strategies, I suppress the time subscripts mov-
ing forward.
Strategies σi can be defined as a mapping from states to actions: σi : X ×RJ+1 → A. A
strategy profile is a vector σ = {σi(x, i)}.Associated with a set of strategy functions σ is
the set of conditional choice probabilities (CCPs), defined as follows:
39Note that this payoff function accounts for the competitive effects of rivals only through quality type;
firms do not receive positive or negative payoff from the characteristics of other firms. Reduced form
estimates suggest that modification would be unlikely to substantially change the results.
40Note that this reduced-form payoff function follows the timing of the game in that payoffs for potential
entrants only come in the form of the sunk cost of entry, while incumbents compete and earn payoffs in
the form of the parameters as described.
41Before the introduction of grade, firms are assumed to follow a similar decision making process; specifically
they are assumed to observe each others’ quality. However, consumers do not observe firm quality in the
pre-grade law period, leading to different assumed patterns of competition. Following Ryan (2012), the
model is estimated separately in the pre- and post-grade periods, allowing the differences in payoffs to
be empirically determined.
42The pre-grade and post-grade law periods are separately pooled and equilibria are assumed to be stationary
within those periods, but are allowed to be different across periods.
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P σi (ai|x) = Pr(σi(x, i) = ai|x) =
∫
I{σi(x, i) = ai}gi(i)di (1.3)
Let piσi (ai, x) be firm i’s payoff if it chooses alternative ai according to its equilibrium
strategy in σ. Denote by V˜ σi (x, i) the value of firm i if it behaves optimally now and in
the future, given that all firms are following their strategies in σ. By Bellman’s principal of
optimality, I can represent this value as:
V˜ σi (x, i) = max
ai∈A
{
piσi (ai, x) + i(ai) + β
∫
x′
(∫
V˜ σi (x
′, ′i)gi(
′
i)d
′
i
)
fσi (x
′|x, ai, a−i)dx′
}
(1.4)
Where fσi (x
′|x, ai, a−i) denotes the transition probability of x conditional on firm i choos-
ing ai and other firms following their strategies in σ. Again, by independence of the private
information shocks, I can express the transition probability as:
fσi (x
′|x, ai, a−i) =
∑
a−i∈AN−1
∏
j 6=i
P σj (aj |x)
 f(x′|x) (1.5)
This expression can be calculated using our first stage policy function estimates and es-
timates of transition processes for exogenous state variables.
It is useful to define the ex-ante value function, V σi (x), which represents the integral of
the value function over the private information distribution, and can be thought of as the
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value function of the firm prior to observing .
V σi (x) =
∫
V˜ σi (x, i)gi(di) (1.6)
This can equivalently be expressed as:
V σi (x) =
∫
max
ai∈A
{vσi (ai, x) + i(ai)}gi(di) (1.7)
Where vσi (ai, x) ≡ piσi (ai, x) + β
∫
x′ V
σ
i (x
′)fσi (x
′|x, ai)dx′ is defined as the choice specific
value function, and can be thought of as the net present value of payoffs conditional on
taking action ai, prior to i being observed.
Define the stationary Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE) as the set of strategy functions
σ∗ such that for any firm i and any (x, i) ∈ X ×RJ+1:
σ∗i (x, i) = arg max
ai∈A
{vσi (ai, x) + i(ai)} (1.8)
Note that this equilibrium definition is equivalent to saying that for all σ 6= σ∗, and for
model parameters θ that enter into the profit function:
Vi(σ
∗, x, i; θ) ≥ Vi(σi, σ−i, x, i; θ) (1.9)
A key result of Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007) is to show that it is possible to represent
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this MPE in the probability space. For a set of MPE strategies, σ∗, there are probabilities
P ∗ associated with these strategies, where P ∗i (ai|x) =
∫
I{ai = σ∗i (x, i)}gi(i)di. It can
be shown then that the equilibrium probabilities are a fixed point, P ∗ = Λ(P ∗), where for
any probability vector P , Λ(P ) = {Λi(ai|x;P−i)} and:
Λi(ai|x;P−i) =
∫
I
(
ai = arg max
ai∈A
{vP ∗i (ai, x) + i(ai)}
)
gi(di) (1.10)
Where I have changed the superscript notation from σ to P ∗ in order to reflect the fact
that the conditional value functions V σi , profit functions pi
σ
i and transition functions f
σ
i
depend on σ only through P . I define the Λi functions as the best response probability
functions.
Equilibrium probabilities P ∗ and structural parameters θ∗ jointly solve the coupled fixed
point problems above (ex-ante value function fixed point problem and the best response
probability representation), with existence being guaranteed by Brouwer’s fixed point the-
orem, and uniqueness unlikely to hold. See Doraszelski and Satterthwaite (2010) for a
discussion.
1.4.3 Estimation
Note that if firms are myopic about the future (β = 0) then calculating Λi reduces simply
to a static discrete choice problem (which can be estimated via a conditional logit), where
vP
∗
i represents the mean payoffs of the firm. However, with β > 0 (as is the case in the
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dynamic setting), vP
∗
i = pi
P ∗
i (ai, x) + β
∫
x′ V
P ∗
i (x
′)fP ∗i (x
′|x, ai, a−i)dx′ which has a contin-
uation value as its second term.43 This continuation value presents a complication to the
estimation.
Two-step estimators are commonly used in the dynamic games literature to simplify the
complex dynamic programming problem created by the presence of the continuation value
function. These estimators involve replacing the continuation value term with a function of
the data, constructing a pseudo-likelihood function, and estimating the structural dynamic
parameters in the payoff function. I use the approach from Arcidiacono and Miller (2011),
which builds off of the methods in Bajari, Benkard and Levin (2007), to approximate the
continuation value. This approach is attractive due to its relative computational ease and
ability to handle large state spaces and continuous state variables.44
Since the private information shocks  are assumed to be distributed T1EV, I can directly
calculate the equilibrium choice probabilities P ∗i (ai|x) using a multinomial logit formula:
P ∗i (ai|x) =
exp (vP
∗
i (ai, x))∑
ai∈A exp (v
P ∗
i (ai, x))
(1.11)
43Following Arcidiacono and Miller (2011), I set β = 0.9 when estimating the model.
44Bajari, Benkard and Levin (2007) show that forward simulation can be used to approximate the continu-
ation value by simulating forward over time along different possible state transition paths. Arcidiacono
and Miller (2011) show that, in problems with a terminal action (such as exit), the choice-specific value
function can be expressed as a function of conditional choice probabilities and a one-time terminal payoff.
This implies that one need only simulate one period into the future, as any dependence on future values
has been eliminated.
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As discussed in Arcidiacono and Miller (2011), there is an analytic expression for the
integral with respect to gi(i) due to the assumption of  being distributed T1EV. Therefore,
I can rewrite the choice specific value function as follows (where γ = 0.577 is Euler’s
constant):
vP
∗
i (ai, x) = pi
P ∗
i (ai, x)
+ β
γ + ∫
x′
ln
∑
a′i∈A
exp(vP
∗
i (a
′
i, x
′))
 fP ∗i (x′|x, ai, a−i)dx′
 (1.12)
Arcidiacono and Miller (2011) show that the choice specific value function can be ex-
pressed solely as a function of the flow payoffs and the conditional choice probabilities for
any sequences of choices until a terminal action is reached. Since that terminal action is
exit in this model (that is, exiting firms do not re-enter the market), I can equivalently
express the representation as:
vP
∗
i (ai, x) = pi
P ∗
i (ai, x)
+ β
[
γ +
∫
x′
(
vP
∗
i (a
′
i = 0, x
′)− ln[P ∗i (a′i = 0|x′)]
)
fP
∗
i (x
′|x, ai, a−i)dx′
]
(1.13)
Where I normalize the expression with respect to an (arbitrary) choice in the next pe-
riod, a′i = 0. Now the expression for the choice specific value function only depends on the
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choice probability and continuation value of this baseline alternative. In general, this nor-
malization still contains a continuation value term on the right hand side of the equation.
However, in the case of the terminating action (in this case, exit), this expression can be
simplified, since as the terminal action (exit) has no future implications beyond its current
payoff, the continuation value is just the current payoff.
This allows me to express the choice specific value function with piP
∗
i and v
P ∗
i (a
′
i = 0, x
′)
as functions that are known up to a vector of parameters, and the terms ln[P ∗i (a
′
i = 0|x′)
and fP
∗
i (x
′|x, ai) as functions of the data. All that is required is that the value functions
are normalized with respect to the terminating action (exiting).
Given this, I can rewrite the MPE as the fixed point of the mapping Ψ(P ) = {Ψi(ai|x;P )},
where:
Ψi(ai|x;P ) =∫
I
(
ai = arg max
a∈A
{
piP
∗
i (ai, x) + i(ai)+
β
[
γ +
∫
x′
[
piP
∗
i (a
′
i = 0, x
′)− ln[P ∗i (a′i = 0|x′)]
]
fP
∗
i (x
′|x, ai, a−i)dx′
]})
gi(di) (1.14)
This expression no longer contains a continuation value function, and can be directly used
in constructing a likelihood function.
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Defining Ψi involves computing the integrated term:
∫
x′
[
pii(a
′
i = 0, x
′)− ln[P ∗i (a′i = 0|x′)]
]
fP
∗
i (x
′|x, ai)dx′
The potential size of the state space requires that the integrated term be derived using
simulation over the possible market structures next period, x′:
∫
x′
[
piP
∗
i (a
′
i = 0, x
′)− ln[P ∗i (a′i = 0|x′)]
]
fP
∗
i (x
′|x, ai)dx′
≈ 1
Ns
Ns∑
s˜=1
piP
∗
i (a
′
i = 0, x
′
s˜)− ln[P ∗i (a′i = 0|x′s˜)] (1.15)
In the equation above, each simulation draw s˜ is a draw from the transitions into next
period. The simulated states probabilistically include the states which are most likely to
be seen next period and as the number of simulations increases, the simulated sum will
converge to the sum over all the possible states.
Based on the above, I can express the ex-ante continuation value as:
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vP
∗
i (ai, x) = pi
P ∗
i (ai, x)
+ β
[
γ +
1
Ns
Ns∑
s˜=1
piP
∗
i (a
′
i = 0, x
′
s˜)− ln[P ∗i (a′i = 0|x′s˜)
]
(1.16)
Using this expression, I can formulate the ex-ante continuation value, and use it in equa-
tion (11) to solve for the model parameters. By solving equation (11) via log likelihood,
the estimation routine solves for the model parameters θ by choosing these parameters to
rationalize the actual choices made in the data (i.e. the firm’s actual quality choice in the
next period), given firms’ consistent beliefs over the evolution of market states. In solving
the log likelihood function, I maximize the likelihood of each choice, mapping the choices
predicted by the model to those played in the data, and choosing parameters θ to make
these values as close as possible.
Due to the large state space and continuous support of the state variables, probabilities
cannot be simply “read off the data” (e.g. by using a frequency estimator). Instead, I first
estimate reduced-form versions of the CCPs using a multinomial logit regression, and then
use these estimated choice probabilities to construct the next period probability of exit, as
well as the transition kernels fPi . These transition kernels are then used to simulate over
the possible evolution of states and subsequent next-period firm actions. The benefit of this
two-step estimator is that these simulations can be done in a first stage, and then averaged
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over for every guess of the parameters during the second stage of the estimation routine.
Averaging a large number of times (Ns = 500) ensures that the states most likely to
seen in the data are weighted the most, and the average should converge to the integral
over all possible state transitions into the next period. Given that, I construct the ex ante
value of a particular quality choice this period, which is a function of a firm’s current qual-
ity as well as the firm’s belief about the value of their quality choice in the next period,
which is a function of the evolution of market states. Each quality choice is compared to the
alternative quality choices as well as the choice to exit, which involves no future payoff term.
To solve for the model parameters, I construct the pseudo-likelihood function proposed
by Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007):
QM (θ, P ) =
1
M
M∑
m=1
T∑
t=1
N∑
i=1
ln Ψi(aimt|xmt;P, θ)(1.17)
Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007) argue that, given a consistent estimate of the population
CCPs Pˆ 0, the two-stage pseudo maximum likelihood estimator can be expressed as:
θˆ2S ≡ arg max
θ∈Θ
QM (θ, Pˆ
0)
To summarize, the estimation routine proceeds as follows:
1. Estimate consistent Pˆ , using estimated reduced-form likelihoods of continuing with
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each quality type, as well as of entering with each quality type, as a function of
observed states. Also estimate the reduced-form likelihood of exiting.
2. Estimate the transition functions for the number of firms of each type j, nj , using
the estimated CCPs. Also estimate the transitions of exogenous market states Mt,
D(Mt+1|Mt) and firm characteristics fZ(Zt+1|Zt).
3. Calculate the full set of permutations of x′ (the possible market structures one period
ahead) using simulation. Construct the estimated likelihood of exit given that draw
from the state variables using the estimated reduced-form CCPs of exit.
4. Use the current guess of parameters θ to construct the current period payoff function
using the current states x. Construct the next period payoff function by averaging
over the simulated states x′ as well as the parameter guess.
5. Construct Ψ and solve for the parameters θ that maximize the pseudo-likelihood
function by re-estimating a multinomial logit:
Ψi(ai|x; Pˆ , θ) = exp (v
Pˆ
i (ai, x; θ))∑
ai∈A exp (v
Pˆ
i (ai, x; θ))
6. Iterate over parameters θ, updating at each round, until convergence.
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1.4.4 Identification
The estimation procedure detailed in the previous section proceeds by first estimating
reduced-form versions of the choice probabilities from the data. These estimated proba-
bilities are assumed to reflect the underlying equilibrium being played in the data. These
reduced-form probabilities are then used along with the estimated transition probabilities
of exogenous state variables to simulate the evolution of state variables into the next pe-
riod. These estimates are then used to construct the continuation value function and solve
for the underlying structural parameters of the dynamic game. Solving for the structural
parameters involves maximizing the likelihood of observing firm decisions as a function of
state variables that determine firms’ current and expected future payoffs.
The estimation routine finds the parameters of the firm’s reduced-form payoff function
that best rationalize the observed variation in firm choices from the data. These choices
are firm decisions to enter with different quality types, to adjust quality types, and to exit
with a quality type. Even with only approximately 3 years of data in each of the pre-grade
law and post-grade law periods, the observed variation in firm decision-making over time
and across markets is sufficient to identify the structural parameters. These observed de-
cisions are correlated in the data with market state variables, and this variation identifies
the structural parameters of the model.
In order to fully estimate the model, I normalize the value of exit/no entry to zero. This
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is a commonly used assumption in the literature. However, papers such as Aguirregabiria
and Suzuki (2014) and Kalouptsidi et al. (2015) show that, given this normalization, the
structural parameters of the payoff function are not separately identified. Rather, according
to Aguirregabiria and Suzuki (2014), the structural parameters relating to entry, operating
and adjustment costs are identified as follows:
θˆ0,α8 = θ
0,α
8 − θα,08
θˆα1 = θ
α
1 + (1− β)θα,08
θˆα,α
′
8 = θ
α,α′
8 + θ
0,α′
8 − θα,08
The parameter estimate for entry payoffs with quality type α is an estimate of the true
parameter for entry payoffs with that quality type, net of the payoffs from exiting with that
quality in the current period. The parameter estimate for operating payoffs with quality
type α is an estimate of the true parameter for operating payoffs with that quality type
and the present discounted value of exiting with that quality type in the next period. The
parameter estimate for switching from quality type α to quality type α′ is an estimate of
the true payoffs from switching today combined with the true payoff from entering with the
quality type being switched to (α′), net of the value from exiting with the current quality
type α today. That is, parameters related to fixed and sunk costs of operating, entry or
investment are identified as being relative to the costs of the “outside” option as an incum-
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bent, or exit.
Variation in firm decision making across markets at different levels of the state variables
serve to identify payoff parameters in the model. These state variables are endogenous (a
firm’s most recent quality choice) and exogenous (market demand and cost factors). Of
particular interest to this study are the parameters θ1 and θ8, interpreted as the fixed pay-
offs of operating with a given quality type, and adjustment payoffs from switching from one
quality type to another, as well as sunk entry payoffs for each quality type. Fixed payoffs of
operating are identified by variation in firm decisions to continue with their existing quality
type as opposed to exiting. Adjustment payoffs are identified by variation in firm decisions
to switch their existing quality type as opposed to exiting. Sunk payoffs of entry are iden-
tified by variation in firms decisions to enter with a particular quality type as opposed to
staying out of the market.
Another source of variation concerns differences in firm decisions over time, specifically
in the pre-grade law and post-grade law periods. I assume that the demand faced by firms
will be different in the two periods, and hence firms are assumed to be playing different
within-period equilibria due to the different payoffs from quality choice. The grade law is
assumed to be an exogenous policy shift, and the model is estimated separately in the two
periods in order to analyze how equilibrium behavior changes. I quantify the impact of
the grade law on firm behavior by comparing the payoff parameters between the pre-grade
43
Chapter 1 Mandatory Disclosure and the Quality Choices of Differentiated Firms
and post-grade periods. This provides an estimate of the effects of a change in the in-
formation environment on firm payoffs, and provides a way to estimate the effectiveness of
the grade law at influencing firm decision-making and incentivizing improvements in quality.
Technically, parameters of the payoff function are identified in terms of payoffs, and not
separately identified as revenues or costs. This is because I do not have revenue data, and so
cannot separately identify the parameters associated with costs from those associated with
revenues. Nevertheless, I infer the relative importance of cost versus revenue components
of the payoffs by considering the sign of the payoff parameter estimated. If the param-
eter is negative and statistically significant, I interpret this as the cost component being
greater than the revenue component. Furthermore, for the pre-grade law period I view the
differences in θ1 and θ8 across quality types as being associated with differences in costs,
assuming there is no demand-side information on product quality.45 In the post-grade law
period, however, I assume that the differences in payoffs across quality types are associated
with both revenues and costs. Assuming that the cost conditions at the firm do not change
with the introduction of the grade law, I interpret the changes in payoff parameters between
periods as due to changes in demand as a result of the grade law.46
45Collard-Wexler (2013) and Lin (2015) interpret their estimates, which are also derived from estimating a
reduced-form payoff function, in a similar way.
46I assume that while the parameters contain information on revenues and costs not just related to hygiene
quality, the model contains variables that control for other factors that could influence revenues or costs,
such that I can interpret differences in payoffs in each period as related to cost differentials across hygiene
quality types, and changes in payoffs across periods as related to demand for hygiene quality.
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1.4.5 Unobserved Heterogeneity
Several papers in the recent literature on dynamic discrete choice (e.g. Collard-Wexler
(2013), Lin (2015), Hollenbeck (2015), Yang and Igami (2015), Rao (2015) and Beauchamp
(2015)) have incorporated unobserved heterogeneity into the model using methods proposed
by Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007) or Arcidiacono and Miller (2011). These methods involve
directly incorporating the unobserved component as a fixed or random effect term into the
payoff function and using techniques such as the EM algorithm to update the unobserved
state each firm is in.
I incorporate permanent firm-level unobserved heterogeneity following the methods pro-
posed in Arcidiacono and Miller (2011).47 Arcidiacono and Miller (2011) propose recovering
the parameters of the dynamic model, adjusting for unobserved heterogeneity, in two stages.
In the first stage, the EM algorithm is used to recover the conditional probability, qis, that
a firm i belongs to unobserved state s, as well as the overall population probability, ρs, of
belonging to unobserved state s, and the CCPs as a function of the observed states and
weighted by qis. In the second stage, the CCPs are used to forward simulate the model one
period into the future, and the dynamic parameters are estimated as described above. In
the Appendix, I describe the implementation of the EM algorithm in more detail.
47Beauchamp (2015) uses Arcidiacono and Miller (2011) to incorporate time-varying unobserved heterogene-
ity. However, due to the short panels in my data I instead assume permanent unobserved heterogeneity,
but exploit the firm-level data to incorporate this heterogeneity at the firm, rather than market, level.
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Firm operating conditions differ depending on the unobserved state they are in. Tables 1.8
and 1.9 show that firms operating in unobserved state 2 are likely to face more competition
from firms of each type as well as from non-Zagat firms, but also are likely to be in markets
with more potential meals sold. That is, firms in unobserved state 2 tend to be in “larger”
markets than firms in unobserved state 1. There is little difference in firm grade choices
across market types, however, suggesting that these unobserved firm differences may drive
firms to differentiate and compete on other quality dimensions besides hygiene quality.
1.5 Reduced-Form CCP Estimates
There are at least two potential factors driving differences in firm optimal decision-making
in the pre-grade law and post-grade law periods. The first is that the information revelation
about a firm’s own quality may affect demand for that firm’s product; hence, firms wishing
to retain their market share from the pre-grade law period may have to increase their qual-
ity to meet consumer demand for quality of their product. The second factor is that this
information revelation additionally concerns the effect of competition in the market: with
the introduction of the grade law, consumers now can sort over the entire distribution of
quality in the market and choose their preferred restaurant. Thus, firm quality decisions
will be made conditional on the level of hygiene quality supplied by competitors. This may
have the effect of inducing firms to substitute for quality in other areas such as food quality
or decor.
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As both a firm’s own grade and the grade distribution of their neighbors can affect their
entry, exit and quality investment decisions, I present reduced-form evidence in order to
examine whether firm decision making is significantly different in the pre-grade law versus
post-grade law period, whether there is evidence of a lagged effect in grade (suggesting fixed
costs of adjustment) as well as evidence of firm response to the market structure (distribu-
tion of grades). Furthermore, standard market factors such as market demand and market
costs, that are potential influences of firm decision making in both the pre-grade law and
post-grade law period, continue to matter; hence I also consider the effect of exogenous
market factors on firm decision making.
In order to understand the factors which influence the choice of different quality types
under the two information environments, I estimate reduced-form multinomial logit regres-
sions of entrant choice of quality types “A”, “B”, or “C” (compared to the value of not
entering), and incumbent choice of quality type “A”, “B”, or “C” (compared to the value of
exiting). These estimates incorporate permanent unobserved heterogeneity using the EM
algorithm, and as noted above are used as a first-stage estimate of CCPs in the estimation
of the dynamic model.
These reduced-form results present evidence on the differentials in payoffs to quality in-
vestment under the different information environment. The multinomial logit regressions
for potential entrants in Table 1.11 suggest that the introduction of the grade law provides
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increased information to consumers that can deter entry of lower quality firms and encour-
age entry of high quality firms. Entering with “C” quality is less likely than with “A” or
“B” quality in the post-grade law period (more negative constant term), suggesting that
the future payoffs of higher quality may outweigh the potential sunk costs of entry. The
reduced-form multinomial logit regressions for incumbents found in Table 1.12 show that
in both the pre-grade law and post-grade law periods, firms with an “A” or “B” as their
last grade (relative to “C”’) are more likely to have an “A” or a “B” than to exit. For
“A” firms, the likelihood of choosing an “A” in the current period is higher if the previous
period grade was an “A” than if it was a “B”, suggesting there are lower payoffs to adjust-
ing from an “A” to a “B”. For “B” firms, choosing a “B” is more likely than choosing an
“A”, also suggesting that there may be some costs to adjusting to a higher quality type.
Firms with “A” or “B” grades relative to “C” are more likely to exit than to choose a “C”
grade in both periods, but the relationship becomes much stronger in the post-grade period.
The findings suggest that while the grade law is partially achieving its goals (far fewer
“C” grade choices by active firms), there is also a lower likelihood of “B” firms improving
their quality to an “A” in the post-grade law period than of them continuing with “B”
quality, meaning that factors such as adjustment costs could restrict quality improvement.
Of course, “A” firms are also not switching to “B” quality as frequently as continuing with
an “A”, but the findings suggest that payoffs from continuing with different levels of quality
or switching to higher quality may be different under the two information environments.
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In the post-grade law period, competition in markets with more “C” quality rivals is
likely to lead to continuing for all types, with a larger effect for “B” or “C” quality firms.
Meanwhile, operating an a market with more “A” firms discourages continuing with any
quality type (though the effect is only significant for “A” firms). Firms in the pre-grade
law period are less likely to continue in markets with higher demand, but the relationship
is insignificant in the post-grade law period, though the relationship is still negative, sug-
gesting that it is costly for firms in both periods to operate in markets with higher demand,
regardless of quality. As in the case with the likelihood of entry, the number of non-Zagat
firms in the market is associated with a higher quality of continuing with any quality in
the pre-grade law period, but the effect is only significant for “A” firms in the post-grade
law period. Of firm characteristics, food rating is positively correlated with lower quality
choice, suggesting it is a possible substitute for hygiene quality.
1.6 Dynamic Model Estimates
1.6.1 Results
The estimated parameters of the dynamic model are presented in Table 1.13 and Table
1.14.48 The Table 1.13 parameters are estimated in units of the scale factor in the T1EV
48Bootstrap standard errors of the parameters are calculated by drawing whole market histories from the
set of markets, with replacement, repeating the full procedure described above 30 times, and estimating
the standard deviation across the parameter estimates. A similar procedure was applied in Sweeting
(2013) and Hollenbeck (2015).
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distribution and do not have a level interpretation. To facilitate the interpretation of these
results, I normalize the payoff parameters associated with each quality choice in both periods
by calibrating the entry costs of entering with “A” quality.49 For the sake of interpretation,
I calibrate the entry payoffs from “A” quality in the pre-grade period to be $500,000.50
These normalizations allow me to convert the parameters into dollars, and I focus my in-
terpretation of the results on the normalized parameters found in Table 1.14.51
The estimated pre-grade law and post-grade law parameters contain information on both
revenues and costs, and the relative importance of each payoff component can be seen from
the sign of the parameter estimated. In the pre-grade law period, because consumers do
not have information on hygiene quality, the difference in payoffs across quality types will
be due to cost differences alone. Conversely, in the post-grade law period, the differences
in payoffs across quality types are driven by both demand and costs. The main focus is on
the change in the model parameters between the pre-grade law and post-grade law periods,
which I interpret as the demand response resulting from the increase in information on
quality. This assumes that the technology for producing hygiene quality should not change
49Such normalizations are common when using reduced-form profit functions. See Aguirregabiria and Mira
(2007), or Sanches et al. (2015).
50I estimate that this was approximately the average entry cost of a firm in 2009. See Entrepreneur Magazine,
“Why Now is the Time to Open a Restaurant”, November 2009. This magnitude of payoffs is an
assumption used for the ease of interpreting the magnitudes of the differences in the pre-grade law and
post-grade law periods.
51The pre-grade law parameters are normalized relative to the calibrated entry payoffs with “A” quality.
The post-grade law parameters are converted into dollars by comparing the ratios of entry with “A”
quality to “C” quality in both periods, and adjusting the post-grade law entry payoffs from “A” quality
based on the percentage difference in these ratios. The post-grade law parameters are then normalized
to the calculated post-grade law payoffs from “A” quality entry.
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as a result of the grade law, meaning that in the post-grade law period, firms still face the
same costs of producing a given quality type as prior to the grade law, though their demand
conditions have changed.
Table 1.14 shows that in the pre-grade law period, operating payoffs for “A” quality firms
are more negative than those for “B” quality or “C” level quality firms, implying that fixed
costs are increasing in hygiene quality. The difference between the post-grade law period
and the pre-grade law period parameters shows that the value of operating with “A” quality
increase under the grade law, while operating payoffs from low quality decrease, suggesting
that a demand response on the part of consumers may drive benefits to operating with
higher quality. Payoffs increase by over $125,000 for “A” level firms after the grade law is
introduced, and decline from $158,000 to $311,000 for lower quality firms, which demon-
strate a demand-side gain from having higher quality. These higher returns are potential
drivers of the increase in “A” firms in the market after the grade law. However, the payoffs
in the post-grade law period are still negative and statistically significant, suggesting that
the benefits of demand response do not completely outweigh the costs associated with pro-
viding different levels of hygiene quality. For example, the gains from having “A” quality
as a result of the grade law are less than 20% of the magnitude of the pre-grade law fixed
operating payoffs. The fact that costs still remain after the grade law, and that the bene-
fits from the grade law do not outweigh these costs, could represent a constraint on firms’
ability or willingness to provide “A” quality in the market. I explore this idea further in
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the counterfactuals below.
The magnitudes of the estimated operating payoffs are fairly consistent with the findings
from industry research. Operating payoffs as a percentage of same-type entry payoffs range
from 18% to 136% in the pre-grade law period, and from 70% to 116% in the post-grade
law period, depending on quality type. One estimate puts annual operating costs at ap-
proximately 147% of startup costs.52 The similarity of such findings to industry research
demonstrates the power of the Markov Nash Equilibrium framework, as entry and operating
costs are inferred from firm quality choices, without any observed entry or operating costs
in the data.53
I find evidence of negative adjustment payoffs to both increasing and decreasing quality in
the pre-grade law period, suggesting that costs of adjusting quality outweigh any benefits.
The differences in adjusting between, for example, an “A” and “C”, and a “B” and “C” in
the pre-grade law period, are assumed to be driven by differences in sunk costs needed to go
from one quality type to another. It is slightly counter-intuitive to think of lowering quality
as potentially more costly than improving quality, though other papers in the literature
have shown that decreasing quality is associated with costs.54 I find that improving hygiene
quality is more expensive than degrading quality (for example, comparing the pre-grade
52See “Bar-onomics”, New York Magazine, May 18th, 2009
53Ryan (2012) makes a similar observation.
54For example, see Lin (2015) or Collard-Wexler (2013).
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law payoffs of going from “B” to “A” “B” to “C”) which suggests that there are larger
sunk costs to improving quality (for example, the cost of renovating the kitchen or closing
the restaurant for a week to re-train staff on new policies and procedures). There is also
evidence that the sunk costs of adjustment from “C” to “B” quality are lower than the
costs of improving from “C” to “A”, again because the required investment to upgrade two
quality levels is more cost-intensive than to upgrade one quality level.
The change in payoffs from the pre-grade law to post-grade law period shows that the
introduction of the grade law increased payoffs from improving quality by nearly $4,500 for
“B” firms and between $3,640 and $23,750 for “C” firms. Therefore, while sunk costs are
still present after the grade law, firms may be more willing to pay these costs of improving
quality in the post-grade law period, in order to capture the increased revenues that come
from having higher quality in the future. The post-grade law change in payoffs to adjust-
ment may also reflect a one-time increase in revenues that firms receive when they upgrade
quality. This is interpreted as a one-time payoff because these parameters are assumed to
reflect sunk costs. Assuming that the sunk costs are not different in the pre-grade law and
post-grade law period, again because the technology of producing hygiene quality should
not change, then any changes in these parameters must be interpreted as one-time increase
in revenue, for example because new consumers, that otherwise would not have frequented
the restaurant, go to the restaurant in the first period it has its new, higher level of hygiene
quality.
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In both periods, there are higher payoffs to adjusting from “C” to “B” quality than
from “C” to “A” quality, suggesting there are higher costs to larger improvements in qual-
ity. However, the difference in the post-grade law and pre-grade law payoffs suggests that
switching from “C” to “B” is more valuable than switching from “C” to “A”. This finding
is somewhat counter-intuitive, but could be because consumers are less likely to believe
that the firm, which had a “C” in the previous period, could have upgraded to an “A”, and
may instead find it more likely that the firm made a stepwise improvement from “C” to
“B”. Also note that the differences in payoffs to decreasing quality from “A” to “B”, “A”
to “C”, or “B” to “C” are negative, which suggests there is a penalty to lowering quality,
due to lower demand for lower quality firms. Similarly, there are negative payoffs to entry
with all quality types in both periods, which is evidence of the presence of entry costs.
However, I find a positive change in payoffs to entering with “A” and “B” quality after
the grade law, suggesting that these firms (especially “A” quality firms) also benefit from a
one-time increase in revenue as “new” higher quality firms in the market once they enter.
However, the evidence suggests that the positive change in these payoffs is small, less than
5% of pre-grade law entry payoffs for “A” quality firms, which means that sunk entry costs
could continue to constrain quality investment even with the demand gains from mandatory
disclosure.
On the margin, firms benefit more from operating in markets of greater size (more po-
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tential meals) after the grade law, and the difference in the post-grade law and pre-grade
law parameters suggest that the gains are positive for firms of all quality types. This may
be because the introduction of new information as a result of the grade law encourages
consumers to go out to eat at restaurants more (as opposed to consuming the outside good,
namely eating at home), and the growth in market size is beneficial to these differentiated
products firms, regardless of their hygiene quality type. In particular, there is a positive
change in payoffs for “B” or “C” quality firms operating in markets of greater size, and
there is also a positive change in payoffs for these firms from operating in markets with
higher property values. The fact that lower quality firms find it profitable to operate under
certain market conditions after mandatory disclosure suggests that the demand-side policy
may fall short in certain circumstances at adequately incentivizing improvement to “A”
quality.
Comparing the difference between the post-grade law and pre-grade law periods, I find
that “A” quality firms benefit from operating in markets with more “A” quality firms un-
der the grade law, while “B” and “C” quality firms suffer from operating in markets with
more “A” quality firms, which suggests that quality types tend to cluster within markets
rather than differentiate after the grade law is introduced. “A” quality firms may benefit
from higher demand when in markets with more “A” firms relative to the pre-grade law. 55
55This finding is related to an extensive literature on the relationship between product quality and firm
competition. I further explore the relationship between product quality choices and market competition
in Chapter 3.
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Conversely, the change in payoffs from operating in markets with more “B” or “C” firms
is negative for firms with “A” quality. This suggests that rather than having an advantage
over those firms due to their increased quality, firms with “A” quality in these markets
instead may suffer if overall demand is lower in that market as a result of it having more
low quality firms.
The presence of alternate quality characteristics have differential effects on payoffs for
a particular hygiene quality type. On the one hand, the tradeoff may be related to infor-
mation, where in the pre-grade law world, consumers may have used information from the
Zagat characteristics as a proxy for hygiene quality type, the benefit of which is reduced or
vanishes once the grade law introduces information on hygiene quality to consumers. On
the other hand, there may be a relationship between the underlying characteristics that is
related to either costs or demand, for example that consumers are willing to tradeoff lower
hygiene quality for better food quality.
I find that having higher Zagat Food ratings is associated with negative payoffs in the
pre-grade law period for all firm types, implying that the costs of providing better food
quality outweigh the revenues gained from doing so. However, the relationship between
Zagat Food rating and hygiene quality in the pre-grade law period is less negative for firms
with “A” quality, suggesting that these firms have a cost complementarity in producing
good tasting food with high hygiene quality. Conversely, in the post-grade law period, firms
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with higher Zagat Food ratings have positive payoffs regardless of quality types, and the
change in payoffs as a result of the grade law is positive for all firms. This is possibly
because, if the grade law increases demand for restaurants in general, consumers also begin
to value Food quality more, regardless of hygiene quality type. Therefore, it seems that the
grade law enhances the value of Food quality. However, the change in payoffs between the
pre-grade law and post-grade law period is lower for “A” firms than for “B” and “C” firms,
suggesting that consumers view food quality as a substitute for hygiene quality.
Conversely, while payoffs from higher Zagat Service ratings are positive regardless of
quality in the pre-grade law period, they are negative regardless of quality type in the post-
grade law period, though the effects are mostly not statistically significant. Furthermore,
the change in these payoffs from the pre-grade law period to the post-grade law period
is also negative regardless of quality type. It may be that the increase in information on
hygiene quality lowers the benefit from having better restaurant service, while the costs of
service quality remain, leading to negative payoffs in the post-grade law period. However,
the change in payoffs to having higher Zagat service ratings are lower for “B” firms than
for “A” firms, and are lower for “C” firms than for “B” firms, suggesting that the Zagat
Service quality is a complement to hygiene quality, as payoffs to having better Service rat-
ings decrease as hygiene quality decreases.
Finally, having a Celebrity Chef in the pre-grade law period actually leads to negative
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payoffs, implying that firms on average are not benefiting from this quality characteristic
conditional on their other (observable) quality characteristics relative to the presumably
higher costs of hiring or operating with a celebrity chef result in negative payoffs. In the
post-grade law period, I find that there are still negative payoffs to having a Celebrity Chef,
but that the change in these payoffs is positive for all firms, and is highest for “A” firms.
The value of having a Celebrity Chef may be improved as a result of the grade law in part
because of the increase in market size discussed above, and also because it is a complement
to hygiene quality.
From Table 1.2 I find that Food and Service quality increased for all firms on average, but
increased the most for “A” quality firms. The question is whether this increase was due to
selection (in that the firms with “A” quality are high food quality firms that did not have
“A” quality in the pre-grade law period) or due to effort (in that firms with “A” quality in
both periods work harder to provide good food quality in the post-grade law period). I check
which effect dominates by separately regressing Food and Service quality on a grade law
dummy interacted with different quality types, and controlling for restaurant fixed effects.
I find that Food, Decor and Service ratings increased for all firms after the grade law, and
there is no significant difference in the increase for firms with “B” or “C” quality compared
to those with “A” quality. This suggests that the results from the dynamic model are not
driven by selection, but rather by lower quality firms improving their Food quality as an
alternative to their low hygiene scores.
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1.6.2 Simulated evolution of product quality in the market under
different information environments
Using the equilibrium parameters θ∗, I solve for the equilibrium choice probabilities, P ∗,
separately for the pre-grade law and post-grade law periods. The optimal policies asso-
ciated with θ∗ are the choice probabilities P ∗ which solve the fixed point problem P ∗ =
Ψ(a|x; θ∗, P ∗). The equilibrium choice probabilities are solved for using the method of it-
eration in the equilibrium mapping.56
Given the equilibrium choice probabilities, I simulate the evolution of firm hygiene quality
separately under the pre-grade and post-grade periods. Figure 1.3 presents the results of
the model fit simulations for the in-sample period.57 These model fits were computed by
simulating the model forward one year, for each year in the sample, and then computing
the average percentage of firms of each type in the market.58 I find that the model predicts
the average percentage of firms of each quality type very well in both periods.
Table 1.15 shows that the model predicts that the introduction of the grade law increases
the percentage of “A” firms by 33 percentage points, and decreases the percentage of “B”
56To solve for these choice probabilities, I start with the reduced-form probabilities, P˜ , estimated from the
multinomial logit models for incumbents and entrants. I then solve for the equilibrium by iterating until
||P k+1 − P k|| < 0.015, where P k+1 = Ψ(a|x; θ∗, P k).
57The difference between the distribution in the data in this figure and that presented in Figure 1.1 is that
this graph only compares data for those markets for which model predictions could be made.
58This is a common method of computing model fit in the literature; see Hollenbeck (2015), Lin (2015) and
Beauchamp (2015) among others.
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and “C” firms by 16 and 17 percentage points. These predictions are nearly identical to those
from the data, further validating the strength of the specified dynamic model at explaining
firm behavior. Note that the lack of full convergence to “A” quality, which mirrors what
is in the data, reflects the possible influence of entry, operating and adjustment costs. As
discussed, I find evidence for the existence of these costs in both the pre-grade law and
post-grade law periods in the estimates of the dynamic model. I explore the sensitivity of
the model predictions to these costs in the counterfactuals below.
1.7 Counterfactual Experiments
Given reasonable estimates of the model parameters, I estimate counterfactuals to explore
how costs constrain quality improvement, and whether changing these costs can improve
the evolution of quality across markets. The dynamic estimates show that the grade law
increases payoffs for “A” quality firms, presumably due to demand response by consumers,
which can drive firms to invest in “A” quality. However, I also find evidence of entry, adjust-
ment and operating costs (negative payoffs) in both periods that are not entirely eliminated
by the post-grade law increase in demand. Therefore, despite the increase in payoffs due to
demand response, these costs may be large enough to prevent full convergence to “A” qual-
ity across markets. Firms, if they are sufficiently differentiated and have alternative quality
characteristics valued by consumers, may find it optimal to avoid these costs of investing
in hygiene quality.59 Therefore, the incentives provided by mandatory disclosure may not
59Spence (1975) discusses how firms with market power are likely to provide quality that is biased away
from the social optimum. His analysis suggests that regulatory constraints may be effective in promoting
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lead as many firms as possible to pay the costs required to operate with a high level of
hygiene quality in the market.60 Could targeting these costs directly, in lieu of mandatory
disclosure, lead to as good or better of an outcome?
I use counterfactuals to compare the gains from mandatory disclosure to the gains from
possible alternative policies that instead target costs. Mandatory disclosure policies implic-
itly tax “B” or “C” quality firms and subsidize “A” quality firms, in that the introduction
of the grade law led to a negative change in payoffs from operating with low quality and a
positive change in payoffs to operating with high quality, which I interpret as being driven
by demand response. However, mandatory disclosure may not lead to the maximal share
of “A” quality firms across markets, because of the presence of the aforementioned costs of
improving and maintaining high quality. My counterfactuals contrast the effectiveness of
demand-side policies such as mandatory disclosure with alternative policies that act purely
on the supply-side, through a variety of taxes and subsidies on firm costs. Recall that I
interpret the pre-grade law operating and adjustment payoff parameters as containing both
revenue and costs components, but the differences between the parameters across quality
types as being due to cost differentials. My counterfactual experiments assume that the
revenues are fixed (since in the pre-grade law period, there is no sorting across firms on
hygiene quality) and that these policies therefore directly increase or decrease the cost com-
quality provision.
60Note that market conditions also may matter for convergence to high quality; for example, there are
differences in payoffs for for different quality firms that operate in markets with more potential meals
sold. However, I fix market conditions at their initial levels for the analysis, and only focus on the
parameters affecting operating and adjustment payoffs.
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ponents in a linear manner.61 Kalouptsidi et al. (2015) show that the CCPs resulting from
counterfactuals using lump-sum transfers in the form of taxes or subsidies are identified.
Since my counterfactuals are all linear transformations of payoff parameters in the form
of taxes and subsidies, the predictions are identified without any extra assumptions being
needed.
The effect of these policies will depend on heterogeneity in the payoffs of producing qual-
ity for different firms in different markets. For example, subsidizing operating or entry costs
to “A” quality may lead to higher initial entry of “A” quality firms but subsequently higher
levels of competition and less investment in quality by new entrants or even lower qual-
ity incumbents (especially if there are adjustment costs). Conversely, penalizing non-“A”
quality can ease competition in certain markets where firms may already be on the edge
of low quality (for example, if in equilibrium quality types concentrate in a market) and
so quality may fall as firms see less incentive to invest to earn profits. However, this can
induce higher quality firms to enter, depending on the demand for quality in those mar-
kets. Similarly, if higher costs of switching from non-“A” to “A” quality are preventing the
convergence towards uniformly higher quality types in the market, then it is possible that
a more optimal equilibrium from the perspective of the policymaker could be achieved via
61All counterfactuals are estimated off the pre-grade law period data. I also experimented with estimating
similar counterfactual experiments off of the post-grade law data, which measure the incremental effect of
policies targeting costs once the mandatory disclosure policy was already in place. I find that generally
targeting costs in the post-grade law period also can increase the proportion of firms choosing “A”
quality. However, since my focus is to evaluate whether mandatory disclosure is more successful than an
alternative policy that targets costs, I do not present results for the post-grade law counterfactuals.
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subsidizing these adjustment costs. However, the cost-effectiveness of this policy will depend
on the degree to which low quality firms find it beneficial to switch quality types in the first
place, particularly if low quality entry mostly occurs in markets with more low quality firms.
In the first set of counterfactual experiments, I abstract from whether the outcome would
be “optimal” from the policymaker’s perspective, and instead show how permuting different
cost parameters can affect the evolution of product quality in the market. In the second
set of experiments, I derive an optimal tax policy that maximizes the average proportion
of “A” quality firms across markets over time, conditional on the optimal tax policy being
budget-neutral, in the sense that it would result in zero or positive net revenues for the
government. I permute the operating and adjustment costs for firms in such a way as to
solve the objective function.62
For the counterfactuals, I forward simulate the model 11 periods into the future, starting
from the baseline market configuration in 2007, the first year in the data for the pre-grade
law period.63 The expected choices of firms for all market/years are then averaged over
Ns = 100 simulations. I use policy function iteration to solve for the fixed point equilib-
rium associated with the counterfactual parameters, θCF , which are perturbations of the
62Specifically, the policy experiment permutes operating costs of high (“A”) and low (non-“A”) quality and
adjustment costs from low to high quality. In each experiment, all other costs are held constant.
63Each counterfactual experiment is conducted independently of the other, and so separate expected market
evolutions are estimated. To simplify computation, I hold the exogenous market conditions fixed at their
initial period levels. Exogenous firm characteristics (Zagat ratings) are held fixed for incumbents in 2007,
and for entrants are drawn from the incumbent distribution each period.
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equilibrium parameters, depending on the experiment being conducted. I use the equilib-
rium model parameters to compute a baseline to which the results from the counterfactuals
can be compared.
It is important to note that, for all of the counterfactuals, the estimated equilibrium may
not be unique, and there is the possibility of multiple equilibria, some of which could be
different from the equilibrium results that I present. This is particularly true when deriving
the optimal tax policy, as there are many possible tax policies that could perform as well if
not better than the one selected; in other words, I estimate a local, but not necessarily global,
maximum. I do not attempt to identify the other equilibria in this study, nor to comment
on which equilibrium is likely to arise. I did experiment with many different starting
parameters when estimating the counterfactuals in order to present what I believe to be the
“best” equilibrium results; however, the counterfactual exercises should be interpreted only
as an attempt to construct one (out of many possible versions of) counterfactual equilibria
that could arise from permuting the parameters of the dynamic model.64
1.7.1 How Do Costs Affect the Evolution of Market Quality Types?
The first set of counterfactual results in Table 1.16 show that within 3 years, policies subsi-
dizing operating costs of high quality firms or increasing operating costs of low quality firms
64No empirical study, to my knowledge, has shown a way of identifying the “best” equilibrium among a
set of multiple equilibria. Therefore, it is common in the dynamic games literature to present a set of
counterfactual results with such caveats. See Beauchamp (2015), Lin (2015), Hollenbeck (2015), Suzuki
(2013), among others.
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would lead to approximately 3 percentage point more “A” firms. However, the effect of the
policy declines overtime, and by 2017, the difference in the average proportion of “A” firms
across markets relative to the baseline would only be approximately 1 percentage points.
Low quality (“B” and “C” firm) proportions decline over time (relative to the baseline),
but only by 1 to 2 percentage points. Therefore, despite these policies being implemented
in every period, there is only a small change from the baseline by 2017. One reason for this
fading out is that over time, as the policy provides an incentive to have “A” quality, or a
disincentive to have “B” or “C” quality, these incentives can lead to more firms choosing
higher quality in the market. However, as this competition intensifies, firm payoffs decline,
which can lead to firms choosing to downgrade their quality. For example, from Table 1.14,
the pre-grade law payoffs from operating in markets with an additional “A” firms is about
-$10,000, around 11% of the policy subsidy. The result is that over time, the net effect of
the policy relative to the baseline is close to zero.
Policies that subsidize adjustment costs from low to high quality are more successful: even
after 10 years, relative to the predicted baseline, a policy that lowers adjustment costs by
$50,000 to $55,000 would lead to 5 percentage points more “A” firms. A policy to eliminate
entry costs for “A” firms would lead to a large increase in the percentage of “A” firms. By
2010, 4 out of every 5 firms on average would have an “A” grade, which is nearly 43 per-
centage points higher than the baseline prediction, and is higher than the model predicted
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result for the effect of mandatory disclosure.65 However, by 2017, the results predict a steep
drop-off in “A” level firms, to the point where it is nearly the same as the baseline. This
suggests that, while entry costs are eliminated for high quality firms, leading to increased
entry with high quality, this could also increase competition (as there are more firms in
the market). Given that, in the pre-grade period, more competition with firms of the same
type leads to negative payoffs, and also, given the large fixed costs of operating with “A”
quality, this leads to switching over time to lower quality types, after initially gaming the
subsidy from entering with “A” quality. The result suggests that, while generous subsidies
can initially lead to large improvements in market quality types, over time, a combination
of subsidies to operating costs of “A” quality may be needed in order to prevent quality
from declining.
Table 1.16 also shows how the total number of firms changes from the baseline. The
policy eliminating entry costs of “A” quality firms increases the total firms by far more
than targeting the operating or adjustment costs of existing firms, since it incentivizes
potential entrants to enter earlier than they may have otherwise entered. In general, the
policies that decrease operating costs for “A” quality firms and decrease adjustment costs to
“A” quality lead to more, not fewer, firms operating in the market relative to the baseline,
meaning that the increase in the proportion of “A” firms under these experiments is likely
driven by more entry/less exit. However, increasing operating costs for “B” and “C” quality
65From Figure 1.3, the model prediction for 2010 is that less than 60% of firms have an “A”.
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firms leads to fewer firms, meaning that the proportion of “A” firms under this experiment
may be increasing not because more firms are choosing “A” relative to the baseline, but
because those firms that were choosing “B” and “C” before are now exiting.
1.7.2 Can an Optimal Tax Policy Outperform Mandatory Disclosure?
The second set of counterfactuals finds a menu of taxes and subsidies that maximizes the
average percentage high quality firms across markets, subject to a budget neutrality con-
straint.66 This optimal tax policy is simulated from the pre-grade law period data, where
there is no mandatory disclosure. Therefore, comparing the outcomes from the optimal tax
policy and those from mandatory disclosure allow us to see whether a supply-side policy
that targets firms’ costs of providing quality can perform more effectively than a demand-
side policy like the grade law. Specifically, I compare the menu of taxes and subsidies from
the optimal tax policy to the implicit taxes and subsidies from mandatory disclosure on
operating and adjustment costs for firms of different quality types, which can be seen from
the changes in payoffs after the introduction of the grade law.67
The results in Table 1.17 show that a budget-neutral tax policy could yield, on average,
66Without a budget-neutral constraint, there is theoretically a large set of possible policies that could lead
to 100% “A” firms; for example, I found policies that, through large subsidies to operating with “A”
level quality, could yield nearly 100% “A” firms on average across all markets by 2017. However, the goal
is to compare the outcome from alternative policies that might be actually feasible to implement. Recall
that the mandatory disclosure policy, since it works on the demand side, is “costless” from a budgetary
perspective.
67For consistency when comparing the results of the counterfactual policy and the predicted effects of
mandatory disclosure, I calculate the taxes and subsidies in terms of pre-grade law dollars, using the
pre-grade law estimate of σ from Table 1.14.
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nearly 80% “A” firms between 2007 and 2013, compared to the predicted mandatory dis-
closure outcome of 69% “A” firms (between 2010 and 2013, the period for which post-grade
law data are available). From Figure 1.4, we see that in fact, by 2013, the counterfactual
policy would yield approximately 85% “A” firms, compared to 73% under mandatory dis-
closure, demonstrating that this taxation policy provides a better incentive to improving
quality than does mandatory disclosure.68 The implicit cost of replicating the payoff-effects
of mandatory disclosure through a taxation policy is large, whereas the optimal tax policy
in this case is budget-neutral, with an average tax revenue of about $950.69 Conversely,
were the mandatory disclosure policy to be implemented as a supply side policy instead of
a demand side policy, it would cost the government nearly $92 million.
The difference between the implied taxation policy under mandatory disclosure and the
counterfactual tax policy is driven more by the large taxes on low quality firms than subsi-
dies to high quality firms. The subsidies to operating with “A” quality under the optimal
tax policy are nearly $236,000 more than the implicit subsidy under the grade law. These
benefits are approximately 60% of the magnitude of the fixed operating payoffs for firms
with “A” quality, implying that they cover a good deal of the fixed costs associated with
68Table 1.16 above showed that, for most counterfactual policies, the effects begin to fade over time. That
is not the case with the optimal tax policy. In fact (not shown), I find that the percentage of “A” firms
remains relatively steady at between 85% and 90%, even after 10 periods. This suggests that the policy
is effective in inducing convergence to persistently higher quality levels than what is predicted under
mandatory disclosure. However, because the goal is to compare counterfactual results to mandatory
disclosure through the end of the sample period (2013), I focus on those comparisons in the discussion.
69The slightly positive tax revenue amount is a consequence of the model being optimized in terms of the
logit parameters, not dollars. In terms of the logit parameters, the optimal menu of taxes and subsidies
satisfies the constraint of zero tax revenue.
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providing “A” quality even without mandatory disclosure. However, the taxes on operating
with “B” quality are over $1,000,000 higher under the optimal tax policy, while they are
over $1,800,000 higher for operating with “C” quality. The results thus show that penaliz-
ing “B” and “C” quality, and subsidizing “A” quality can be an important driver of firm
adjustment to “A” quality types, especially coupled with adjustment cost subsidies that
are around $73,000 to $81,500 higher under the optimal tax policy relative to those implied
by the grade law. The policy satisfies the budget neutrality constraint because the taxes
imposed on firms that choose to have “B” and “C” quality are balanced by the subsidies to
those firms that choose to improve to or maintain “A” quality.
The magnitudes of these penalties to “B” and “C” quality firms are around 2 to 4 times
entry costs in the pre-grade law period from Table 1.14. To contextualize the magnitudes
of these estimates, note that the average pre-grade law market sales and revenues for all
restaurants in NYC (including non-Zagat firms) is $276,000,000. If we assume 100 firms
per market, this implies average sales of approximately $2.75 million per firm. If a “B” firm
had this level of annual volume, the taxation policy would represent nearly half of their
annual sales, which would severely diminish their profitably of operating with that grade.
Similarly, using the pre-grade law parameters, I calculate the average payoffs from “B” and
“C” quality at around $150,000 to $200,000 per year, meaning that these penalties are quite
large relative to baseline payoffs.
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Based on the differences in the implicit taxes and subsidies under the two policies, we
can infer that high quality (“A”) firms would actually prefer the optimal tax policy to
mandatory disclosure, while low quality (“B”, “C”) firms would prefer mandatory disclo-
sure.70 Mandatory disclosure imposes lower taxes on firms operating with lower quality
than the optimal tax policy. While both policies yield relatively similar subsidies to high
quality firms, low quality firms are under-penalized by mandatory disclosure, which fur-
ther increases the proportion of low quality firms across markets. One reason these firms
may be under-penalized is because they are differentiated-products firms. It is possible
that, for many consumers at these firms, there are alternative characteristics that the con-
sumer values equally if not more to the hygiene quality characteristic. All things equal,
a consumer is likely to choose a firm with higher hygiene quality, but when products are
differentiated, the consumer may be willing to accept an alternative characteristic as a sub-
stitute for lower hygiene quality, which as in Spence (1975) can lead to firms with market
power under-providing hygiene quality, especially when improving quality and operating
with higher quality types involves significant sunk costs. In contrast, the counterfactual
policy enables the policymaker to work directly on the supply side to target lower quality
firms and incentivize them to improve quality.
70Note that, by 2013, I predict slightly more “C” firms on average (10%) under the counterfactual than
under mandatory disclosure (7%). Therefore, despite receiving higher taxes for operating, and higher
subsidies encouraging them to switch to “A”, slightly more firms are likely to find “C” optimal compared
to under mandatory disclosure. This may be because in estimating the counterfactuals, I fix other
payoff parameters at their pre-grade law equilibrium levels, but the change in information as a result
of mandatory disclosure may in reality affect the other payoff parameters for “C” firms. In any case,
policies presented here are only meant to propose an alternative policy targeting operating and switching
costs, and I view the positive trend towards more “A” firms under the counterfactual as strong support
for using supply-side policies in lieu of (or at least in combination with) demand-side policies such as
mandatory disclosure.
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Recall that in the model, firms choose quality so as to maximize their value of continuing
into the next period with that chosen quality type. In the estimated counterfactual equilib-
rium, firms choosing non-“A” quality are behaving optimally, even subject to the taxation
policy. Therefore, there must be other factors affecting their payoffs (for example, cost com-
plementarities) such that the value from exiting is lower than continuing with low quality or
switching to higher quality. These factors, based on the results in Table 1.14, could include
operating in markets with more lower quality firms, or having high levels of characteristics
such as Food quality. Despite the large penalties to choosing non-“A” quality, 15% of firms
in 2013 would still find it optimal to supply non-“A” quality, which further shows that
incentivizing hygiene quality improvement is a complicated process which depends heavily
on consumer demand for hygiene quality as well as for other product quality characteristics,
not to mention costs and market conditions. Nevertheless, the presence of these low quality
firms creates the tax revenue that enables the subsidies to firms that want to invest in or
maintain “A” quality.71 The counterfactual experiment shows that by leveraging a com-
bination of taxes and subsidies, the government can outperform the mandatory disclosure
law in terms of increasing the average proportion of “A” quality firms across markets.
71In that sense, the proposed counterfactual taxation policy is similar to policies in the energy industry,
where firms with the greatest willingness-to-pay to pollute are taxed, which generates the tax revenue
needed to enable firms to innovate and lower emissions to avoid these taxes.
71
Chapter 1 Mandatory Disclosure and the Quality Choices of Differentiated Firms
1.7.3 Welfare Implications
To the extent that the grade law improved hygiene quality among firms, it potentially in-
creased social welfare, as consumers benefit from the improved food safety practice and
sanitary conditions in restaurants. A 2013 USDA ERS study found that the most common
bacteria which cause food poisoning can cost consumers nationwide upwards of $7 billion
annually in medical expenses, loss productivity, and death.72 Jin and Leslie (2003) showed
that improvements in hygiene inspection scores can lead to a reduction in incidents of food
poisoning, placing downward pressure on these social costs and improving social welfare.
My results show that generally, the introduction of the grade law increased the value of en-
tering with, adjusting to, and operating with the highest level of quality, which resulted in
an increase in the proportion of firms choosing high quality (see Table 1.15). The question
is whether these increases improved overall social welfare.
There is some theoretical literature that discusses whether welfare would be expected
to improve after mandatory disclosure. Levin et al. (2009) and Board (2009) show that
consumer surplus is higher under more disclosure, giving support to the need for mandatory
disclosure laws. However, Polinsky and Shavell (2010) show that while mandatory disclosure
is beneficial to consumers in that it provides them with more information and can increase
their overall surplus, it may lower the incentive for producers to reveal their private infor-
mation about product risks, which could mean that voluntary disclosure would give higher
72See Hoffmann and Anekwe (2013).
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welfare than mandatory disclosure. Janssen and Roy (2013) show that when firms do not
voluntarily disclose quality, mandatory disclosure may increase or decrease total surplus,
depending on consumer willingness to pay for quality. They show that in a world where
low quality generates a higher social surplus than high quality (because of low willingness
to pay for quality), mandatory disclosure actually reduces total surplus relative to a world
where no firm discloses their quality. Conversely, they show that mandatory disclosure is
likely to improve welfare relative to the outcome where no firm voluntarily discloses, so long
as the disclosure cost is small, if consumers have “considerable” uncertainty about product
quality, and if consumers have a high willingness to pay for quality. Generally, these studies
agree that in most cases, mandatory disclosure should improve consumer surplus. How-
ever, I do not know of any theoretical result that shows that welfare would be maximized
under mandatory disclosure, and the mixed results in some cases suggest that it need not be.
Empirical studies such as Mathios (2000) and Jin and Leslie (2003) show that, even when
there is some voluntary disclosure of product quality, mandatory disclosure regulations still
had an impact on consumer choices and, in the case of Jin and Leslie (2003), firm quality
improvements. Mathios (2000) relates this to only partial unraveling of information, and
notes that mandatory disclosure provided clearer information to customers on all features
of the product, including those for which producers may not have revealed information (for
example, producers may have revealed information on only the positive attributes of their
products prior to mandatory disclosure). In this sense, mandatory disclosure improved con-
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sumer choice and theoretically consumer surplus. Since in my setting, there is no voluntary
disclosure of information, it is possible that as in Mathios (2000), mandatory disclosure
improved consumer choice and also consumer surplus.
The social welfare calculation involves both consumer and producer surplus. While con-
sumer surplus is commonly studied in the theoretical and empirical literature, to my knowl-
edge no study has explicitly estimated the effect of mandatory disclosure on producer sur-
plus. One benefit of having a structural dynamic model is that I am able to simulate firm
payoffs with and without the grade law. This allows me to quantify the change in producer
surplus as a result of mandatory disclosure. In Figure 1.5, I show the distribution of the
difference in total discounted payoffs for firms operating with the grade law without, which
serves as an estimate of the change in producer surplus as a result of the mandatory dis-
closure policy.73 I find that payoffs generally did not change or increased for 64% of firms
and strictly increased for 61% of firms under the grade law, compared to a counterfactual
world where the grade law was never implemented.
In Figure 1.6 I show a similar set of charts, broken out by the value of having each quality
type in the two different worlds. Figure 1.6 shows that the gains as a result of the grade
law largely accrued to firms that chose “A” quality, meaning that the grade law did not
73This difference is calculated by simulating the firms payoffs for each period starting from July 2010, when
the grade law was introduced, but in one case using the post-grade law estimated parameters and CCPs,
and in another case using the pre-grade law estimated parameters and CCPs. This allows me to compare
the net present value of payoffs from 2010 to 2013 under two scenarios, one in which the world continued
as it had without the grade law, and the other in which the grade law was introduced in 2010.
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change or increased surplus for nearly 86% of firms that chose an “A” and strictly increased
surplus for 72% of these firms, but did not change or decreased surplus from choosing “B”
or “C” quality (for approximately 78% to 86% of firms) and strictly decreased surplus for
25% to 50% of these firms. For the minority of firms that actually benefit from having “B”
or “C” quality relative to the post-grade law period, this may be due to other factors. It is
possible that the market size expanded in the post-grade law period as consumers feel more
comfortable going out to eat. Though most of the firms with low quality would “lose” as a
result of the grade law, a minority of them would potentially gain if they have alternative
quality characteristics that can sufficiently attract consumers, or if they operate under mar-
ket conditions that are more favorable to them as lower quality firms.74 The fact that some
“B” or “C” firms actually benefit from the grade law points to the possible insufficiency of
mandatory disclosure at fully incentivizing firms to make quality improvements, even aside
from addressing the costs of improving quality.
Note that the prediction that more firms choose “A” quality in the post-grade law pe-
riod, combined with the fact that having an “A” is more valuable in the post-grade law
period for the majority of firms, suggests that producer surplus increased for the majority
of firms, though it decreased for the minority of firms that choose non-“A” quality. Given
this finding, along with studies such as Levin et al. (2009) and Board (2009) which show
that consumer surplus improves with more disclosure, and the correlation between improved
74For example, Table 1.14 shows that operating in markets with more demand or higher property values
after the grade law benefits non-“A” quality firms.
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hygiene quality and lower food poisoning incidents estimated by Jin and Leslie (2003), it
is likely that the mandatory disclosure policy improved total welfare. However, it is not
clear whether the grade law maximized total welfare. The costs of improving quality, even
relative to the higher demand from doing so, may be prohibitive for firms in certain markets,
and so the grade law may lead low quality firms to exit rather than improve quality. The
counterfactuals presented above show that changing these costs can have substantial effects
on quality improvements across markets. In particular, the optimal tax policy proposed
could in theory lead to a higher level of social welfare than what is achieved with manda-
tory disclosure, depending on how important the proportion of “A” quality firms across
markets is to the overall welfare calculation.
Taxation policies can theoretically lead to deadweight loss and lower consumer welfare, as
they may lead to exit and hence fewer firms supplying products in the market. This would
be the case, for example, if the policy caused a substantial amount of “B” or “C” quality
firms exit rather than switching to higher quality. Such exit could also lead to remain-
ing firms having more ability to exercise market power and charge higher prices, harming
consumers. As the policy I consider is a supply side policy, one cannot assume minimal
deadweight loss due to higher elasticity of demand for low quality firms, as is the case once
the grade law is introduced. However, the results show that a minimal amount of firms exit
rather than choosing lower quality. In fact, I find that under the optimal tax policy, by 2013
there are actually 13% more firms in the market relative to the simulated baseline prediction
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with no mandatory disclosure. Therefore, the gains from the counterfactual policy appear
to come from entry with “A” quality and switching from “B” or “C” to “A” quality, rather
than an increase in the percentage of “A” firms because of “B” and “C” firms exiting, and
so on net the taxation policy likely increases welfare.
I find that markets that tend to be relatively worse off under the policy are those that have
lower average property values, as in the pre-grade law period these are neighborhoods where
lower quality (“B” and “C” firms) may find it more profitable to operate. Therefore, the
taxation policy may disproportionately affect individuals in lower income neighborhoods.
However, as mentioned I do find evidence that firms are more likely to switch to higher
quality than to exit, meaning that the net effect of the taxation policy on consumer surplus
is likely positive. To calculate the producer surplus from the taxation policy, I conduct an
exercise similar to that shown in Figures 1.5 and 1.6 above. I find that total discounted
payoffs either did not change or increased for nearly 73% of the firms under the taxation
policy relative to the pre-grade law period, which is higher than the amount in Figure
1.5. Payoffs did not change or strictly increased for 100% of firms choosing “A” quality,
meaning that no firms that would have chosen “A” quality lose under the taxation policy
(compared to the approximately 14% with negative payoffs under the grade law from Figure
1.6). Additionally, I find that no “B” or “C” quality firms gain under the taxation policy,
compared to the approximately 15% to 20% of firms that gain under mandatory disclosure.
The results suggest that firms that would have chosen “A” quality, as well as firms that
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would like to upgrade from “B” or “C” to “A” quality would prefer the taxation policy
(because of larger subsidies), while firms that would have chosen “B” or “C” quality would
prefer mandatory disclosure (because their implicit tax burden is lower under mandatory
disclosure).
The proposed counterfactual taxation policy is not a perfect solution. My findings can
only point to the welfare implications of a tax policy in terms of improving hygiene quality
in the market. As mentioned, I do conclude that the mandatory disclosure policy likely
improved total welfare. However, the findings from my analysis still show that mandatory
disclosure, when applied to differentiated product firms, may under-incentivize firms to
improve quality, relative to a policy that provides taxes or subsidies depending on quality
decisions. I cannot explicitly show that mandatory disclosure does or does not lead to
maximal social welfare. However, given that I find an optimal tax policy that increases
the proportion of firms choosing “A” quality across markets, while also increasing the
percentage of firms operating in the market (rather than leading to more exit) and increasing
overall surplus by more than mandatory disclosure, my results suggest that the welfare
maximizing solution could be some combination of mandatory disclosure policies, which
address consumer demand, and taxation policies, which address the costs of providing better
product quality. In future research, I intend to solve for a similar optimal tax policy in the
post-grade law period, in order to measure the incremental effect of adding a supply-side
policy when a pre-existing demand-side policy is in place. Comparing the effects of having
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both policies in place to the predicted case of mandatory disclosure with no tax policy, or
the counterfactual tax policy with no mandatory disclosure, would shed further light on the
effectiveness of these policies when implemented separately versus jointly.
1.8 Conclusion
Mandatory disclosure laws require that firms publicly reveal information about their prod-
uct quality. These laws may lead consumers to sort over firms based on their product
quality (demand response). However, the presence of fixed or sunk costs to operating with
or adjusting quality type can prevent monotonic increases in quality, both before and after
mandatory disclosure. The introduction of a mandatory disclosure law may change firms’
optimal behavior when it comes to quality choices, as well as choices over entry and exit, due
to the change in the information environment. Firms’ optimal behavior will depend on the
state of the world in which the firm is operating or is a potential entrant, including market
demand and the firms’ own characteristics, as well as the cost structure in the industry.
In this chapter, I estimate a dynamic structural model of firm entry, exit and quality
investment decisions under two information environments, before and after the introduc-
tion of a mandatory disclosure law in New York City, restaurant grading. I find that the
introduction of the grade law increases the payoffs from entering and operating with high
quality, and decreases the payoffs to entering and operating with low quality. Adjusting
from low to high quality gives higher net payoffs after the grade law. After the grade law,
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“A” quality firms earn higher payoffs when operating in markets with other “A” quality
firms, and lower payoffs when operating in markets with more “B” or “C” quality firms.
Finally, firm and market conditions matter for the payoffs to different quality choices. Op-
erating in larger markets is more beneficial to “A” quality firms after the grade law, while
alternative firm qualities, such as Zagat characteristics, can be substitutes or complements
to demand for firm hygiene quality in the post-grade law period.
The results suggest that the introduction of the grade law benefited firms choosing high
quality, and penalized those choosing lower quality. However, I also find evidence of costs in
both periods that are not completely outweighed by the post-grade law changes in demand,
which may constrain firms from uniformly choosing high quality. Using the estimated pa-
rameters, I simulate counterfactuals in order to determine whether the market distribution
of quality types can be altered by changing costs to operating with or investing in different
hygiene qualities. I find that changing these costs can be an effective means of increasing the
percentage of high quality firms in the market, even without implementing the mandatory
disclosure policy. Furthermore, I solve for an budget-neutral tax policy that could lead to
a higher percentage of higher quality firms in the market than mandatory disclosure.
This chapter shows that introducing a mandatory disclosure policy affects payoffs to
different firm quality choices which can induce firms to provide better quality products.
Mandatory disclosure laws are highly important for providing information to consumers,
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who then can use this information in making consumption decisions. I show that the intro-
duction of the law likely increased consumer surplus, as well as increased producer surplus
for the majority of firms, which matches theoretical predictions that mandatory disclosure
can be welfare improving. However, when firms are supplying differentiated products, such
as Zagat rated restaurants, the shift in demand from improving this additional character-
istic (hygiene quality) may not outweigh the costs of improvement, and so some firms will
not improve their quality even under mandatory disclosure. In that case policymakers can
potentially use supply-side policies such as those proposed in the counterfactuals, either
in lieu of or in combination with demand-side policies, to increase overall hygiene quality
across markets.
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Figure 1.5: Difference in Simulated Payoffs: With Grade Law vs. Without Grade Law
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Table 1.1: Difference of Means: Pre-Grade Law vs. Post-Grade Law
Variable Pre Post Diff. p-value
Avg. Inspection Score 20.77 13.73 -7.04 0
Percentage of “A” firms in market 0.33 0.67 0.34 0
Percentage of “B” firms in market 0.41 0.26 -0.15 0
Percentage of “C” firms in market 0.26 0.07 -0.19 0
Total “A” firms in market 17.05 49.82 32.77 0
Total “B” firms in market 21.24 19.06 -2.18 0
Total “C” firms in market 13.36 4.89 -8.46 0
Total Inspections 51.66 73.78 22.12 0
Total Non-Zagat Restaurants Inspected 176.73 274.96 98.22 0
Log Potential Meals 15.42 15.54 0.12 0
Log Avg. Property Sales Price 14.35 14.48 0.13 0
Food Rating 20.92 22.04 1.12 0
Decor Rating 15.95 17.15 1.20 0
Service Rating 18.22 19.45 1.23 0
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Table 1.2: Means by Incumbent Grade Choice: Pre-Grade Law vs. Post-Grade Law
Pre-Grade Law Choice Exit A B C
Percentage of “A” firms in market 0.31 0.38 0.32 0.32
Percentage of “B” firms in market 0.41 0.39 0.45 0.39
Percentage of “C” firms in market 0.27 0.24 0.23 0.30
Log Potential Meals 15.41 15.40 15.41 15.42
Log Avg. Property Sales Price 14.52 14.39 14.37 14.41
Total Non-Zagat Restaurants Inspected 126.77 160.55 163.07 155.23
Food Rating 20.02 20.92 20.80 20.65
Decor Rating 15.50 15.70 15.89 15.80
Service Rating 17.46 17.95 18.10 17.89
Post-Grade Law Choice Exit A B C
Percentage of “A” firms in market 0.57 0.69 0.61 0.59
Percentage of “B” firms in market 0.32 0.25 0.32 0.27
Percentage of “C” firms in market 0.11 0.06 0.07 0.14
Log Potential Meals 15.50 15.49 15.45 15.41
Log Avg. Property Sales Price 14.49 14.42 14.40 14.30
Total Non-Zagat Restaurants Inspected 256.83 261.11 254.35 256.10
Food Rating 21.50 21.90 21.69 21.39
Decor Rating 16.47 17.13 16.29 15.64
Service Rating 19.03 19.40 18.92 18.22
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Table 1.3: Means by Entrant Grade Choice: Pre-Grade Law vs. Post-Grade Law
Pre-Grade Law Entry Choice A B C
Percentage of “A” firms in market 0.32 0.33 0.34
Percentage of “B” firms in market 0.42 0.41 0.37
Percentage of “C” firms in market 0.26 0.26 0.29
Log Potential Meals 15.37 15.56 15.59
Log Avg. Property Sales Price 14.48 14.41 14.46
Total Non-Zagat Restaurants Inspected 151.61 170.55 183.54
Food Rating 21.52 20.91 21.18
Decor Rating 16.44 17.36 17.82
Service Rating 18.37 18.53 18.73
Post-Grade Law Entry Choice A B C
Percentage of “A” firms in market 0.55 0.51 0.58
Percentage of “B” firms in market 0.33 0.34 0.30
Percentage of “C” firms in market 0.12 0.14 0.12
Log Potential Meals 15.51 15.65 15.28
Log Avg. Property Sales Price 14.54 14.38 14.39
Total Non-Zagat Restaurants Inspected 254.55 267.17 232.46
Food Rating 22.11 22.24 22.22
Decor Rating 17.34 17.14 19.00
Service Rating 19.35 18.97 19.56
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Table 1.4: Transition probabilities of incumbent firms: Pre-Grade Law
Gradet+1
Gradet Exit A B C
A 8.33% 47.85% 29.39% 14.43%
B 11.37% 20.07% 53.33% 15.23%
C 14.36% 16.23% 26.54% 42.87%
Table 1.5: Transition probabilities of incumbent firms: Post-Grade Law
Gradet+1
Gradet Exit A B C
A 4.59% 76.29% 16.03% 3.10%
B 5.19% 46.17% 42.34% 6.29%
C 6.78% 44.92% 26.47% 21.83%
Table 1.6: Grade at Entry: Pre-Grade Law vs. Post-Grade Law
Grade Pre-Grade Law Post-Grade Law
A 51.31% 80.95%
B 35.86% 15.79%
C 12.83% 3.26%
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Table 1.7: Reduced-Form Estimates: Choice of remaining active
(1) (2)
Pre-Grade Law Post-Grade Law
Dependent variable: Choice at time t− 1 Active in t Active in t
Gradet−1 = A 0.437 0.849***
(0.290) (0.210)
Gradet−1 = B 0.300 0.313*
(0.281) (0.188)
Tot. “A” neighborst−1 0.0333 -0.00654
(0.0229) (0.00477)
Tot. “B” neighborst−1 -0.0181 0.00564
(0.0210) (0.0139)
Tot. “C” neighborst−1 -0.0232 0.0564***
(0.0323) (0.0205)
Log Potential Mealst−1 -0.254* -0.143
(0.141) (0.159)
Log Avg. Property Sales Pricet−1 -0.172 -0.0252
(0.148) (0.103)
Tot. Non-Zagat firmst−1 0.00676*** 0.000981
(0.00221) (0.00117)
Food Ratingt−1 0.0753* 0.0633*
(0.0453) (0.0370)
Decor Ratingt−1 -0.0221 0.0215
(0.0357) (0.0227)
Service Ratingt−1 0.0164 -0.0317
(0.0459) (0.0401)
Celebrity Chef -0.0378 0.187
(0.358) (0.381)
Constant 6.603*** 3.463
(2.402) (2.606)
Observations 2,083 4,878
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 1.8: Difference of Means by Unobserved States: Incumbents
Pre-Grade Law Post-Grade Law
Variable s=1 s=2 Diff. s=1 s=2 Diff.
Choose A 26.0% 30.0% 0.040 66.0% 64.0% -0.010
Choose B 45.0% 41.0% -0.040 23.0% 25.0% 0.020
Choose C 22.0% 23.0% 0.010 7.0% 6.0% -0.010
Total Nbr. As 19.6 16.7 -2.81*** 35.3 43.6 8.28***
Total Nbr. Bs 26.3 21.7 -4.6*** 19.2 24.1 4.91***
Total Nbr. Cs 17.2 14.4 -2.83*** 6.7 8.6 1.87***
Log Potential Meals 15.7 15.4 -0.32*** 15.2 15.6 0.34***
Log Avg. Sales Price 14.5 14.3 -0.11** 14.3 14.5 0.17***
Non-Zagat Inspected 205.3 175.2 -30.14*** 228.1 271.5 43.36***
Food Rating 20.8 20.8 -0.060 21.9 21.8 -0.070
Decor Rating 15.8 15.8 -0.060 17.3 16.6 -0.64***
Service Rating 17.9 18.0 0.030 19.5 19.1 -0.4***
N 283 1800 1134 3744
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 1.9: Difference of Means by Unobserved States: Entrants
Pre-Grade Law Post-Grade Law
Variable s=1 s=2 Diff. s=1 s=2 Diff.
Enter A 16.0% 16.0% 0.000 21.0% 20.0% -0.010
Enter B 18.0% 18.0% 0.000 5.0% 5.0% 0.000
Enter C 10.0% 12.0% 0.020 1.0% 1.0% 0.000
Total Nbr. As 13.1 11.4 -1.72*** 37.6 43.2 5.55***
Total Nbr. Bs 17.3 14.7 -2.55*** 20.7 24.2 3.45***
Total Nbr. Cs 11.6 10.0 -1.66*** 7.3 8.2 0.9**
Log Potential Meals 15.6 15.4 -0.17*** 15.3 15.6 0.21***
Log Avg. Sales Price 14.6 14.6 -0.010 14.5 14.5 -0.060
Non-Zagat Inspected 140.5 124.4 -16.13*** 221.2 268.0 46.78***
N 530 2846 494 1777
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 1.10: Unobserved Heterogeneity Parameters
Dependent variable: P(S=2) Pre-Grade Law Post-Grade Law
Constant 2.25*** 0.4201**
(0.169) (0.188)
Avg. Property Tax Ratet0−1 0.0766 -10.54
(5.068) (8.598)
Tot. Firms with less than 20 employeest0−1 -0.0009** 0.002***
(0.0004) (0.0005)
Observations 2,083 4,878
ρˆ(s = 1) 14% 23%
ρˆ(s = 2) 86% 77%
Standard errors are cluster-bootstrapped at the zipcode level, 100 replications
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 1.11: Multinomial Logit Regressions: Entrant Quality Choice
Pre-Grade Law Post-Grade Law
Dependent variable: Choice at time t− 1 A in t B in t C in t A in t B in t C in t
Constant -5.397*** -2.834 0.181 -4.418*** -3.537 -9.314*
(1.444) (2.177) (2.731) (1.564) (3.491) (5.295)
Tot. “A” neighborst−1 0.093** 0.01 0.098 -0.005* -0.005 -0.012
(0.037) (0.04) (0.069) (0.003) (0.006) (0.018)
Tot. “B” neighborst−1 0.005 -0.003 -0.052 -0.001 -0.014 -0.055
(0.02) (0.024) (0.045) (0.01) (0.021) (0.047)
Tot. “C” neighborst−1 -0.087*** -0.029 0.003 0.009 0.072** 0.068
(0.03) (0.038) (0.079) (0.015) (0.036) (0.07)
Log Potential Mealst−1 -0.572*** -0.255 -0.58** 0.09 0.258 0.352
(0.102) (0.196) (0.241) (0.13) (0.289) (0.388)
Log Avg. Property Sales Pricet−1 0.239** 0.085 0.24 0.129 -0.235 0.004
(0.12) (0.208) (0.267) (0.093) (0.246) (0.322)
Tot. Non-Zagat firmst−1 0.007*** 0.011*** 0.008** 0.001 0 0
(0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.001) (0.002) (0.004)
I(s = 2) 6.648*** 0.742*** -1.119*** -0.75*** -0.781*** -0.209
(0.107) (0.135) (0.23) (0.06) (0.128) (0.257)
Observations 3,376 3,376 3,376 2,271 2,271 2,271
Standard errors are cluster-bootstrapped at the zipcode level, 100 replications
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 1.12: Multinomial Logit Regressions: Incumbent Quality Choice
Pre-Grade Law Post-Grade Law
Dependent variable: Choice at time t− 1 A in t B in t C in t A in t B in t C in t
Constant -5.198** -1.87 -0.67 2.736* 1.545 6.355***
(2.517) (2.314) (2.284) (1.487) (1.483) (1.649)
Gradet−1 = A 1.893*** 0.922*** -0.584*** 1.205*** 0.33* -1.374***
(0.216) (0.225) (0.219) (0.161) (0.177) (0.203)
Gradet−1 = B 0.457** 1.128*** -0.847*** 0.433*** 0.822*** -1.028***
(0.227) (0.22) (0.231) (0.157) (0.153) (0.165)
Tot. “A” neighborst−1 0.07* 0.061** 0.061* -0.009** -0.006 -0.004
(0.037) (0.03) (0.032) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Tot. “B” neighborst−1 -0.036 -0.018 -0.029 0.016 -0.004 0.001
(0.032) (0.028) (0.032) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012)
Tot. “C” neighborst−1 -0.046 -0.052 -0.039 0.038* 0.075*** 0.064***
(0.039) (0.039) (0.046) (0.02) (0.021) (0.019)
Log Potential Mealst−1 -0.35** -0.367** -0.211 -0.059 -0.138 -0.213
(0.15) (0.144) (0.164) (0.124) (0.163) (0.156)
Log Avg. Property Sales Pricet−1 0.064 -0.011 -0.19 0.019 -0.01 -0.132
(0.168) (0.175) (0.17) (0.104) (0.092) (0.144)
Tot. Non-Zagat firmst−1 0.011*** 0.01*** 0.009*** 0.002** 0.001 0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Food Ratingt−1 0.325*** 0.279*** 0.282*** 0.058* 0.078** 0.1***
(0.035) (0.037) (0.039) (0.032) (0.032) (0.038)
Decor Ratingt−1 -0.047 -0.048* -0.034 0.035* 0.002 0.025
(0.032) (0.028) (0.035) (0.018) (0.022) (0.027)
Service Ratingt−1 -0.056 -0.013 -0.045 -0.016 -0.023 -0.123***
(0.036) (0.04) (0.047) (0.034) (0.035) (0.047)
Celebrity Chef 0.684 0.475 0.836 0.303 -0.122 0.104
(0.764) (0.766) (0.748) (0.329) (0.301) (0.353)
I(s = 2) 10.441*** 9.087*** 9.225*** -2.959*** 0.189 -0.943***
(0.295) (0.268) (0.308) (0.112) (0.118) (0.145)
Observations 2,083 2,083 2,083 4,878 4,878 4,878
Standard errors are cluster-bootstrapped at the zipcode level, 100 replications
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 1.13: Estimates for the model of Entry, Exit and Investment
Pre-grade Law Post-grade Law
Payoff Parameter Grade Coeff. SE Coeff. SEa
Operating Payoffs (θ1) A −7.467∗ 1.107 −5.629∗ 0.948
B −4.882∗ 1.109 −6.130∗ 1.143
C −1.209 1.027 −4.275∗ 1.388
Log Potential Meals (θ2) A −0.041 0.082 0.238∗ 0.109
B 0.151 0.112 0.296∗ 0.140
C 0.035 0.125 0.250 0.185
Total “A” neighbors (θ3) A −0.110∗ 0.030 0.003 0.001
B −0.035 0.021 0.007∗ 0.003
C 0.012 0.030 0.004 0.004
Total “B” neighbors (θ4) A 0.003 0.024 −0.014 0.009
B −0.036∗ 0.019 −0.065∗ 0.011
C 0.028 0.027 −0.002 0.017
Total “C” neighbors (θ5) A 0.111∗ 0.030 0.012 0.015
B 0.074∗ 0.022 0.077∗ 0.018
C −0.051 0.043 −0.036 0.037
Total Non-Zagat neighbors (θ6) A 0.002 0.003 −0.001 0.001
B 0.001 0.002 −0.002∗ 0.001
C −0.004 0.003 −0.001 0.001
Log Avg. Property Sales Price (θ7) A 0.279∗ 0.112 0.124 0.084
B −0.089 0.132 0.042 0.082
C −0.228 0.158 −0.052 0.178
Food Rating (θZ1 ) A −0.112∗ 0.043 0.031 0.031
B −0.182∗ 0.044 0.062∗ 0.038
C −0.185∗ 0.055 0.095∗ 0.046
Decor Rating (θZ2 ) A 0.011 0.038 0.018 0.024
B 0.001 0.031 −0.011 0.032
C 0.013 0.037 0.016 0.032
Service Rating (θZ3 ) A 0.033 0.040 −0.013 0.042
B 0.102∗ 0.042 −0.026 0.051
C 0.065 0.049 −0.155∗ 0.056
Celebrity Chef (θZ4 ) A −0.773∗ 0.314 −0.074 0.398
B −0.926∗ 0.286 −0.586 0.369
C −0.620∗ 0.246 −0.299 0.421
Adjustment Payoffs: A to B (θA,B8 ) −0.641∗ 0.120 −0.636∗ 0.134
Adjustment Payoffs: A to C (θA,C8 ) −1.065∗ 0.331 −1.616∗ 0.236
Adjustment Payoffs: B to A (θB,A8 ) −0.942∗ 0.142 −0.826∗ 0.117
Adjustment Payoffs: B to C (θB,C8 ) −0.866∗ 0.247 −1.061∗ 0.195
Adjustment Payoffs: C to A (θC,A8 ) −1.267∗ 0.310 −1.136∗ 0.171
Adjustment Payoffs: C to B (θC,B8 ) −1.012∗ 0.233 −0.696∗ 0.151
Entry Payoffs: A (θOut,A8 ) −5.481∗ 0.225 −4.837∗ 0.101
Entry Payoffs: B (θOut,B8 ) −6.095∗ 0.155 −5.475∗ 0.167
Entry Payoffs: C (θOut,C8 ) −6.550∗ 0.294 −6.123∗ 0.334
I(s = 2) A 0.092 0.101 0.039 0.047
B 0.048 0.120 0.084 0.059
C −0.109 0.108 0.191∗ 0.086
Observations 5,459 7,149
*:= Statistically significant at the 95% confidence level
a Bootstrap standard errors computed by drawing whole market histories from the set of markets, with
replacement, and repeating the estimation procedure 30 times.
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Table 1.14: Dollar Estimates of Structural Parameters
Pre-grade Law Post-grade Law Effect of Grade Law
Payoff Parameter Grade Payoff SE Payoff SE Diff. SE
Operating Payoffs (θ1) A −$681, 153.52∗ $100, 986.37 −$554, 534.35∗ $93, 385.49 $126, 619.17∗ $1, 757.28
B −$445, 276.65∗ $101, 168.80 −$603, 954.98∗ $112, 626.11 −$158, 678.33∗ $1, 910.30
C −$110, 252.89 $93, 679.89 −$421, 208.68∗ $136, 713.83 −$310, 955.79∗ $2, 054.76
Log Potential Meals (θ2) A −$3, 698.14 $7, 524.86 $23, 404.48∗ $10, 718.79 $27, 102.62∗ $162.61
B $13, 814.10 $10, 228.17 $29, 183.57∗ $13, 753.15 $15, 369.47∗ $213.59
C $3, 199.72 $11, 405.78 $24, 598.44 $18, 245.59 $21, 398.72∗ $265.32
Total “A” neighbors (θ3) A −$10, 029.07∗ $2, 753.66 $249.90 $137.93 $10, 278.97∗ $37.31
B −$3, 183.41 $1, 935.72 $643.25 $266.00 $3, 826.66∗ $26.39
C $1, 107.43 $2, 709.97 $356.03 $344.81 −$751.40∗ $36.90
Total “B” neighbors (θ4) A $305.27 $2, 160.84 −$1, 353.96 $857.11 −$1, 659.23∗ $30.95
B −$3, 259.59 $1, 736.41 −$6, 409.80∗ $1, 093.55 −$3, 150.22∗ $26.83
C $2, 589.90 $2, 448.72 −$157.38 $1, 684.66 −$2, 747.28∗ $38.67
Total “C” neighbors (θ5) A $10, 135.92∗ $2, 747.00 $1, 168.83 $1, 507.33 −$8, 967.09∗ $41.23
B $6, 730.78∗ $2, 028.21 $7, 556.02∗ $1, 724.07 $825.24∗ $34.20
C −$4, 640.34 $3, 880.37 −$3, 551.13 $3, 615.62 $1, 089.21∗ $67.73
Total Non-Zagat neighbors (θ6) A $156.77 $230.20 −$111.62 $68.96 −$268.40∗ $3.22
B $79.13 $177.24 −$218.48∗ $88.67 −$297.61∗ $2.62
C −$359.00 $243.53 −$141.99 $128.07 $217.01∗ $3.63
Log Avg. Property Sales Price (θ7) A $25, 410.76∗ $10, 225.43 $12, 253.44 $8, 236.13 −$13, 157.31∗ $169.24
B −$8, 092.77 $12, 079.87 $4, 182.79 $8, 039.09 $12, 275.56∗ $189.13
C −$20, 820.54 $14, 418.68 −$5, 137.75 $17, 526.40 $15, 682.78∗ $284.69
Food Rating (θZ1 ) A −$10, 203.60∗ $3, 893.51 $3, 056.29 $3, 044.22 $13, 259.88∗ $63.82
B −$16, 640.81∗ $4, 024.13 $6, 110.79 $3, 753.55 $22, 751.60∗ $70.27
C −$16, 888.47∗ $5, 037.46 $9, 324.02∗ $4, 561.40 $26, 212.49∗ $86.94
Decor Rating (θZ2 ) A $1, 014.00 $3, 501.64 $1, 730.60 $2, 364.44 $716.60∗ $55.03
B $121.81 $2, 827.45 −$1, 129.86 $3, 123.03 −$1, 251.67∗ $53.19
C $1, 215.11 $3, 413.52 $1, 570.38 $3, 113.18 $355.27∗ $59.08
Service Rating (θZ3 ) A $2, 978.89 $3, 649.23 −$1, 280.88 $4, 098.36 −$4, 259.76∗ $69.20
B $9, 277.95∗ $3, 851.82 −$2, 541.32 $5, 014.58 −$11, 819.27∗ $78.96
C $5, 901.92 $4, 468.90 −$15, 235.12∗ $5, 477.62 −$21, 137.04∗ $88.63
Celebrity Chef (θZ4 ) A −$70, 503.81∗ $28, 656.74 −$7, 299.43 $39, 249.69 $63, 204.38∗ $604.91
B −$84, 426.95∗ $26, 093.54 −$57, 768.50 $36, 392.66 $26, 658.44∗ $556.76
C −$56, 546.19∗ $22, 425.71 −$29, 473.68 $41, 495.90 $27, 072.51∗ $577.05
Adjustment Payoffs: A to B (θA,B8 ) −$58, 501.49∗ $10, 941.48 −$62, 613.12∗ $13, 221.15 −$4, 111.62∗ $215.36
Adjustment Payoffs: A to C (θA,C8 ) −$97, 166.41∗ $30, 195.57 −$159, 218.62∗ $23, 250.32 −$62, 052.21∗ $492.58
Adjustment Payoffs: B to A (θB,A8 ) −$85, 908.37∗ $12, 927.28 −$81, 422.33∗ $11, 497.08 $4, 486.04∗ $221.59
Adjustment Payoffs: B to C (θB,C8 ) −$78, 948.70∗ $22, 523.31 −$104, 507.10∗ $19, 230.77 −$25, 558.40∗ $380.34
Adjustment Payoffs: C to A (θC,A8 ) −$115, 582.57∗ $28, 248.09 −$111, 940.45∗ $16, 807.22 $3, 642.12∗ $430.91
Adjustment Payoffs: C to B (θC,B8 ) −$92, 300.46∗ $21, 251.74 −$68, 544.34∗ $14, 905.82 $23, 756.12∗ $337.36
Entry Payoffs: A (θOut,A8 ) −$500, 000.00∗ $20, 560.32 −$476, 527.55∗ $9, 960.20 $23, 472.45∗ $302.18
Entry Payoffs: B (θOut,B8 ) −$555, 998.83∗ $14, 113.10 −$539, 419.71∗ $16, 423.00 $16, 579.12∗ $272.42
Entry Payoffs: C (θOut,C8 ) −$597, 462.02∗ $26, 833.31 −$603, 254.12∗ $32, 865.70 −$5, 792.10∗ $531.97
I(s = 2) A $8, 413.59 $9, 173.70 $3, 840.28 $4, 650.06 −$4, 573.31∗ $135.80
B $4, 424.00 $10, 915.03 $8, 299.91 $5, 773.17 $3, 875.91∗ $162.75
C −$9, 901.28 $9, 815.86 $18, 855.61∗ $8, 472.57 $28, 756.89∗ $166.41
Standard Deviation of Shock: σ $91, 217.03 $98, 518.29 $7, 301.27
*:= Statistically significant at the 95% confidence level
a Amounts computed by dividing the coefficient associated with a particular grade choice by the absolute value of the coefficient for entry with that
grade choice, and multiplying by the cost of entry with that grade choice.
b Entry with “A” quality calibrated to $500,000 for the pre-grade law period. Entry costs for other quality levels in the pre-grade law period
computed as the ratio between that coefficient and the coefficient for “A” entry, multiplied by the calibrated cost of “A” entry.
c Entry with “A” quality in the post-grade law period computed as being approximately 95% of the cost of entry with “A” quality in the pre-grade
law period, based on a comparison of relative coefficients within each period. Entry costs for other quality levels in the post-grade law period
computed as in the pre-grade law period.
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Table 1.15: Comparison of Model Prediction to Data
Effect of Mandatory Disclosure ∆ Avg. Percent As ∆ Avg. Percent Bs ∆ Avg. Percent Cs
Model 33% -16% -17%
Data 32% -15% -17%
Table 1.16: Counterfactual Experiments: Evolution of Market over Time
∆ Avg. Percent As ∆ Avg. Percent Bs ∆ Avg. Percent Cs ∆ Total Firms
Market Evolution by Policy 2010 2013 2017 2010 2013 2017 2010 2013 2017 2010 2013 2017
Increase θC1 , θ
B
1 by σpre 2.8% 2.6% 0.5% -2.0% -2.1% -0.3% -0.8% -0.5% -0.2% -30 -38 -3
Decrease θA1 by σpre 3.3% 3.4% 0.8% -1.7% -1.7% -0.6% -1.6% -1.6% -0.2% 16 23 4
Decrease θC,A8 , θ
B,A
8 by
1
2σpre 5.2% 4.9% 5.1% -2.7% -2.4% -2.8% -2.5% -2.5% -2.3% 24 31 27
Decrease θ0,A8 to zero 42.8% 34.8% 0.4% -20.6% -16.5% 3.6% -22.2% -18.3% -4.0% 918 715 466
i All changes relative to baseline prediction. Results averaged across 100 simulations for each market/year (11 periods total).
ii Exogenous market conditions fixed to starting (2007) levels. Other payoff parameters fixed at equilibrium (pre-grade law) values.
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Table 1.17: Comparison of Mandatory Disclosure and Alternative Taxation Policy
Model
Prediction:
Mandatory
Disclosure
Counterfactual:
Optimal Tax
Policy
Diff.
∆θA1 -$167,716 -$403,555 -$235,839
∆θB1 $113,919 $1,256,515 $1,142,596
∆θC1 $279,740 $2,123,077 $1,843,337
∆θB,A8 -$10,520 -$83,463 -$72,943
∆θC,A8 -$11,938 -$93,496 -$81,558
Avg. Perc. As 68.9% 79.9% 11.0%
Avg. Perc. Bs 25.3% 10.0% -15.3%
Avg. Perc. Cs 5.8% 10.1% 4.3%
Tax Revenue per A -$167,716 -$403,555 -$235,839
Tax Revenue per B $103,398 $1,173,052 $1,069,653
Tax Revenue per C $267,802 $2,029,581 $1,761,779
Avg. Total Tax Revenue -$91,894,508 $954 $91,895,462
i Results averaged across 100 simulations for each market/year. Averages are for
periods 2007-2013 in the counterfactual case, and 2010-2013 for the mandatory
disclosure model predictions.
ii For the counterfactual, exogenous market conditions fixed to starting (2007)
levels, and unaffected payoff parameters fixed at equilibrium (pre-grade law)
values.
iii All dollar amounts calibrated using pre-grade period σ from Table 1.14.
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Chapter 2
Mandatory Disclosure and the Prices of
Differentiated Firms
2.1 Introduction
In Chapter 1, I showed how mandatory disclosure laws can affect the product quality choices
of differentiated firms. In this chapter, I explore how mandatory disclosure laws affect the
pricing decisions of firms with different levels of product quality. I empirically estimate
whether prices rise or fall after the grade law is introduced, and whether price changes
vary depending on the firm’s hygiene quality. I also estimate whether these price changes
occur more in certain market environments (for example, where there are more high quality
firms), as well as whether firms pass through the costs of obtaining quality onto consumers.
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As noted in Chapter 1, mandatory disclosure laws solve an asymmetric information prob-
lem, allowing consumers to perfectly observe product qualities and make consumption de-
cisions using this information, which in turn provides incentives for firms to improve their
quality. However, while mandatory disclosure laws can increase consumer surplus through
this additional information, if firms pass through the costs of providing higher quality to
consumers in the form of higher prices, or if low quality firms supplying differentiated prod-
ucts are still able to charge higher prices, then consumer welfare may actually decline as
a result of mandatory disclosure. The outcome can vary depending on factors such as the
shape of the demand curve for the new information on hygiene quality, the marginal costs
of providing hygiene quality, and the competitive conditions in the market. Since the grade
law introduces a new dimension of product quality, firms may be able to charge higher
prices for access to high quality. However, because firms are selling differentiated products,
it is possible that prices do not change. Furthermore, prices charged by lower quality firms
may fall, because consumers would not consume at a low quality firms without being com-
pensated with a lower price, or the prices may not change or even rise, partially because
consumers are still willing to pay for the firm’s other quality characteristics.
Board (2009) models the tradeoff between more information on product quality, which
puts downward pressure on the prices charged by lower quality firms (due to a shifting of
the demand curve), and lower competition with other low quality firms, which puts upward
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pressure on prices of higher quality firms in those markets.1 Which firm the consumer will
ultimately purchase from depends on consumer preferences for quality. Board (2009) shows
that in cases where firms in a given market have generally similar quality levels, introducing
mandatory disclosure causes prices to fall and makes consumers better off.
Studies such as Monroe (1973), Wolinsky (1983), Milgrom and Roberts (1986), Judd and
Riordan (1994), Osborne and Shapiro (2014) show that prices could fall with the introduc-
tion of mandatory disclosure as firms lose the advantage of using prices to signal better
quality. Milyo and Waldfogel (1999) find that price advertising led to lower prices of adver-
tised products, while Albaek et al. (1997) show that public disclosure of prices led to price
increases as a result of lower intensity in oligopoly price competition. More recently, Lemus
and Luco (2014) and Luco (2015) showed that mandatory disclosure of gas station prices
led to lower price dispersion over time and an increase in firm margins.
Jin and Leslie (2003) suggest that introducing information on the quality type of all firms
in the market enables firms to use the information environment to charge a premium for
access to quality, especially if they are higher quality firms. Prices could rise at high quality
firms due to increased demand for their products, depending on the market environment.
Prices could also rise due to lower price competition (higher product differentiation) in the
market, or because firms seek to recover costs of hygiene maintenance or improvement.
1Board (2009) discusses these outcomes in the context of a duopoly setting, but the results are generally
applicable to markets with multiple firms.
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They also point out that prices could fall due to lower search costs to consumers and higher
elasticity of substitution between restaurants, increasing competition and lowering prices,
and could also fall at low quality firms due to decreased demand for their products.2
To summarize, the “demand-side effect” implies that prices could fall for lower quality
firms compensating for their lower quality, while remaining unchanged (or also decreasing)
for high quality firms due to lower search costs and higher elasticity of substitution for
consumers. However, the “supply-side effect” implies that prices could rise because firms
may pass-through the marginal costs of providing quality (especially if they have sufficient
market power to do so), or because lower price competition with low quality firms leads
to higher prices at high quality firms (like a premium for access to quality). This chapter
explores whether the demand-side effect or supply-side effect occurs after the grade law.
The answer ultimately depends on consumer demand and the market power of these differ-
entiated products firms, and how it relates to their hygiene quality.
Data on prices are from the same source as the sample of Zagat rated firms used in
Chapter 1. The Zagat sample represents a dataset of differentiated product firms, allowing
me to consider the incentives of such firms when setting prices to compete for consumers in
the market. The fact that these are differentiated products firms implies that the each firm
2Jin and Leslie (2003) do not have price data for the firms in their sample, but use BLS data to construct
a price index, and show that when a restaurant grade law law is introduced, their price index of eating
out declines relative to price indices for other goods. They interpret this as being a sign that the grade
law leads to higher competition and lower prices among restaurants, possibly due to lower search costs.
105
Chapter 2 Mandatory Disclosure and the Prices of Differentiated Firms
faces a different demand curve, which could support certain firms charging higher prices
in the post-grade law period regardless of quality. Furthermore, the differentiated nature
of these firms means that introducing an additional dimension of quality may or may not
affect consumer demand and firms’ optimal markup, depending on how much consumers
were already valuing the implicit quality of that firm.
Ideally, I would estimate a model of consumer demand for restaurants, including prefer-
ences for hygiene quality, and compare it to firms’ optimal pricing behavior in a Bertrand
equilibrium, given the demand curve they face. However, I lack data on quantities sold
over time by the restaurants in my sample. Therefore, I employ a reduced form approach,
where in the estimation, I control for different factors that determine price in a Bertrand
equilibrium, namely firm characteristics (Zagat ratings), demand-side factors and supply-
side (cost) factors and market structure (for example, the number of firms of each quality
type in a given market/year), in order to identify which effect dominates. For example,
demand and cost factors may be captured by firm fixed effects (time invariant firm specific
costs), time fixed effects (annual cost shocks to all firms in the industry), market specific
time variant demand and cost factors (for example, the number of meals sold or the average
annual home sales price) and time variant firm costs (the counts of firm violations that I
interpret as related to firm marginal costs of producing quality).
I estimate a “pre-post” regression model to measure the effect of the grade law on prices.
106
Chapter 2 Mandatory Disclosure and the Prices of Differentiated Firms
I regress prices charged by firms on quality choice, market structure, and exogenous market
variables, as well as firm and year fixed effects, and use an IV-GMM estimation approach
to consistently estimate the effect of the grade law on prices charged by firms of different
quality types. Instrumental variables are needed because both quality choice and market
structure may be correlated with unobserved, time-varying (demand or cost) conditions
affecting price.3 I instrument for current quality choice using lagged quality choices from
the previous two periods. Quality choice is correlated over time due to the fixed and sunk
costs of quality investment; however, contemporaneous prices are unlikely to be correlated
with past quality, assuming that firms are solving for their profit-maximizing price each
period.4 Finally, I also present results from a specification where not only quality choice
but also the number of firms of each quality type are instrumented for, to account for the
potential endogeneity in the relationship between market structure and prices.
I find evidence of demand-side effects on pricing, in that the introduction of the grade
law led to a decrease in prices charged by lower quality firms. The results imply that
mandatory disclosure laws benefit “A” quality firms, but can lead to a decline in profits
3For example, unobserved cost conditions could include the price of inputs rising, and that could be
correlated with the firm’s ability to afford a certain quality level. Unobserved demand conditions could
include demand for a certain food product or cuisine, which could enable a firm to charge a higher price
regardless of quality (due to the differentiated nature of its product). To the extent possible, the other
variables in the model (including firm and year fixed effects) are meant to control for these unobserved
factors; however, I use instruments to account for the fact that the variables in the model may not fully
capture all of the unobservable influences on hygiene quality and price.
4Note that if firms are playing a sequential game where they first set quality and then set price, current
period quality should be independent of price shocks. However, demand or supply shocks affecting both
quality and price could occur prior to the game beginning, and so quality could still be endogenous, and
hence the need for hygiene quality instruments.
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for non-“A” quality firms. This is because mandatory disclosure can negate some of the
market power of lower quality firms, as it allows for vertical sorting of consumers on hygiene
quality. However, I also find evidence that relative to the pre-grade law period, firms in
the post-grade law period with more violations (a proxy for the marginal cost of obtaining
quality) charge higher prices, indicating the presence of some supply-side effects, although
ultimately lower quality firms still charge lower prices, all else equal.
2.2 Data
In Chapter 1, I discussed the background of the New York City grade law, and data sources.
This chapter covers the same subset of Zagat rated firms in all five boroughs from 2007 to
2013. I used the same approach from that chapter to construct the inspection scores and
assign an annual grade to each firm.
This chapter examines the pricing decisions made by Zagat rated firms. There may be a
concern that, either in the pre-grade law or post-grade law period, these firms have system-
atically different inspection results as compared to non-Zagat rated firms. For example, it
is possible that in the post-grade law period, only firms with excellent inspection results are
assigned Zagat ratings. If this were the case, not only would it limit the ability to generalize
the conclusions of Zagat rated firms to the overall restaurant industry in NYC, but also, if
there is a systematically different way in which restaurants are included in the Zagat guide
in the pre-grade law post-grade law period that is correlated with hygiene quality, this could
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bias the estimates of impacts on prices.
To address these concerns, I examine the distribution of inspection scores for firms that
are non-Zagat rated as compared to those that are Zagat rated, and also compare these
distributions across the two information environments. The results in Figure 2.1 suggest
that the Zagat and non-Zagat distributions of inspection scores are similar. Zagat firms
would seem to have slightly lower inspection scores in the post-grade law period.
To further examine the issue, I run a linear probability model of the likelihood of being
Zagat rated, controlling for year fixed effects, cuisine type fixed effects and zipcode fixed
effects, and interacted each grade with a dummy for whether the inspection law is in effect
or not. I find that, in the post-grade law period, firms with a C grade are about 1.3% less
likely to be Zagat rated, and firms with A grades are about 2% more likely to be Zagat
rated. There is no significant effect for B grade firms. In the pre-grade law period, there
is no significant difference in the likelihood of being Zagat rated for firms of each quality
type. Therefore, I conclude that the differences appear marginal and the similarity of the
distributions assuage any concerns that firms in Zagat are somehow systematically different
in terms of inspection results than the general restaurant population.
109
Chapter 2 Mandatory Disclosure and the Prices of Differentiated Firms
2.2.1 Definition of Quality
As in Chapter 1, quality choice is measured as the grade corresponding to the average in-
spection score data, where each grade corresponds to the firm’s average score within the
ranges used by DOHMH (“A” = 0-13, “B”= 14-27, “C” = 27 and greater). For the purposes
of the analysis, I group firms into “A” and “not-A” ratings, where “not-A” firms have a
“B” or “C” grade.5
The inspections data can also be used to proxy for the marginal costs of obtaining a
certain level of quality. I assume that the marginal costs of improving quality can be
inferred via the number of employee-level violations that would need to be addressed, in
that firms with more of these violations would need to pay larger marginal costs to improve
quality. Employee-level violations include violations related to food preparation (e.g. food
not being cooked to required minimum temperature), food handling (e.g. food worker not
washing hands after preparing raw foods), or employee policies (e.g. employee smoking in
food preparation area). I assume these are proxies for marginal costs, since educating or
correcting the negative behavior that can lead to violations requires time, which carries
an opportunity cost of the labor of the employee not being used elsewhere in the firm. In
the analysis below, I estimate how the prices charged by firms change when they have an
additional employee-level violations, both before and after the grade law.
5I also experimented with separately estimating the pricing decisions of “A”, “B” and “C” firms. The
results do not qualitatively change.
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2.2.2 Model Variables
Firms are assumed to set prices in each market/year.6 Geographic markets are defined at
the zipcode level, following Kwok and Studart (2012), who used a similar market definition
in their study. As in Chapter 1, there are 118 unique markets in the sample, for a total
of 826 market/years. The dataset is filtered only to include those firms that have available
information on price.7
Following Chapter 1, I represent market competition by the number of firms of each
quality type in each market/year, and additionally control for the number of non-Zagat
rated firms in the market receiving inspections each period. This variable is included to
capture the possibility that Zagat firms consider general competitive conditions in their
price setting, and may benefit from being in market environments with more non-Zagat
rated firms, due to reputation gains.8 Additionally, I account for market price competition
by controlling for the average neighbor price, where neighbors are defined as the 5 closest
surrounding firms (measured in Euclidean distance).9 Finally, I also allow market demand
6I use price as defined in the Zagat data. There, price is defined as the average cost (to the consumer) of
a dinner entree with one drink, including tips. All dollar values are inflation-adjusted to 2007 dollars.
7In some cases involving the entry of new firms, the Zagat guides define prices according to a range, e.g.
inexpensive, moderate, or expensive. In those cases, I use the median of the range to impute the firm’s
price.
8As in Chapter 1, I do not include the number of non-Zagat rated firms of each quality type, but only the
overall counts.
9Controlling for the average neighbor price allows us to control for any endogenous selection into markets
of certain quality types that could be correlated with price. For example, if a firm selects to operate
in a high quality market after the grade law because they believe they can charge higher prices in that
market, this choice process (to the extent that other firms are also profit maximizing) will also be borne
out in the prices charged by other firms in that market. Therefore, by controlling for the prices of nearest
neighbor firms (those most likely to influence the firm’s selection choice), I can identify the relationship
between operating in markets with more high quality firms and price. That is, if a firm in a market
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and market cost conditions to influence firm pricing patterns, where these variables are
constructed as in Chapter 1.
Firm prices may also vary with their exogenous characteristics from the Zagat data. I
focus on the Food, Decor, and Service ratings, as well as whether firm is affiliated with
a Celebrity Chef, as my measures of characteristics that may influence demand (besides
hygiene quality type). These variables are included in order to allow for the possibility
that, for example, if low quality firms are forced to lower prices after the grade law (due to
lower demand for their product), they may lower costs in order to retain the same margin
as in the pre-grade law period (for example, by lowering quality in another dimension). To
the extent that lowering of Food or Service quality would be correlated with changes in
the Zagat rating variables, controlling for these variables will allows me to better isolate
the impact of the grade law on the price and hygiene quality relationship. Furthermore, I
assume the Zagat ratings variables are exogenous shifters of price.10
with more high quality rivals tends to charge higher prices, this effect is identified separately from any
endogenous selection that would relate that firms choice to operate in that type of market with their
ability to charge higher prices.
10It is possible that the Zagat characteristics are in endogenously related to price, for example, if they cor-
related with some unobserved component of the consumer’s dining experience. However, these variables
are not the primary interest of this study, and are only controls for the differentiated nature of each
firm, so as to better identify the effect of the grade law on the pricing of firms with different hygiene
quality types. As long as the instruments for quality already control for any endogeneity that could
result from the endogenous Zagat variables, the coefficients on the Zagat variables may be biased, but
the coefficients on the hygiene quality variables will be unbiased. As a robustness check, I experiment
with instrumenting for these Zagat characteristics and find the results on hygiene quality type do not
substantially change (though including additional instruments does reduce overall precision). Therefore,
I treat these variables as exogenous in the estimation.
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2.3 Summary Statistics
Summary statistics are presented in Table 2.1. The table shows how variables of interest
in the model change from the pre-grade law period to the post-grade law period. Table 2.2
further breaks these changes out by each firm hygiene quality type. These tables are similar
to those presented in Chapter 1.
Prices are fairly constant across the two periods, and the average price only declines
by about $0.70 for all firms. Table 2.3 shows that, prior to the grade law, “A” and “B”
firms appear to have higher prices, on average, than “C” firms. However, when broken
out by quality type, Table 2.3 shows that while on average the prices of “A” firms do not
substantially change, the prices of “B” and “C” firms have significantly declined with the
introduction of the grade law, suggesting a demand-side effect.
Table 2.4 shows the relationship between quality choice, price, and market distribution
of quality types in the two periods. The table shows how firms of different types respond
to market conditions. Prior to the grade law, prices are higher for “B” and “C” firms when
they operate in higher quality markets (where there are a majority of high quality firms),
but are lower for “A” firms. It is possible that, in the pre-grade law period, when informa-
tion on hygiene quality is not publicly revealed to consumers, high quality firms attempt
to signal their quality through higher prices. However, in absence of mandatory disclosure,
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low quality firms appear to free ride and raise prices as well.
In the post-grade law period, Table 2.4 shows that prices are higher for all firms that
operate in markets with a majority of high quality firms (and are highest for firms with “A”
quality). This could occur because a market with more high quality firms is a market where
consumers are willing to pay more to access a differentiated product with higher quality.
In order to compete, then, all firms may raise their prices, regardless of quality, so long as
they believe it is profitable to do so. That is, it may be an optimal decision of firms, condi-
tional on their product characteristics (including hygiene quality), to charge higher prices
in higher quality markets, especially since the grade law allows them to identify the type
of market they are operating in (as they know the hygiene quality of other firms) and price
accordingly. On the other hand, higher prices may be because other firms in that market are
charging higher prices, and not just because those firms are higher quality (we do see from
Table 2.2 that in the post-grade law period, “A” quality firms tend to charge higher prices,
on average, than “B” or “C” firms).11 Nevertheless, the result suggests that, rather than
increase price competition in high quality markets, the grade law actually decreases it (by
leading to higher prices across the board), and that this may be due to pricing premiums to
all consumers looking to purchase products in a high quality market (regardless of quality),
or may be due to self-selected quality in markets due to the ability to charge higher prices.
11If other firms in the market that are charging higher prices also happen to be high quality, this could lead
to a endogeneity between markets with high quality firms and higher prices. I control for this possibility
in the estimation by including the average neighborhood price of a firm’s closest competitors in the
model.
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There is a notable change in the distribution of prices charged by firms of different qual-
ity types when comparing the pre- and post-grade law periods. Figure 2.2 shows that the
distribution of prices charged by “B”, “C” firms shifts leftward with the introduction of
mandatory disclosure, but that the price distribution for “A” firms in both periods is simi-
lar, though there are slightly more firms charging prices between $30 and $50 per meal n the
post-grade law period. These findings suggest that low quality firms are forced to discount
their prices after the grade law is introduced, but that there is little change in prices for
high quality firms.
Figure 2.3 shows how the median price per meal for firms of each quality type changed
over time. An obvious downward change in slope for “B” and “C” firms can be observed
upon the introduction of the grade law, while similarly there is an increase in prices charged
by “A” firms over time once the grade law is introduced. There is some evidence that all
prices declined prior to the grade law, perhaps as a result of the recession in the restau-
rant industry that took place in 2009-2010. There is also a large spike in the price of
“C” firms and a small decline in the price of “B”, “A” firms in 2012 that could be due
to post-recessionary recovery, as well as firms beginning to differentiate themselves beyond
the hygiene quality scores; however, this effect is short lived, and by 2013, the patterns ob-
served upon the onset of the grade law are once again in place.12 This figure thus provides
12Fluctuations in price for a given year could be due to year-specific events occurring, for example a 2012
recession recovery. I account for this by controlling for year fixed effects in the estimation.
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additional evidence of low quality firms discounting their prices after the grade law, and
high quality firms increasing them.
Note that it is possible that what is observed in these tables is a selection effect as
opposed to actual price changes. For example, it may be that the firms with “B” quality
in the post-grade law period may not be the same firms with “B” quality in the pre-grade
law period, and in fact these firms may be systematically different. Table 2.3 shows that
“B” or “C” firms in the post-grade law period appear to have lower prices relative to the
pre-grade law period “B” or “C” firms. In fact, this could be due not to the effect of the
grade law (where these firms would lower their prices relative to a but-for world where they
had the same quality but a higher price) but rather, due to a selection effect where the
firms observed as having “B” and “C” quality in the post-grade law world may have been
lower-priced “A” firms in the pre-grade law period. In Table 2.5 I control for whether the
firm had “A” quality or non-“A” quality in the pre-grade law period, and look at how their
prices changed after the grade law, irrespective of their grade choice in the post-grade law
period. I find that for those firms that had “A” quality or those that did not have “A”
quality in the pre-grade law period, their prices fell in the post-grade law period, though
the difference is not statistically significant. The difference in the results from Table 2.3
and Table 2.5 suggest that the selection effect may upwardly bias the effect of the grade law
on the prices of low quality firms. To account for this in the estimation, I include firm fixed
effects, and also use an instrumental variables approach to control for potential endogeneity
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in hygiene quality choice that may vary across firms or over time, which is discussed below.
2.4 Theoretical Model
Here, I present a basic theoretical model to illustrate and motivate some of the empirical
findings. First, assume two firms in the market, each producing a single differentiated
product, j and k. Suppose that the market contains i = 1, 2, ...,M consumers interested in
consuming one of the two goods. Let consumer i preferences for good j be expressed by the
following utility function:
uij = xjβ + αpj + θhj + ij
Where pj represents price of good j, hj represents hygiene quality, and xj are other
exogenous product characteristics. Assume disutility from higher prices, α < 0, and that
utility is increasing in hygiene quality, θ > 0. However, assume that when hygiene quality
is unobserved (i.e. in the pre-grade law period), consumers assume firm hygiene quali-
ties can be perfectly observed through their exogenous product characteristics, such that
Ei(hj |xj , pj) = 0, and so in the absence of disclosure firms demand decisions are based
entirely on firm observable characteristics, including price.13
13Note that in this simple model, consumers have identical preferences over hygiene quality and price, and
hence the only reason a consumer might choose good j over an otherwise identical good k is due to
their idiosyncratic preference component, ij . In a real world scenario, consumers are more likely to have
heterogenous preferences over hygiene quality and price. However, I use the simpler version of the model
in order to illustrate the possible results that we may expect to see in the data.
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Consumer i will choose product j over product k only when uij > uik. Assuming a logit
demand function (type 1 extreme value distribution for ij , I can write the share of product
j as:
sj =
exp {xjβ + αpj + θhj}∑
k exp {xkβ + αpk + θhk}
Here, the set of all k possible goods includes the outside option (not eating a restaurant
meal).
Firms are assumed to play a Bertrand competition game where they set prices to maximize
profits, subject to costs cj(hj , xj), which are assumed to be increasing in hygiene quality,
∂cj
∂hj
> 0.
pij = pjsj − cj(xj , hj)sj
The equilibrium can be expressed as:
pj = cj − sj
(
∂sj
∂pj
)−1
= cj − 1
α(1− sj)
Under what situations will firms with lower hygiene quality charge higher prices? Consider
the pre-grade law period, that is, the no-disclosure case. Assume that pj > pk and hj < hk.
Then:
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pj > pk ⇒ cj − 1
α(1− sj) > ck −
1
α(1− sk)
Assuming constant marginal costs of production with the exception of hygiene quality,
this implies that hj < hk ⇒ cj < ck. Then it follows that firms with lower hygiene quality
will charge higher prices when the following holds true:
sk − sj
α(1− sj)(1− sk) > ck − cj > 0
Since α < 0, for the term on the left hand side to be positive, it must be that sj > sk,
i.e. the lower quality firm cannot charge higher prices unless they have a higher share in
the market (i.e. are more in demand by consumers) than the other product k. And even
then, there is the additional restriction that the left hand side term be greater than the
net differences in costs between providing high and low hygiene quality. Nevertheless, it is
possible to envision scenarios where this constraint holds, and the lower quality firm charges
higher prices.
Now consider the case where there is disclosure, and continue to assume that hj < hk. It
is possible that some consumers will switch from product j, given that it is lower quality.
Note that for the consumers that would have chosen product j prior to the grade law, this
implies uij > uik ⇒ xjβ + αpj + ij > xkβ + αpk + ik. For those that would switch, this
implies that xkβ + αpk + θhk + ik > xjβ + αpj + θhj + ij . In order for the firm not to
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lose those consumers that they would have captured prior to information disclosure, they
would need to change prices as follows:
xjβ + αp
1
j + θhj + ij > xkβ + αpk + θhk + ik > xjβ + αp
0
j + θhj + ij
In other words, since there is disutility from prices, they would need p1j < p
0
j . Therefore,
this example shows that under mandatory disclosure, a lower hygiene quality firm would
need to lower prices in order to capture the same consumers they would have prior to dis-
closure. This intuitively can be seen as the lower quality firm offering the consumers lower
prices as compensation for the lower quality of their product, which the consumer can now
perfectly observe.
We have seen that, in the absence of disclosure, lower hygiene quality firms could still
charge higher prices than higher hygiene quality firms. What would happen to the price of
high quality firms relative to low quality firms when there is information disclosure? One
way to look at this is to see under what conditions prices are increasing in hygiene quality
type. It can be shown that, conditional on observable characteristics:
∂pj
∂hj
|xj = ∂cj
∂hj
− θ
α
(
sj
1− sj
)
Given our assumptions that
∂cj
∂hj
> 0, θα < 0, and
sj
1−sj > 0, it follows that under disclosure,
conditional on observable characteristics, prices should increase as hygiene quality increases,
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or conversely, that firms with lower quality will charge lower prices than firms with higher
prices. Note that since this is conditional on observable characteristics, this condition may
vary across firms, and the relationship above only holds within firms. In the estimation
below, I control for firm fixed effects, which enables me to estimate an average effect of
disclosure controlling for differences across firms. This within-estimator approach allows
me to empirically test the theoretical prediction above.
2.5 Econometric Model
The regression specification is a reduced-form approximation of a Bertrand price equilibrium
where players are differentiated product firms. In an imperfect competition environment,
differentiated product firms have specific quality characteristics that consumers may prefer,
allowing them to exercise market power. In the mandatory disclosure case, the revelation
of hygiene quality is an additional characteristic that allows firms to credibly vertically
differentiate themselves from others. The Bertrand equilibrium assumption underlying the
model also implies that marginal costs, but not fixed costs, affect optimal price. In this
model, the equilibrium can generally be expressed as:
P ∗it = Cit −Qit
(
∂Qit
∂Pit
)−1
In the regression specification used, we can think of the variables shifting (marginal) costs
as representing Cit, and those shifting demand (or the elasticity of demand) as representing
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the term Qit
(
∂Qit
∂Pit
)−1
. Note that demand shifters can include variables affecting market
structure, as these reflect substitution opportunities for consumers.
I present results using a general specification for firm pricing decisions. Firm pricing is
assumed to be static and assumed to reflect an equilibrium played each period. A list of
control variables used in the model can be found in Table 2.6.
lnPit = µi + τt + 1(GradeLaw)× δ + x′itβpre + 1(ait 6= A)× θprea
+ 1(GradeLaw)× [x′itβpost + 1(ait 6= A)× θposta ] + it (2.1)
This specification represents a classic “pre-post” design, intended to evaluate the effects
of the NYC Grade Law on the pricing decisions of firms. I assume the introduction of the
grade law is exogenous and unrelated to the prices charged by either high or low quality
firms. The coefficient δ captures the percentage change in price for an “A” graded firm i in
market/year t after the introduction of the grade law. The regression controls for firm and
market specific characteristics which are captured by xit, as well as in certain specifications
firm and year fixed effects, µi and τt. The coefficient θa captures the percentage difference
in price for non-“A” graded firm i in market/year t, relative to those of “A” graded firms.
A comparison of θprea and θ
post
a shows whether in the post-grade law period non-“A” graded
firms charge higher or lower prices than “A” graded firms, compared to in the pre-grade law
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period. In the pre-grade law period period, firms may have had the same variable costs of
supplying quality, but I assume there were no demand-side effects. Therefore, differences in
conditional-mean prices across the two periods (pre-grade law and post-grade law) identify
the demand-side effect on pricing.
2.6 Empirical Results
2.6.1 OLS Estimates
The results of the regression specifications discussed in the previous section are in Table
2.7. The results from column 1, which are for an OLS regression without firm fixed effects,
suggest that the grade law actually decreases prices for “A” firms (the excluded quality cat-
egory) relative to the pre-grade law period, and that prices of “B” and “C” firms also fall,
though the coefficients are not statistically significant. However, there is not much evidence
to suggest that market competition (the number of firms of different quality types) plays a
meaningful role either before or after the grade law.
Controlling for firm fixed effects allows me to control for potentially time invariant de-
mand and cost factors that could affect firm prices, including exogenous firm-specific cost
conditions. Furthermore, these unobserved time invariant costs may be correlated with firm
quality choices, so the extent to which they can be controlled for in the model prevents bias
of those coefficients. Firm fixed effects may also proxy for unobserved, time invariant firm
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characteristics that may affect demand, such as whether the firm has a dining room with
a view, is a restaurant frequented by celebrity clients or is an institution in the city dining
scene. Additionally, by incorporating firm fixed effects, I am using a within-estimator to
estimate the average effect of the mandatory disclosure policy on prices charged by different
hygiene quality types. The within-estimator allows me to control for potential composition
effects (for example, controlling for the fact that low quality firms in the post-grade law
period may have been high quality firms charging low prices in the pre-grade law period)
that may bias the results.
From column 2 of Table 2.7, controlling for firm fixed effects reduces the significance of
many of the model coefficients, and reverses the signs on some. For example, the grade
law is now associated with a positive but insignificant increase in prices. Any evidence of
market power or competitive effects is no longer present. In short, the fixed effects appear
to absorb a large degree of variation that otherwise may have identified the coefficients of
interest. However, in that there are observed sign changes, including fixed effects clearly
also controls for unobserved conditions that may have biased the results.
In order to better understand the model predicted difference in prices, I use a Blinder-
Oaxaca decomposition (not shown). This method divides the price differential between the
pre-grade law and post-grade law periods into a part that is explained by differences in
the characteristics that can affect prices, and a part that captures the differences in the
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coefficients, that is, in the effects of the different characteristics on prices.14 The predicted
average price gap (or decline in prices after the grade law) is about 1.6%, though this dif-
ference is insignificant. Decomposing this difference using a pooled model with an indicator
for whether the grade law is in effect, I find that the component explained by differences
in firm and market characteristics between the two periods (including hygiene quality) is
slightly negative, suggesting that the price gap would be larger if firms in the post-grade
law period operated under the same characteristics as in the pre-grade law period. I find
that the differential in the coefficients, which measures the expected change in post-grade
law prices if operating under the pre-grade law period returns to characteristics, is larger
than the actual price gap.
These results suggest that differences in returns to characteristics narrow the price gap
relative to what it would be if both periods had the same characteristics. In other words,
prices actually decreased by less than they would if characteristics were the same in both
periods, due to the slightly higher returns from operating in markets with certain charac-
teristics. A closer examination of the detailed breakdown of what is driving the explained
portion of the effect suggests that these returns could be related to the fact that more firms
operate with “A” quality, as well as in markets with more “A” quality firms, after the grade
law. Therefore, if some firms with non-“A” quality in the post-grade law period are actually
lower priced firms from the pre-grade law period, the predicted price change will be smaller
14To do this, I use the oaxaca command in Stata. For an overview of the command and the Blinder-Oaxaca
decomposition method, see Jann (2008).
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than it would be if the set of firms with non-“A” quality in both periods was the same.
2.6.2 IV-GMM Estimates
The specifications from columns 1 and 2 of Table 2.7 show little evidence that the grade
law had any effect on firm pricing, regardless of hygiene quality type. However, the esti-
mates of θa in both periods may be biased, due to their correlations with unobserved factors
that affect prices. The possible endogeneity of quality arises from correlations with both
unobserved demand and cost shocks. Quality can easily be endogenous in the model, since
factors affecting firm pricing decisions (such as demand and/or cost shocks) can also affect
the firm’s hygiene quality choice. Correlations with demand shocks could cause the coeffi-
cients on non-“A” grade quality to be biased towards zero, since failing to control for these
correlations in the model causes the estimates to only be partially identified effects on price.
For example, in the post-grade law period, if the model is not adequately capturing positive
demand shocks that may affect quality choice and price, then the model would predict that
lower quality firms charge prices closer to those of the high quality firms than actually is true.
To address any endogeneity concerns, and to obtain consistent estimates of the price
changes, I instrument for quality choices using the previous 2 periods lags of quality.15
Quality choices can be correlated over time due to the presence of sunk costs to invest-
ing/divesting in quality, as well as fixed costs to operating with a given quality type, as
15Using lags of possibly endogenous variables in a model is a common technique in the panel data literature,
especially when other “good” instruments are not available. This is particularly common in the dynamic
panel data literature, see for example Arellano and Bond (1991).
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discussed in Chapter 1 of this dissertation. However, earlier quality choices are not likely to
be correlated with unexpected shocks to demand and/or costs, and factors affecting current
prices should not depend on sunk costs, which are not assumed to affect firm equilibrium
prices in a Bertrand model.16 In addition, my instruments not only control for the potential
endogeneity of hygiene quality choice and prices, but also by using lags of hygiene quality
they control for changes due to composition effects, and so are similar to firm fixed effects
in that regard.
I use IV-GMM to produce efficient estimates of the coefficients, assuming that all the
other variables in the model are exogenous.17 The results in columns 3 and 4 of Table 2.7
suggest that the OLS estimates are in fact attenuated towards zero. Using instruments for
hygiene quality reveals positive and significant coefficients of the difference between prices
charged by “B” and “C” grade firms relative to those charged by “A” grade firms in the
pre-grade law period, and negative and significant coefficients in the post-grade law period.
This finding is consistent with the summary statistics discussed earlier, and shows that in
the pre-grade law period, low quality periods are able to charge higher prices than high qual-
ity firms, which is possibly due to exploiting the lack of consumer information on quality,
or due to other attributes that are in demand by consumers. In the post-grade law period,
however, high quality firms benefit from the vertical sorting by consumers over quality, and
16Note that an assumption here is that any expected shocks to demand that may be correlated with both
prices and hygiene quality are controlled for in the model.
17Instrumental variables regressions are implemented in Stata using the commands ivreg2 and xtivreg2 for
the regressions with fixed effects. The results from the regressions satisfy the requirement that the
instruments are not weak instruments, and that they are not jointly correlated with the error term.
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hence low quality firms are forced to cut prices in order to continue to attract consumers.
However, I do not find a significant change in prices charged by “A” grade firms, suggesting
that while the grade law may increase demand for these firms, the potential for prices to
increase are offset by increased elasticity of substitution by consumers (which can increase
competition and lower prices) as well as a decrease in the ability of high quality firms to
signal their quality through higher prices.
Estimating the IV specification using firm fixed effects (which are eliminated using first-
differencing, so as to avoid bias) produces similar results. From column 4 of Table 2.7,
having a “B” or “C” grade in the post-grade law period yields prices that are 10.1% lower
than those of “A” grade firms. For example, in Table 2.3 the average price for an “A” grade
firm in the post-grade law period is $39.23 per meal, and I predict a price that is around
$3.96 lower for non-“A” firms. Compared to the pre-grade law period, where prices charged
by non-“A” grade firms are 5.1% higher than those of “A” grade firms, and given that the
average price for an “A” grade firm in the post-grade law period is $39.03 per meal, the
grade law results in a net loss of around $1.90 per meal for non-“A” firms. This result is
conditional on other demand and cost shifters faced by firms in both periods, and hence I
interpret this difference as the effect of increased consumer information due to the grade
law on prices.
In column 4 of Table 2.7, I find that an additional employee violation is associated with
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0.7% lower prices in the pre-grade law period and with 1.4% higher prices in the post-grade
law period, for a net increase in prices of 0.7% for every additional employee violation. Since
I assume that higher violations imply larger marginal costs required to improve quality, the
negative effect in the pre-grade law period suggests that prior to the grade law, where there
is little incentive to pay marginal costs to improve quality due to a lack of response on the
demand-side to hygiene quality, more violations may correspond to fewer marginal costs
paid, and could explain why prices are lower for these firms. Firms may lower prices in
these situations in order to stay competitive with other firms; alternatively, prices may be
lower because more employee violations may degrade the the dining experience, and firms
may compensate customers with slightly lower prices rather than pay the marginal costs to
improve quality. However, in the post-grade law period, where there is more incentive to
pay the marginal costs needed to improve quality due to demand response, more violations
may correspond to higher marginal costs paid. If this interpretation holds, then the net
effect represents the fraction of these costs passed on to consumers in the form of higher
prices once information on hygiene quality is publicly available. The ability of firms to pass
through some of these costs of providing quality suggests that, since they sell differentiated
products, they have some market power that enables them to at least partially share the
cost burden of improving their quality with consumers.
Other market characteristics have little effect on pricing. For instance, in my preferred
specification of IV-GMM with firm fixed effects, there is virtually no relationship between
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the average neighbor price and the price charged by the firm in either period, suggesting
that there is an absence of direct price competition in the market. Demand and cost shifters
such as total market sales and the average home sales price also have effectively zero rela-
tionship with price in either period. There is, however, a small relationship between price
charged and the Zagat characteristics. For example, after the grade law, firms are able to
charge higher prices, regardless of quality, if they have a higher Food rating. On the other
hand, characteristics such as Decor or Service, which prior to the grade law were associated
with higher prices (suggesting they may have served as signals of hygiene quality), are neg-
atively correlated with price in the post-grade law period.
The results in columns 3 and 4 of Table 2.7 show some evidence of competitive effects.
Before the grade law, I find that conditional on other factors (including hygiene quality),
firms operating in markets with more high quality firms charge higher prices. Specifically,
a 1% increase in the number of “A” firms in the market in the pre-grade law period leads
to a 1.5% increase in price. This finding shows that firms operating in markets with more
high quality firms in the pre-grade law period are able to charge higher prices, regardless
of their own quality. This may be because firms use price as a signal to suggest that they
are also high quality, or may be related to consumer search costs for quality.18
However, this finding could be endogenous, as prices and the number of firms of each
18For example, Stiglitz (1987) shows that in markets where consumers have higher search costs, more firms
can lead to higher market prices in equilibrium.
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type in a given market may both be correlated with unobserved demand and cost shocks
that could affect, for example, costs of entry. To control for this potential endogeneity, I
instrument for the number of firms of each quality type, in both the pre-grade law and
post-grade law periods. The instrument I use is the number of firms of each type operating
in the market in the previous period interacted with the current period real estate taxes
collected. This variable is meant to proxy both for the market state in the previous period
(which is assumed to be unaffected by current prices) and market trends that could influ-
ence the sunk costs of entry (such as real estate values). Similar instruments have been
used to correct for the endogeneity between market structure and price in studies such as
Mazzeo (2002b) and Singh and Zhu (2008).
The effect of instrumenting for both hygiene quality and the number of firms of each type
is found in columns 5 and 6 of Table 2.7. In column 6 (the specification including firm
fixed effects), I find that the relationship between the number of firms of each type in the
market and price is negative but insignificant in both periods. This is consistent with these
firms, as differentiated product firms, pricing along their own demand curve, as opposed to
competing intensely with other firms in the market. However, there is still a strong and
statistically significant relationship between hygiene quality and price in both periods. In
the pre-grade law period, prices of non-“A” firms are 3.4% higher, whereas in the post-
grade law period, prices of non-“A” firms are approximately 6.8% lower, which assuming
average prices as before corresponds to a net loss of around 3.4% or $1.55 per meal for
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non-“A” firms. Comparing these results to those from columns 3 and 4 of Table 2.7, prices
of low-quality firms decline between 7 to 10% as a result of the grade law. Similarly, there
is still a significant relationship between the number of employee-level violations and price
in both periods. Comparing results from columns 4 and 7 of Table 2.7, I find that prices
are between 0.4% and 0.7% higher for an additional employee violation in the post-grade
law period.
Overall, the results present evidence that lower quality firms must discount their prices in
order to remain competitive after the grade law, but that firms also pass through some of the
costs of improving quality in the form of higher prices. These results point to a combination
of a demand-side effect (lower quality firms charging lower prices) and supply-side effect
(firms charging higher prices under certain market conditions, firms charging consumers
higher prices when they incur costs of improving quality) that has been suggested in the
previous literature.
2.7 Conclusion
Mandatory disclosure laws have known impacts on consumer decision making and firm be-
havior. However, their impact on prices can be ambiguous. Theory suggests that mandatory
disclosure laws could work through demand to lower prices for lower quality firms, or could
work through the supply-side to lead to higher prices due to higher costs or lower price
competition. The effect of these laws on prices is ultimately an empirical question, which I
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pursue in this chapter.
Using a dataset of Zagat rated restaurants for periods prior to and after the introduc-
tion of a law in NYC requiring restaurants to publicly reveal information on their hygiene
quality, I find evidence for both effects. Specifically, I find that the introduction of the
grade law leads to non-“A” quality firms charging approximately 3% to 5% lower prices
than “A” firms relative to the pre-grade law period, which amounts to an average loss
of around $1.50 to $1.90 per meal for non-“A” firms as a result of the grade law. How-
ever, there is no evidence that the introduction of the grade law results in “A” quality
firms charging higher prices. I also find evidence that firms with higher marginal costs
of improving quality charge higher prices after the grade law. These estimates are robust
to unobserved demand or cost conditions in that they incorporate a pre-post design, along
with instrumental variable techniques and firm fixed effects to identify the effects of interest.
The results suggest that mandatory disclosure laws benefit “A” quality firms, but can
lead to a decline in profits for non-“A” quality firms. I cannot conclude, however, that
margins fall for non-“A” quality firms as a result of the grade law. It is possible that,
while these firms lower prices, they may also degrade other aspects of product quality, such
as Food quality, to lower costs (for example by purchasing less expensive or lower quality
ingredients). I have attempted to control for this in the model by including the Zagat
characteristic variables. However, without data on revenues, I am unable to fully model
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whether non-“A” firms would have the market power to lower costs in order to maintain the
same level of margins as before the grade law, and therefore it is not clear what effect these
price changes actually had on the consumer’s dining experience. I can only infer from the
results that consumers are compensated for lower hygiene quality in the form of lower prices.
Since I find little evidence that competition with other quality types in the market matters
for pricing decisions in either period, it may be that these firms, as differentiated product
firms, are pricing along their own demand curve. In a differentiated products market, firms
with lower quality may still find in profitable to operate, however the evidence suggests they
need to offer lower prices in order to remain competitive. However, I find evidence that
in the pre-grade law period, non-“A” quality firms may be able to exploit the asymmetry
of information on their product’s quality and charge higher prices to consumers. In other
words, mandatory disclosure negates some of the market power of lower quality firms, as
it allows for vertical sorting of consumers on hygiene quality. The results indicate that the
demand-side effects dominate, though firms still appear to have some ability to pass-through
the costs of obtaining higher quality in the form of higher prices. These findings indicate
the presence of some supply-side effects, although ultimately lower quality firms still charge
lower prices, all else equal.
The results do not take into account additional factors, such as dynamics in pricing. For
example, it may be that certain unobserved costs are correlated over time, or that demand
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conditions make prices sticky. An extension to this research could be to use dynamic panel
data methods in firm pricing decisions. Allowing for dynamics in firm pricing, for example
by controlling for the lagged previous period price in the model, allows the econometri-
cian to control for these unobserved cost or demand factors that may affect prices and be
correlated over time. My data are a classic example of “Big N, Small T” data suggested
for use by Arellano and Bond (1991), and estimation techniques in that paper could be
used to control for the endogeneity of lagged price in the regression equation. I have not
experimented with this extension, but could do so in future research.
Furthermore, an additional extension would be to explore how the effects of various
factors controlled for in the model (see Table 2.6) change depending on the hygiene quality
type of the firm. For example, the results suggest that firms operating in higher quality
markets charge higher prices after the grade law. This finding controls for the quality type
of the firm, but do “A” firms charge prices that are significantly higher than “B” or “C”
firms in these market scenarios? Alternative regression specifications could be suggested
to better understand that relationship, however all experiments I have done to this point
have been inconclusive, likely due to a lack of variation in the data. Nevertheless, a closer
examination of whether some of the findings on firm pricing in different market scenarios
vary with quality types is needed for future research.
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics: Pre-Grade Law vs. Post-Grade Law
Variable Pre Post Diff. p-value
Average Inspection Score 20.77 13.73 -7.04 0
Percentage of “A” firms in market 0.33 0.67 0.34 0
Percentage of “B” firms in market 0.41 0.26 -0.15 0
Percentage of “C” firms in market 0.26 0.07 -0.19 0
Total Annual Market Sales (millions) 283.69 301.97 18.28 0
Avg. Annual Market Sales Price (millions) 2.23 3.41 1.18 0
Avg. Neighbor Price 38.14 37.92 -0.22 0.30
Food Rating 20.92 22.04 1.12 0
Decor Rating 15.95 17.15 1.20 0
Service Rating 18.22 19.45 1.23 0
Avg. Employee Violations 1.49 1.35 -0.15 0
Price 38.77 38.07 -0.7 0.15
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Table 2.2: Summary Statistics: Pre-Grade Law vs. Post-Grade Law, By Grade Choice
Pre-Grade Law Post-Grade Law
Grade A B C A B C
Percentage of “A” firms in market 0.38 0.32 0.32 0.69 0.61 0.59
Percentage of “B” firms in market 0.39 0.45 0.39 0.25 0.32 0.27
Percentage of “C” firms in market 0.24 0.23 0.30 0.06 0.07 0.14
Total Annual Market Sales (millions) 279.66 288.35 281.17 308.39 289.55 285.56
Avg. Annual Market Sales Price (millions) 2.24 2.28 2.12 3.76 2.73 2.48
Avg. Employee Violations 0.82 1.56 2.33 1.05 1.83 2.50
Food Rating 21.09 20.95 20.62 22.13 21.91 21.62
Decor Rating 15.99 15.98 15.84 17.47 16.59 15.96
Service Rating 18.29 18.29 18.01 19.65 19.15 18.50
Price 39.03 39.19 37.63 39.23 36.13 33.20
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Table 2.3: Average Prices by Grade Choice, Information Environment
Grade Avg. Price: Pre-Grade Law Avg. Price: Post-Grade Law Diff.
A $ 39.03 $ 39.23 $ 0.19
B $ 39.19 $ 36.13 −$3.06∗∗∗
C $ 37.63 $ 33.20 −$4.43∗∗∗
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 2.4: Average Prices by Grade Choice, Quality Distribution, Information
Environment
Pre-Grade Law Post-Grade Law
Grade Majority non-“A” Firms Majority “A” Firms Majority non-“A” Firms Majority “A” Firms
A $ 39.93 $ 37.16 $ 36.54∗ $ 39.40∗
B $ 39.04 $ 39.86 $ 36.08∗ $ 36.14∗∗∗
C $ 37.02 $ 39.90 $ 28.85∗∗∗ $ 34.36∗∗∗
Significance of cross-period differences by group
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 2.5: Average Prices by Pre-Grade Law Choice
Grade Avg. Price: Pre-Grade Law Avg. Price: Post-Grade Law Diff.
A-Graded Pre $ 39.28 $ 39.00 -$0.28
Not A-Grade Pre $ 38.66 $ 37.99 -$0.67
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.6: List of variables in xit
Variable Type
Log Number “A” Neighbors Demand Shifter
Log Number “B” Neighbors Demand Shifter
Log Number “C” Neighbors Demand Shifter
Log Number of Non-Zagat Neighbors Demand Shifter
Food Rating Demand Shifter
Decor Rating Demand Shifter
Service Rating Demand Shifter
Avg. Annual Employee Violations Cost Shifter
Log Avg. Neighbor Price Demand/Cost Shifter
Log Total Market Sales Demand/Cost Shifter
Log Avg. Property Sales Price Demand/Cost Shifter
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Table 2.7: Effects of Mandatory Disclosure on Firm Pricing Behavior
OLS IV-GMM: Set 1 IV-GMM: Set 2
Dependent Variable : Log Price (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Grade Law -0.750** 0.0405 -0.253 0.0857 -0.00975 -0.0287
(0.297) (0.0961) (0.276) (0.0703) (0.574) (0.128)
Non-“A” Graded 0.0260** -0.000860 0.290*** 0.0508*** 0.241*** 0.0344***
(0.0109) (0.00306) (0.0601) (0.00974) (0.0562) (0.00979)
Grade Law x Non-“A” Graded -0.0124 -0.00307 -0.176*** -0.101*** -0.135** -0.0687***
(0.0134) (0.00521) (0.0605) (0.0265) (0.0587) (0.0249)
Log Number “A” Neighbors -0.0192 0.00660 -0.0510** 0.0145** -0.0740 -0.00775
(0.0148) (0.00573) (0.0208) (0.00653) (0.0887) (0.0199)
Log Number “B” Neighbors -0.0192 -0.00306 -0.0271 -0.00488 0.222* -0.0197
(0.0170) (0.00555) (0.0192) (0.00497) (0.130) (0.0159)
Log Number “C” Neighbors -0.0200 -0.00612 -0.0154 -0.00404 -0.173* -0.0140
(0.0163) (0.00493) (0.0203) (0.00440) (0.0897) (0.0131)
Grade Law x Log Number of “A” Neighbors -0.0271 0.00241 0.0287 0.00887 0.106 -0.0214
(0.0299) (0.00768) (0.0349) (0.00601) (0.133) (0.0468)
Grade Law x Log Number of “B” Neighbors 0.0145 0.00269 0.00887 0.00447 -0.220 0.0433
(0.0272) (0.00538) (0.0270) (0.00430) (0.136) (0.0307)
Grade Law x Log Number of “C” Neighbors 0.0256 -0.00174 0.0151 -0.00442 0.193* -0.0205
(0.0155) (0.00471) (0.0188) (0.00365) (0.103) (0.0170)
Log Avg. Neighbor Price 0.0349 -0.00103 0.0489** -0.00904 0.0173 -0.00704
(0.0283) (0.00816) (0.0209) (0.00884) (0.0245) (0.00953)
Log Number of Non-Zagat Neighbors -0.0908*** 0.0276 -0.102*** 0.0191 -0.150*** 0.0206
(0.0207) (0.0171) (0.0239) (0.0200) (0.0429) (0.0275)
Log Total Market Sales 0.135*** 0.0134 0.158*** 0.000304 0.126*** 0.0198
(0.0171) (0.0138) (0.0159) (0.0111) (0.0370) (0.0167)
Log Avg. Property Sales Price 0.0127 0.00146 0.0266** 0.00258 0.0132 0.000427
(0.0127) (0.00257) (0.0105) (0.00272) (0.0206) (0.00355)
Avg. Annual Employee Violations 0.00762*** 0.000806 -0.0408*** -0.00722*** -0.0312*** -0.00537**
(0.00258) (0.00128) (0.0117) (0.00212) (0.0112) (0.00216)
Food Rating -0.00343 -0.00408* -0.00657 -0.00712*** -0.00769 -0.00671***
(0.00458) (0.00226) (0.00458) (0.00197) (0.00499) (0.00193)
Decor Rating 0.0498*** 0.00531*** 0.0545*** 0.00509*** 0.0550*** 0.00539***
(0.00197) (0.00187) (0.00154) (0.00173) (0.00162) (0.00174)
Service Rating 0.0705*** 0.00438*** 0.0658*** 0.00403*** 0.0638*** 0.00261**
(0.00449) (0.00157) (0.00380) (0.000918) (0.00404) (0.00114)
Grade Law x Log Avg. Neighbor Price 0.0257 -0.00491 0.0222 0.00377 0.0551** 0.00382
(0.0218) (0.00909) (0.0182) (0.00356) (0.0263) (0.00506)
Grade Law x Log Number of Non-Zagat Neighbors -0.0292** -0.00194 -0.0156 -0.000154 0.0337 0.00376
(0.0141) (0.00560) (0.0155) (0.00437) (0.0473) (0.00830)
Grade Law x Log Total Market Sales 0.0149 -0.00209 -0.0146 -0.00629 -0.0551 -0.00251
(0.0191) (0.00575) (0.0147) (0.00397) (0.0406) (0.0119)
Grade Law x Log Avg. Property Sales Price 0.0172* 0.000507 0.00829 0.000789 0.0203 0.00193
(0.00892) (0.00260) (0.00850) (0.00191) (0.0191) (0.00395)
Grade Law x Avg. Annual Employee Violations 0.00345 -0.00154 0.0330*** 0.0139*** 0.0244** 0.00964**
(0.00571) (0.00161) (0.0114) (0.00463) (0.0113) (0.00457)
Grade Law x Food Rating 0.00747** 0.00338** 0.00714** 0.00309*** 0.00574* 0.00300***
(0.00319) (0.00146) (0.00298) (0.000796) (0.00323) (0.000917)
Grade Law x Decor Rating 0.000967 -0.00280*** -0.00430** -0.00245*** -0.00492** -0.00180***
(0.00229) (0.000624) (0.00204) (0.000559) (0.00198) (0.000638)
Grade Law x Service Rating 0.00385 -0.000666 0.0139*** -0.000473 0.0172*** -0.000930
(0.00313) (0.000913) (0.00341) (0.000576) (0.00358) (0.000645)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 7,713 7,713 6,077 5,528 5,862 5,318
RMSE 0.252 0.0544 0.265 0.0581 0.266 0.0576
IV-GMM Sets 1 and 2: Hygiene quality instrumented for using 2 lags of inspection results
IV-GMM Set 2: Market distribution instrumented for using interaction between lagged market distribution and market-level real estate taxes
Zipcode cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Chapter 3
Mandatory Disclosure, Quality Choice,
and Competition of Bagel Shops
3.1 Introduction
In Chapter 1, I estimated the payoffs to differentiated products firms from entering with,
investing in and maintaining hygiene quality before and after the introduction of the NYC
grade law. I noted in Chapter 1 that in both periods, Zagat rated restaurants have al-
ternative quality characteristics that consumers value in their consumption decisions, and
I argued that because these differentiated products firms face their own demand curves
and are effectively monopoly pricing, the gains from information disclosure (in terms of
increased demand for the new dimension of product quality) may not shift their demand
curve enough for quality improvement to be optimal, and so may not be sufficient (from
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a profit-maximization standpoint) to overcome the corresponding costs of producing high
quality products. Furthermore, the fact that these firms are selling differentiated products
means that the incentives provided by the grade law transmitted through competition with
other firms of different quality types may be lower than in a situation where consumers
respond more uniformly to increased information on hygiene quality. Therefore, the grade
law may not lead to all firms choosing the highest quality possible.
In this chapter, I focus on a sample of restaurants with few observable product quality
characteristics prior to the grade law: bagel shops. As limited service restaurants selling on-
the-go food, bagel shops may have a very different cost structure and face different demand
than full service restaurants such as Zagat rated restaurants. For bagel shops, increased
information on hygiene quality as a result of the grade law may lead to more demand and
competition on hygiene quality. The grade law provides more information to consumers
on firm product qualities, which can shift the demand curve for firms depending on their
quality, and the gains from that information will transmit through consumption choices, a
“demand response”. This may result in consumers sorting over firms on the new vertical
quality dimension, and the change in consumer preferences driven by the new information
on product quality may impact the relationship between firm quality choices and the quality
type of their rivals in the market. A key focus of this chapter is estimating this relationship
between competition and product quality choice, and how it is affected by the introduction
of the grade law.
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Local geographic markets (zipcodes) in this industry are concentrated: I find that on
average there are 3 or fewer firms operating in a market in a given year. Evidence suggests
that bagel shops also tend to have high entry costs relative to their cash flow, which may
make it unprofitable to enter with high quality. These entry costs may also serve as barriers
to entry to future competitors, further complicating the incentive to provide better quality.
The effectiveness of the grade law may vary depending on the market structure, since firms
operating as a monopoly in their market may have less incentive to improve hygiene quality
relative to firms operating with additional competitors. In my results, I find that entering
the market with high quality is more expensive than with low quality, which may keep high
quality firms from entering a market, especially if competition prevents them from earning
enough to pay down the entry costs over time. For incumbent firms, without the grade law
there may be little incentive to improve or alter hygiene quality, since there is no consumer
demand response to incentivize quality improvements.1 As discussed in Chapter 1, the
grade law was introduced in part to combat this inertia by shifting the demand curve for
quality outward, incentivizing firms to supply more quality in order to capture this demand.
The theoretical and empirical evidence on the relationship between competition and qual-
ity provision is mixed. On the one hand, one may expect to see payoffs decreasing in the
number of firms of the same quality type, and increasing in the number of firms of a lower
1The data support this hypothesis, in that there is little variation in (conditional on no exit) grades over
time in the pre-grade law period.
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quality type. Intuitively, a firm in a market with more low quality rivals can differenti-
ate itself by choosing higher quality and steal market share; however, once a firm is in a
market with many firms of the same type, that differentiation is gone. Nevertheless, in a
market with more high quality rivals, the information from the grade law still incentivizes
that firms choose high quality in order to maintain share. There is a tradeoff between
the increased share that a high quality firm can capture from having high quality, and the
lowering of the price-cost margin as a result of increased competition, which can make the
sign of the relationship between competition and quality theoretically ambiguous. Addi-
tionally, having higher quality may also attract consumers to the market (a market size
effect) making it more attractive to operate with high quality in markets with more high
quality types, and less attractive to operate with high quality in markets with more low
quality types. Consumers may sort over markets first (assuming low to zero transportation
costs, as may be the case in NYC with its wide transit system and relatively small area) to
find high quality firms that they might enjoy, and then sort over firms based on other crite-
ria (or just randomly) once they arrive in the high quality market. In these markets, firms
may also need to provide higher quality in order to maintain share or steal share from rivals.
Assuming that in the pre-grade law period there is no vertical dimension of quality at bagel
shops, consumers make decisions based on their individual preferences for the horizontally
differentiated components of the product, such as proximity in geographic or characteristic
space. Without information on quality, more competition could be expected to generally
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lower profits, which would occur regardless of quality type. With the introduction of the
grade law, a vertical dimension of product quality is introduced, and firms can use hygiene
quality to vertically differentiate themselves. This may shift the equilibrium quality supply
decisions of firms and affect the returns to quality from operating in different market envi-
ronments. Furthermore, competition can matter for the induced supply response: firms face
the prospect that not only they but also their competitors are now making supply decisions
over quality, since not only can consumers see their quality, but also that of their competi-
tors, and they sort over all qualities in the market to make their choice. In a market with
all high quality firms, the advantage from having high quality may vanish, and consumers
may resort back to sorting over the horizontal dimensions of the product. However, the
presence of other high quality firms in the market may be sufficient to incentivize the firm
to also provide a high quality product, what I refer to as a competitive response.
Ultimately, the relationship between competition and quality, and how it is affected by
mandatory disclosure, is an empirical question. I estimate how the equilibrium choice of
each quality type as a function of the competitive landscape faced by the firm changes after
the law is introduced. Assuming quality is costly to invest in or maintain, forward-looking
firms will only improve quality if it means increased payoffs in the future. If a firm is in
a market with more high quality firms, and consumers are willing to substitute away from
low quality firms, then to stay competitive, the firm may need to invest more in quality in
markets where there are more high quality firms than they otherwise would have absent the
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law. Depending on the costs of operating with or adjusting to high quality, the competitive
effect could be what drives the increase in the proportion of high quality firms across mar-
kets after the grade law is introduced.
As in Chapter 1, I estimate a dynamic model of the hygiene quality choices of bagel firms
across zipcodes from 2007-2013, separately analyzing the pooled data in the pre and post
grade law periods. I incorporate firm-level permanent unobserved heterogeneity to proxy for
the unobserved time invariant demand and cost shifters for each firm. The estimated model
results are sensitive and largely insignificant in both periods, suggesting that there is not
enough variation in the data to successfully identify the payoff parameters of interest in the
dynamic model. However, though preliminary, I do find evidence of relatively large entry
costs for all firms, and also find that entry costs are larger for investing in high low quality).
However, I find that operating payoffs in the pre-grade period are low, suggesting that to the
extent they are identified, operating costs for bagel shops may be small. In the post-grade
period, I find evidence of a large demand response leading to big gains for high quality
and big losses for low quality in terms of operating payoffs, though this effect is noisy given
that most of the parameters in the pre-grade law and post-grade law period are insignificant.
I find that in the pre-grade law period there is mixed evidence on the importance of com-
petition with other quality types, and most of the results do not seem to be well-identified.
However, in the post-grade period, there is strong and statistically significant evidence that
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high quality firms benefit (and low quality firms lose) from being in markets with more high
quality firms. I interpret this result as evidence of strategic complementarities (positive
payoffs from operating in market with more firms of the same type) once information dis-
closure is introduced. This effect is only for high quality firms, which is consistent with the
idea that high quality is what we would expect to be rewarded under information disclo-
sure, particularly in a market where firms have few other observable quality characteristics.
This suggests that the introduction of the grade law leads to a competitive response, where
firms choose high quality because they are operating in markets with more high quality
rivals. Over time, the endogeneity of this relationship, which I capture in my model, can
explain the increase in the proportion of high quality firms operating across markets. I
interpret this as evidence that the effects of mandatory disclosure are primarily transmitted
through competition. However, I do caveat that the results are preliminary and may be
under-identified due to a lack of variation in hygiene quality choices for certain markets. I
suggest alternative normalizations for future research that may improve identification, but
change the model results.
In order to explore how competition and entry costs contribute to the predicted market
distribution of quality types in the data, I estimate counterfactuals where in one set of
experiments I permute entry costs and in another set of experiments I permute competition
parameters, separately for the pre-grade law and post-grade law periods. My entry cost
experiments focus on the effect of incremental increases in entry costs for low quality firms
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and incremental decreases in entry costs for high quality firms. My experiments involving
competition parameters permute the payoffs from operating with “A” quality in markets
with more “A” quality firms, allowing me to analyze how important competition is for the
effectiveness of mandatory disclosure. Because of the concentrated nature of the industry, I
examine the counterfactual results overall as well as broken out by initial market structure
(monopoly, duopoly or oligopoly) in order to determine whether market outcomes vary de-
pending on the initial market structure. The counterfactual predictions are sensitive to how
well my model fits the data on these initial market structures, as I find the model performs
better under duopoly or oligopoly market structures than monopoly.
In the counterfactuals targeting entry costs, I find that increasing costs of entering with
“B” or “C” quality and lowering costs of entering with “A” quality can improve quality
both with and without mandatory disclosure; however, improvements are larger in the pre-
grade law period. This suggests that the gains from mandatory disclosure somewhat offset
the entry costs, such that the benefits from lowering entry costs are lower when theres an
additional compensating factor from demand response also available. However, as in Chap-
ter 1, the finding suggests that an alternative approach to achieving the same outcomes as
mandatory disclosure may be found through targeting costs, in this case entry costs with
low or high quality.
In the counterfactuals targeting high quality payoffs from competition with other high
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quality firms, I find that in the post-grade law period, removing any payoff from competition
with high quality rivals matters a great deal for incentivizing high quality choice. Specifi-
cally, the experiment shows that removing these payoffs can almost completely reverse the
predicted effect of mandatory disclosure. Improving high quality payoffs from same-type
competition also can do just as well as removing the costs of high quality entry, suggest-
ing that firms receive a large benefit from competition with other high quality firms under
mandatory disclosure, and that promoting this competition can improve the proportion of
firms choosing “A” quality. However, I find that these results only hold for the post-grade
period. In the pre-grade period, where there is no information disclosure, permuting the
payoffs of competition with more high quality firms has no effect, suggesting that the ef-
fects of competition are purely driven by the demand-side response as a result of increased
information.
Though preliminary and sensitive to the ability of the model to use the underlying vari-
ation in the data to identify the parameters of interest, my findings contribute to the
literature on the relationship between competition and quality choice, especially as it re-
lates to the effectiveness of mandatory disclosure policies. The findings support the theory
that with information disclosure, competition incentivizes firms to invest more in quality,
in a dynamic setting where firms are forward looking and maximizing current and expected
payoffs. While Chapter 1 found that targeting costs directly can lead to more “A” quality
firms than mandatory disclosure, this chapter shows that information disclosure is necessary
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to encourage competition in quality and promote choice of high quality.
3.2 Industry and Data
3.2.1 The NYC Bagels Industry
Bagels are a quintessential “New York City” food.2 Beginning in the late 19th century,
Eastern European immigrants brought their skills as bagel bakers to New York, and by
1915 a bagel bakers union had formed. Over time, the bagels industry has grown and the
technology has developed considerably. For instance, in 1960 Dan Thompson invented the
first machine for making bagels, whereas until that time, all bagels were hand rolled.
In NYC, bagels are traditionally hand rolled and made in-house, where the baker bakes
fresh bagels for immediate consumption (from dough made at the bagel shop or made else-
where). However, some bagel shops purchase their bagels wholesale from larger suppliers,
and some bagels may be machine-made. Bagels can be somewhat differentiated in terms
of flavors, with flavors ranging from traditional (plain wheat, rye, salt, egg, poppy-seed,
sesame, onion, garlic, “everything”), to more modern flavors such as cinnamon raisin or
dried tomato and herb. It is also common to add cream cheese to bagels, which comes
in many varieties. However, there are not usually price differentials across these different
varieties of cream cheese or bagel flavors. Due to their size and portability, bagels are a
popular “on-the-go” food item. Typically, most consumers view bagels as a breakfast or
2The information in this section is largely taken from http://www.encyclopedia.com/topic/Bagel.aspx
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lunch food item, although most shops also sell cold and hot bagel sandwiches for consump-
tion at dinner time.
In this sense, while bagels may vary on shape, size, ingredients, and price, prior to the
grade law there is no clear vertical dimension of product quality for bagel shops. Customers
may have a loyalty to one bagel shop over another, and bagel shops may be horizontally dif-
ferentiated in characteristic or geographic space, with consumers preferring the “local” bagel
shop. The grade law, which introduces information on product hygiene quality, introduces
a vertical dimension of product quality that might impact consumption choices and hence
would impact the relationship between competition on hygiene quality. The assumption is
that with this new information, customer elasticity of demand with respect to quality is such
that a customer would be willing to switch to another bagel place if quality was degraded,
and so firms can use the information on hygiene quality to vertically differentiate themselves.
Bagel shops tend to have fairly low marginal costs, due to lower labor costs and also
inexpensive ingredients. Generally, all bagels must contain at least the following: water,
salt, flour, and yeast, all of which are relatively low cost to procure, though the quality of
ingredients, particularly the flour and yeast, is important. However, fixed or sunk costs,
which can include production equipment, the restaurant space itself, as well as training and
quality control, may be high. For example, the process of making bagels involves some skill
and care. Temperatures for water and the temperature of the flour before mixing must
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be precisely monitored or yeast will not activate properly. It takes an experienced bagel
baker to know when to remove inferior or malformed bagels from the oven belt, as well as
monitoring baking regardless of what the timer reads. This could lead to many ingredients
being wasted and bagels being made that are then unfit for sale, if the production process
is not operating with efficiency and care.
Quality control, and particularly maintaining product hygiene quality, is also an impor-
tant factor in the production process. For example, the life span of the yeast must dictate
handling priorities. It is imperative to know the age of the raw product as indicated on the
tags attached to the boards. Furthermore, because bagels are made with raw ingredients
and at times can contain eggs, and also because cream cheese has the potential to become
contaminated if exposed or incorrectly handled, proper handling and care of food ingredi-
ents is important to maintain a level of hygiene quality. All of this involves training and
refinement that may require significant sunk investment costs.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that variable costs in the bagel industry are low. Levitt
(2006) estimates that on average (in 2010 dollars) bagels sold wholesale for $1.07 cost $0.35
to make, for a variable cost margin of 67%. An example from a bagel shop in Manhattan
suggests that, for a restaurant doing about $1.16 million per year in sales, variable profit
margins are on the order of 45%.3 However, Table 3.1 shows that overall cash flow margins
3See http://blogs.baruch.cuny.edu/dollarsandsense/2011/06/08/government-loans-give-rise-to-a-local-
bagel-shop/
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are lower (around 21%), and in the same example as above, the owner estimates overall
margins (presumably including fixed costs) at around 15%, suggesting that fixed costs play
a role in the firm’s ability to continually operate.4 In Table 3.1, I calculate that a bagel
costs around $2 on average, though this can vary depending on factors such as location and
competition. Compared to the average prices of full-service Zagat rated restaurants ana-
lyzed in Chapter 2, bagels are clearly a lower cost option for consumers, which could drive
demand, especially once the grade law is introduced. However, the relatively low prices of
bagels may also mean that consumers might not be sensitive to hygiene quality changes, as
they are already consuming a relatively low-cost item.
Table 3.1 shows that startup costs for bagel shops are relatively high compared to annual
sales. Purchasing an existing business (including land value) is over twice as expensive
as starting up by renting a 1,500 square foot store. However, even renting the store out
costs about $238,500 on average, or 22% of annual sales, below the annual cash flow margin
(meaning that a firm would need to be in operation for over a year in order to cover their
entry costs). As a result, markets are highly concentrated, where on average 3 or fewer
firms operate (see Table 3.2). Relatively high rates of entry and exit suggest that it is hard
for new entrants to earn a profit and obtain the scale needed to pay back their entry costs,
though once they do so, they can maintain their incumbency and prevent new entry from
4It is worth noting that these cash flow margins are still above most other margin levels in the restaurant
industry, likely due to the relatively low marginal costs of production. According to anecdotal evidence, it
is common for limited-service restaurants to have margins above 30%, compared to full-service restaurants
which mostly operate at below 15% margins.
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competitors. The degree to which entry costs affect the distribution of quality types in the
market before versus after the grade law is further explored in the analysis below.
An additional barrier to entry that can explain the market concentration observed in the
data is that incumbent firms may benefit from reputation with repeat or “loyal” consumers
within their local markets, which can make it hard for new entrants to capture share.5
An important factor about the grade law, then, is how it enables new and existing firms
to use the new information on product quality available to consumers to potentially steal
share from rivals by improving quality, which as discussed below can lead to a positive
best response function to rival qualities. One element that I explore in this chapter is how
firms compete on quality choice depending on the existing distribution of quality types
they compete against in the market. As I discuss below, this ties into a long literature
on the interaction between competition and quality, and can shed light on how mandatory
disclosure works through competition to incentivize quality improvement.
3.2.2 Data
Inspection results are from the NYC Restaurant Inspections database, and are aggregated
according to the same method used in Chapter 1. I filter the set of restaurants to only
include bagel shops, which are identified as those restaurants including “Bagel” in the
name.6 The data do not include any restaurant that might be part of a national bagel
5See Balinska (2008), p.155
6It is possible that this selection method misses some bagel shops; however, in the absence of a full outside
database of firms that primarily manufacture and sell bagels, I determine this to be the most conservative
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chain (e.g. Bruegger’s Bagels, Einstein Bagels) or a large entity that might manufacture
bagels in addition to other baked items (e.g. Dunkin Donuts). All told, from 2007 to 2013
there are 451 unique bagel shops across 117 zipcodes in the sample, or approximately 3.85
shops per zipcode. To control for market demand and cost conditions in the estimation, I
use the same set of variables as in Chapter 1, with the exception of using non-bagel shops
as a control for “other restaurants”, and using total dollar sales rather than total potential
meals as a measure of market demand.
3.3 Summary Statistics
Table 3.2 presents firm-level summary statistics for both the pre-grade law and post-grade
law periods. Average scores are higher pre-grade law versus post-grade law, suggesting that
firms are investing in quality more after the grade law period begins. There is an increase of
about 30% in the proportion of “A” firms in the market in the post-grade law period, while
the percentage of “B” or “C” firms declines. As in Chapter 1, the lack of full convergence
to “A” quality may be related to costs. Interestingly, the large majority of the decline in
low quality firms in the post-grade law period is for “B” firms, as “C” firms only decline by
about 3% relative to pre-grade law levels. However, there are also lower percentages of “C”
firms on average in the pre-grade law period, and it appears that the lack of information
on hygiene quality primarily results in firms choosing to have “B” quality. This could
method of identifying bagel shops. Given the sample size, I do not expect that results would be generally
different even with the inclusion of additional restaurants in the sample.
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suggest that bagel shops do not have to pay large costs to obtain a “B”, but obtaining “A”
quality is more costly. Markets have slightly more incumbents inspected after the grade law,
though the rate of growth for non-bagel restaurants is much higher, suggesting that bagel
shops remain concentrated due to the reasons discussed above even after the grade law. It
is worth noting that markets in both periods are fairly concentrated, with only around 3
bagel shops being inspected per year. This may result in the competition parameters being
under-identified due to a lack of variation in the data across markets. Finally, total dollars
spent on food services increased between the pre-grade and post-grade law periods, however
the average property sales price did not significantly change.
Hygiene quality transition functions for the pre-grade law and post-grade law periods are
presented in Table 3.3 and Table 3.4. The tables show the probability that incumbent firms
will change quality type or exit in time t + 1, given their quality type at time t. Current
quality matters for the likelihood of quality investment/divestment. In the pre-grade law
period, there is a low likelihood of transitioning away from the current grade, which could
mean that adjustment payoffs in the pre-grade law period will be under-identified.
In the post-grade law period, firms with an “A” are far more likely than any other quality
type to retain their existing grade (nearly 73% of “A” firms retain their “A” quality). The
difference in grade retention likelihood in the pre-grade law versus post-grade law period,
as well as across quality types, suggests that consumer response to firms’ grades, along with
market conditions, may have an influence on firms’ decisions regarding the relative trade-
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off between payoffs from operating with a certain grade and payoffs from quality adjustment.
Table 3.5 shows the distribution of “entry” grades, both prior to and after the grade
law. Entry with “A” quality is higher after the grade law is introduced, while entry with
“B” quality falls by more than entry with “C” quality relative to the pre-grade law period.
This again suggests that entry is less profitable with low quality in the post-grade law
period, likely owing to consumers ability to observe and sort on quality. However, even
under the grade law, entry with “A” quality only comprises about 60% of overall entry
quality, suggesting that entry costs may still prevent firms from entering with high quality.
Additionally, I find (not shown) that entry rates overall are lower in the post-grade law
period relative to the pre-grade law period, suggesting that the payoffs from entering are
overall lower after the grade law is introduced.
3.3.1 Grade Choice by Distribution of Quality Types
Figure 3.1 describes the evolution of the grade distribution across markets over time, along
with the trend in inspections results (the vertical line indicates when the grade law was
introduced). The figure displays a generally upward trend in the proportion of “A” firms,
and a generally downward trend in the proportion of “B” firms. However, the change in
“C” firms is relatively flat. Moreover, starting in 2012, there is a leveling off and even slight
reversal in the growth of “A” firms and the decline of “B” firms, possibly due to increased
competition or the presence of costs to providing quality.
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Figure 3.2 describes the evolution of quality choices across markets over time, as a func-
tion of the proportion of competitors of each type in the market. The graph shows that the
choice of “A” quality is increasing over time, regardless of market competition, and choices
of “B” and “C” qualities are decreasing. However, the graph also shows that the choice
of “A” quality tends to increase more in markets with a higher proportion of “A” firms,
while the choices of “B” and “C” qualities also tend to increase more in markets with higher
proportion of firms with that product quality type. Therefore, these results suggest benefits
from operating in markets with more firms of the same quality type, especially once the
grade law is introduced.
In Table 3.6 and Table 3.7, I show the relationship between incumbent/entrant quality
choices and the proportion of rival quality types in the market, depending on the information
environment. In the post-grade law period, it is much more likely for firms to have high
quality, regardless of the market, as well as to have high quality in markets with more
high quality type firms. Therefore, the evidence generally suggests that the improvement
towards higher quality types on average is largely due to adjustment from lower to higher
quality being made by incumbents, as opposed to low quality firms exiting the market.
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3.4 Theory and Empirical Approach
This study is primarily focused on understanding the interaction between competition and
product quality choice before and after the grade law is introduced. The theoretical and
empirical literature on the interaction between competition and product quality is mixed.
Below, I present a brief summary of the literature, as well as a simple theoretical example
to illustrate some of the findings from this study. I then discuss the empirical approach used
in this study to uncover the payoffs to firm quality choices under the different information
environments, including the payoffs to operating in markets with more firms of different
quality types.
3.4.1 Theoretical and Empirical Literature
The literature on competition and product quality mainly focuses on the following tradeoff:
when demand is responsive to product quality, more competition incentivizes higher qual-
ity, because firms can improve their quality and steal share from competitors, a “market
share” effect. This can lead to a positive relationship between competition and quality,
where improving and maintaining high quality types in markets with more high quality
firms is valuable to forward-looking firms, since otherwise they would lose share to their
competitors. Firms with high quality levels may also gain from operating in markets with
more low quality rivals, as they can steal consumers that prefer higher quality products.
More high quality firms may also attract more customers to a market, leading to a “mar-
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ket size” effect. This can also lead to a positive relationship between competition and
quality, where a firm chooses high quality in markets with more high quality firms because
the presence of high quality competitors attracts more customers to the market, and the
firm wants to compete for share.7
However, increased competition may also lead to lower prices and lower the price-cost mar-
gin. Because providing a certain level of product quality involves both fixed and marginal
costs, firms that are profit-maximizing by choosing quality and price will need to trade-off
the benefits of having a certain quality type (increased demand for their product) with the
costs of providing that quality. Whether it is profit-maximizing to operate as a high quality
firm in markets with more high quality firms will depend on the shape of the demand curve
for quality, as well as cost structure at the firm. Since more competition with the same-
quality type firms could put downward pressure on prices (absent any other differentiating
characteristics), and assuming costs are increasing in quality, competition with more high
quality firms will have a negative effect on choice of high quality and will reduce the incen-
tive to provide higher quality, a “price competition” effect. Therefore, the overall effect of
competition on quality can be ambiguous.
The early literature on competition and quality, such as Chamberlin (1933) and Abbott
7The “market size” effect and “market share” effects could jointly occur, however the “market size” effect
could make it unprofitable to operate with high quality in a market with more low quality competitors,
since less consumers will visit those markets.
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(1955), argued that firms with market power may reduce product quality to save costs and
maximize profits. However, Swan (1970, 1971) found that there is no relationship between
monopoly power and product quality, and defines conditions under which a competitive
and monopoly market introduce products with same quality, but monopoly exercises mar-
ket power to charge higher price. Douglas and Miller (1974) and Schmalensee (1977) show
that when prices are fixed, the possibility of share stealing can lead to a positive relation-
ship between competition and quality. However, Gaynor (2006) shows that when prices not
fixed, more competition lowers the price/cost margin, which may reduce incentives to invest
in quality; quality investment will ultimately depend on the ratio of the quality elasticity of
demand to price elasticity of demand. Similarly, Katz (2013), examines the different cases in
which healthcare provider competition can affect quality and shows scenarios under which
the relationship between competition and quality could be positive or negative, depending
on the elasticity of demand for quality, as well as the marginal costs to quality production.
Note also that the effect will vary depending on the market structure; a firm facing no
competition (monopoly) will have a different incentive to provide quality than a firm facing
competition (e.g. duopoly). Katz (2013) shows that this is because a monopolist is only
competing against the outside good, whereas a duopolist competes against the outside good
as well as other firms.
Economides (1993) uses a model of variety-differentiated products to show that in a
3-stage game with entry, quality choice and price choice, more brands may lead to un-
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derprovision of quality because each firm has lower demand. Kranton (2003) shows that
competition for market share can eliminate the price premium firms require to maintain
a reputation for high quality, leading to lower quality in the market. Kranton (2003) also
shows that if firms compete in price for market share, both price and quality can fall, as the
price elasticity of demand for quality exceeds the quality elasiticty of demand. However,
Brekke, Siciliani and Straume (2010) generalize Economides (1993) but find that when util-
ity is strictly concave in income (i.e. when there are income effects) that more competition
(measured by lower transport costs) always leads to higher quality. Also they find that if
there is cost substitutability between output and quality, more firms reducing demand will
lead to lower marginal costs of quality and hence an increase in quality. Stucke and Ezrachi
(2015) show that the assumed correlation between competition and quality (i.e. that more
competition will increase quality for a given price) can break down when consumers have
limited ability to assess quality differences, or have imperfect information on quality.
Empirical studies that have found a negative relationship between competition and prod-
uct quality include Mazzeo (2002a) and Dranove, Gron and Mazzeo (2003), which show that
firms prefer to quality differentiate rather than directly compete on quality. Studies that
have found a positive relationship between competition and product quality include Mazzeo
(2003) and Prince and Simon (2014) on airline flight delays, Brueckner and Luo (2013) on
airline flight frequency, Goolsbee and Petrin (2004) on cable TV channel capacity, Hiller
et al. (2015) on TV advertising, Olivares and Cachon (2009) on car dealership inventory,
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Matsa (2011) on supermarket product availability and Kugler and Weiss (2016) on gas sta-
tion opening hours. Perhaps most relevant to this study, Kwok and Studart (2015) use a
two-stage static payoffs model to show that upon introduction of a mandatory disclosure
law similar to the one in NYC, restaurant quality in equilibrium increases in the number
of competitors up to a certain threshold. They conclude that “the pathway through which
information disclosure incentivizes restaurants to invest more in quality is competition”.
Papers using a dynamic games framework to evaluate the relationship between compe-
tition and quality have generally found a negative relationship between competition and
product quality. For example, Lin (2015) finds negative effects of other high quality firms
on the choice of high quality, as well as a similar relationship for low quality choice. However,
no paper that I am aware of compares the relationship between competition and quality
under different information environments, which I do by virtue of analyzing both pre-grade
law and post-grade law quality decision-making. In that sense, my approach is most closely
related to Kwok and Studart (2015), but different in that I use a dynamic, forward looking
decision framework. Matsa (2011) describes tradeoffs facing the firm in the short and long
run. In the short run, lower profit margins under more competition may reduce the imme-
diate cost of losing a sale, so firms may lower/not invest in quality. However, in the long
run, competition can raise likelihood of switching to competitors, so firms improve quality.
Therefore, focusing on dynamics is important.
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3.4.2 Theoretical Motivation
To motivate the relationship between the “market share”, “market size” and “price com-
petition” effects after mandatory disclosure, suppose consumers have the following utility
function:8
uij = θhj − αpj − γ(vi − xj)2
Here, vi represents consumer i’s “location” and xj represents firm j’s “location”, such
that γ captures consumer i’s preferences for the horizontally differentiated component of
firm j. Preferences of consumer i for quality hj are represented by θ, while α represents
consumer i’s disutility from price pj . For simplicity, θ and α are assumed to be the same for
all consumers, with θ > 0, α > 0.9 Finally, assume that hygiene quality hj can be perfectly
observed by consumers (which is the case under mandatory disclosure).
On the supply side, let firm j’s cost function be specified as c(hj) where costs are weakly
increasing in quality hj . Suppose also there are fixed costs to producing quality such that
FC = F (hj), where
∂F
∂hj
≥ 0. Note that given consumer utility as defined above, the
quantity demanded faced by firms will be a function of own and rival prices, qualities and
“locations”. Then firm profits can be specified as:
8The discussion below is borrowed, in part, from Katz (2013).
9Note that the relative locations of consumer i and firm j allows for the market size effect, where consumers
trade-off the disutility of “travel” γ for the utility of consuming higher quality θ.
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pij = [pj − c(hj)]qj(pj , p−j , hj , h−j , xj , x−j ; θ, α, γ)− F (hj)
For simplicity, assume two firms in the market, j and k. Assume that firms set quality
to maximize profits.10 Then:
∂pij
∂hj
= 0 = [pj−c(hj)]∂qj(pj , pk, hj , hk, xj , xk; θ, α, γ)
∂hj
−∂c(hj)
∂hj
qj(pj , pk, hj , hk, xj , xk; θ, α, γ)− ∂F
∂hj
∂pij
∂hk
= [pj − c(hj)]∂qj(pj , pk, hj , hk, xj , xk; θ, α, γ)
∂hk
Note that in equilibrium, hj = f(hk). Therefore, I can re-write the expression above as:
∂pij
∂hk
= [pj − c(hj)]∂qj(pj , pk, hj , hk, xj , xk; θ, α, γ)
∂hj
∂hj
∂hk
Assuming pj − c(hj) > 0, firm j payoffs will be increasing in the quality of firm k if
∂qj(pj ,pk,hj ,hk,xj ,xk;θ,α,γ)
∂hj
> 0 and
∂hj
∂hk
> 0. Notice that qj is a function of preferences for
quality, θ. Since θ > 0, all else equal quantity of good j demanded should be increasing in
the quality of good j, so own payoffs will increase as rival quality increases if and only if own
quality increases as rival quality increases. In other words, if the relationship between own
and rival quality is positive, then it will be profitable for the firm to operate in a market
10For simplicity, prices and locations are assumed fixed, though in a more general model they may be set
in a separate stage.
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with a rival that has higher quality, because the firm has incentive to improve their quality
as a best response to the quality improvement of their rival.
Another way to see this is to rewrite the firm’s profit maximizing quality solution as:
ηj =
∂qj
∂hj
hj
qj
=
hj
[pj − c(hj)]
(
∂c(hj)
∂hj
+
∂F
∂hj
1
qj
)
Note that the right-hand side of the equation is increasing in hj . Assuming that pj −
c(hj) > 0, a change in competitive conditions that raises the elasticity of the firm-specific
demand curve with respect to quality shifts the best response function outward.11 That is,
competition will lead to a greater level of quality at any given price if competition increases
the elasticity of demand with respect to quality. This relationship between the demand for
quality and a firm’s best response to the actions of rivals given that demand defines the
“market share” effect. This effect dominates whenever a firm can profitably compete with
its rivals by raising quality and stealing share. Note that even if there are already other
high quality firms in the market, assuming that consumers demand high quality, the firm
will still have an incentive to provide high quality. However, there is a tradeoff between
the incremental benefit of an additional sale from a certain quality type with the costs of
providing that quality.
11This is because ηj is a function of both hj and hk and therefore the elasticity of demand for own quality
will respond to the quality provided by rivals.
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An additional effect which may lead to a positive relationship between the number of
high quality firms in the market and the choice of high quality is the “market size” effect.
The intuition is that firms operating in markets with high quality rivals find it profitable to
choose high quality because consumers sort into these markets, which raises the likelihood
of the firm being able to capture some of that new business, provided they have sufficiently
high quality. Consider a simple example where consumers first sort over markets based
on the overall distribution of quality in the market, before visiting the market that they
rank the highest. Assume this sorting is costless, but consumers only sort when they have
information on the full distribution of product qualities in a market.12 Suppose also that
even if consumers find a high quality firm they would like to consume at, they may for other
reasons (e.g. price) still choose the outside good (eating at home). Assume that consumers
will purchase a meal at “A” quality firms with probability 25%, at “B” quality firms with
probability 15%, and at “C” quality firms with probability 5%.
Now suppose that in the market, there are 2 “A” firms and 1 “B” firm. For such a market,
the probability that the consumer will not purchase a meal is 0.75 × 0.75 × 0.85 = 0.48.
Compare this to a market where there are 2 “B” firms and 1 “A” firm. There, the probabil-
ity that the consumer will not purchase a meal is 0.75× 0.85× 0.85 = 0.54. Therefore, the
consumer would prefer to go to the market where they have higher likelihood of purchasing
a meal, which would be the market with more “A” firms. Under these assumptions, a firm
12This type of sorting may be costless if transportation costs are low.
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in a market with more “A” firms is likely to have more consumers visit that market. Fur-
thermore, by improving their quality, the firm can attract more consumers to the market
(assuming other firms are also behaving optimally) and capture some additional share. This
is what I define as the “market size” effect, where more firms would prefer to choose high
quality and operate in markets with other high quality firms because this attracts more
consumers to the market and increases the probability that consumers would purchase one
of their products.
If either the market share or market size effect always dominated, then we should only
see “A” firms operating across all markets. The reason that this does not occur is due to
costs. Note that the firm’s optimal quality choice takes into account not only marginal
costs of providing quality, c(hj), but also fixed costs of providing quality, F (hj). If costs of
providing quality are reasonably high, and if there are other rivals competing in the market,
then the price-cost margin pj − c(hj) will fall as more competition puts downward pressure
on prices, a “price competition” effect. Both c(hj) and F (hj) are assumed to be increasing
in quality, but even if costs are constant in quality, the possibility of prices falling with more
competition in a market leads to firms earning less margin on every unit of their product
sold. This may involve cost-cutting by reducing or not improving quality, and could explain
why markets do not only have high quality firms even after mandatory disclosure.
Finally, if hygiene quality is unobserved (as is the case without mandatory disclosure), I
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assume that all consumers expect hygiene quality to be the same across firms, hj = hk = h¯.
In this case, we would not expect a competitive response to rival quality, because as noted
above, the incentive for firms to improve their quality is driven by the elasticity of con-
sumer demand for quality. If all consumers have the same expectations over quality, and
firms cannot alter these expectations with their quality supply decisions, then firms hygiene
quality choices will be solely driven by their costs of providing that level of quality, and
will not respond to the quality choices of rivals, meaning we should not expect to see a
“market share” effect absent disclosure. Furthermore, consumers will not sort over markets
based on overall quality, since from an ex-ante perspective they view all firm qualities as
equal, meaning that we should not expect to see a “market size” effect in the absence of
mandatory disclosure. Therefore, the question of whether the market share/market size or
price competition effect dominates is relevant for the post-grade law period alone, as in the
pre-grade law period we would expect the price competition effect alone to dominate.
Therefore, under mandatory disclosure, there can either be a positive or negative re-
lationship between hygiene quality choice and competition with rivals of different quality
types. A positive relationship between quality and competition suggests that the “market
share” or “market size” effect dominates, while a negative relationship between quality and
competition suggests that the “price competition” effect dominates. Therefore, mandatory
disclosure can potentially benefit firms who operate in markets with more high quality ri-
vals, relative to the case of no information disclosure. Ultimately, showing which effect
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dominates must be done empirically. The empirical approach in this study contributes to
the literature by untangling the relationship between payoffs from different quality choices
and competition with rivals of each quality type.
3.4.3 Empirical Approach
I set up a dynamic model of entry, exit and hygiene quality investment, where I estimate
the following per-period payoff function from hygiene quality choice:
piit(ait,xt|θ) =
∑
α∈A,B,C
1(xit = α)×
(
θα1 + θ
α
2M
D
t + θ
α
3 n
A
t + θ
α
4 n
B
t + θ
α
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C
t + θ
α
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NB
t + θ
α
7M
C
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)
+
∑
α∈A,B,C
∑
k∈S
1(xit = α)× θαk 1(s = k) +
∑
l 6=m,m 6=0
θl,m8 1(xit = l, ait = m) (3.1)
The variables in the model equation above are similar to those specified in Chapter 1. I
solve for the equilibrium parameters, θ, by setting up the conditional value function and
using the same approach discussed in detail in Chapter 1.
It is worth noting that identifying the parameters of the dynamic model requires sufficient
variation in the data across markets and over time, which is discussed in detail in Chapter
1. Without this variation, however, many of the parameters will be not identified or under-
identified, and the results may be noisy, with few estimates being statistically significant.
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Furthermore, the magnitudes of the estimates may be larger or smaller than they would be
if there were more variation in the data to precisely estimate them. This may further result
in an unstable estimated model and counterfactual equilibrium.
Estimating a dynamic model asks much of the data, particularly when relying on the
Arcidiacono and Miller (2011) two-step method with exit as a terminal action to estimate
the parameters in a computationally tractable way. The findings I present below are pre-
liminary, in that I do find evidence that they are subject to a lack of variation and hence a
substantial amount of noise in the estimates. This is not to say that all of the estimates are
not identified or under-identified, as there may be enough variation in the data to estimate
some of the payoff parameters of interest. Rather, the results should be taken as prelimi-
nary, and factors such as the statistical significance of the parameter estimates as well as
the fit of the model, point to where the model falls short in predicting whatever variation
there is in the data.
Given the model estimates presented below, I conclude that the model may not be ade-
quate given the existing level of variation in the data. This presents a few normalizations or
alternate specifications that could hopefully lead to better identification of the parameters
of interest:
1. Normalize one or more of the payoff parameters; for example, assume symmetry in
adjustment payoffs such that θC,B8 = θ
B,A
8 .
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2. Rather than consider the payoffs from the number of firms of each quality type in
the market, consider the payoffs from the number of same-type versus the number of
different-type firms in the market in each period.
3. Separately estimate payoff parameters depending on whether the firm competes against
zero, one, or two or more firms in the market. Such an approach has been used in
other studies such as Collard-Wexler (2013) and Lin (2015) and is a possible future ex-
tension, though identification will depend in the frequency with which each situation
appears in the data.
I will use these model adjustments in future revisions to this research, in order to more
reliably estimate the underlying payoffs driving the quality choices made in the data. How-
ever, I have not incorporated these changes in the results presented, and therefore the results
are preliminary and should be interpreted with caution. Incorporating the suggested model
adjustments may change the parameter estimates, model predictions, and subsequent coun-
terfactual results.
3.4.4 Unobserved Heterogeneity
I incorporate firm-level permanent unobserved heterogeneity, using the approach described
in Arcidiacono and Miller (2011) and discussed in more detail in Chapter 1. Below, in
Tables 3.8 and 3.9, I show how the variables used in the empirical analysis vary across
unobserved states. Overall, there are no significant differences by state for the pre-grade
law period. In the post-grade law period, the evidence suggests that firms in unobserved
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state 2 tend to enter and operate in larger markets with more demand. Table 3.10 shows
the predicted probabilities of being in each state in both the pre-grade law and post-grade
law periods after correcting for the initial conditions problem (see Chapter 1).
3.5 Reduced-Form Estimates
The findings from the multinomial logit regressions for potential entrants in Table 3.11 show
that there is generally no systematic relationship between entry with a particular quality
type, and the number of competitors of that quality type operating in the market. In the
pre-grade law period, the sign of the competitive effect is negative regardless of the quality
being chosen, or the quality type of the competitors. In the post-grade law period, only the
choice of “B” upon entry is positively related to the presence of competitors, but again the
effect is generally insignificant.
The reduced-form multinomial logit regressions for incumbents found in Table 3.12 sug-
gest variation in payoffs to operating with the same grade and of adjusting quality: Firms
with an “A” or “B” as their last grade (relative to “C”’) are more likely to have an “A”
or a “B” than to exit, an effect that persists in both the pre-grade law and post-grade law
periods. For “A” firms, the likelihood of choosing an “A” in the current period is higher
if the previous period grade was an “A” than if it was a “B”, suggesting negative payoffs
to adjusting from an “A” to a “B”. Likewise, for “B” firms, choosing a “B” is more likely
than choosing an “A”, also suggesting that there may be some costs to adjusting to a higher
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quality level. Firms with “A” or “B” grades relative to “C” are more likely to exit than
to choose a “C” grade in both periods, but the relationship becomes much stronger for
“A” firms in the post-grade law period. The findings suggest payoffs from continuing with
different levels of quality or switching to higher quality may be different under the two
information environments.
In the pre-grade law period, more “B” and “C” neighbors have a negative effect on the
likelihood of choosing any quality, regardless of the level of quality being chosen. However,
in the post-grade law period, competition in markets with more firms of a certain type
matters: more “A” firms discourages continuing with any quality type, but it discourages
continuing with a “B” or “C” more than with an “A”. The finding for the relationship
between competition with more “A” firms and quality choice is therefore consistent with a
story where more competition discourages operating in the market. However, because the
likelihood of continuing is more negative for lower quality firms, it may still suggest that
it is best to choose high quality when competing in markets with more high quality firms.
Conversely, there is a positive (but insignificant) relationship between the number of “B”
and “C” firms and continuing with any quality type.
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3.6 Dynamic Model Estimates
3.6.1 Results
The parameters of the dynamic model are found in Table 3.13 and Table 3.14.13 As in
Chapter 1, I calibrate entry costs of “A” firms in the pre-grade law period and use that
calibration to approximate the dollar values of the parameters in Table 3.14. Entry costs
in the pre-grade law period are calibrated to $238,500, the average startup cost (in 2010
dollars) of a 1,500 square foot bagel shop from Table 3.1. All parameters are interpreted as
in Chapter 1. As mentioned above, these estimates are preliminary, and may contain noise
due to the limitations of the data to identify the parameters of interest.
Table 3.14 shows that operating payoffs in the pre-grade law period are negative but sta-
tistically insignificant. These payoffs are small in magnitude, suggesting that the revenues
earned by these firms are nearly equal to their costs. The differences across different quality
types can be interpreted as due to cost differences, and the evidence, somewhat counter-
intuitively, suggests that “A” quality firms have lower costs than “B” or “C” quality firms.
The magnitude of these operating payoffs in the pre-grade law period, however, suggests
that the fixed cost component of these payoffs is not much larger than the revenues from
operating in the market. However, it may also be that these estimates are under-identified
and that the model cannot extract the underlying payoffs in the data, and thus should be
13Bootstrap standard errors of the parameters are calculated by drawing whole market histories from the
set of markets, with replacement, repeating the full procedure described above 50 times, and estimating
the standard deviation across the parameter estimates.
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interpreted with caution.
I find evidence that the grade law leads to a positive change in operating payoffs after
the grade law for “A” quality firms and a large negative change in payoffs for “C” firms.
As in Chapter 1, I interpret this difference in payoffs as being driven by demand, assuming
that the costs of providing a given level of quality do not change from the pre-grade law to
post-grade law period. Therefore, as in Chapter 1, there is evidence of demand response
that benefits “A” quality firms and penalizes “C” quality firms. However, the post-grade
law payoffs are not statistically significant for “A” or “B” quality firms, and furthermore,
the demand response is negative but not statistically significant for “B” quality firms. It
may be that consumers are willing to accept “B” quality even after the grade law because
prices are already low, or because they believe “B” quality at a bagel shop is unlikely to
be associated with a significant probability of food poisoning. Nevertheless, there is clearly
value to having “A” quality over “B” quality, which can explain the convergence to higher
quality levels after the grade law observed in the data. However, as in the pre-grade law
period, the noise in the post-grade law payoffs suggests they may be under-identified, and
so the demand response effect posited, while consistent with theory, may not be reliably
identified given the limitations of the data.
The entry payoffs parameters are negative both periods, suggesting the presence of sunk
entry costs, and are increasing in hygiene quality choice. I find a negative change in entry
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payoffs for “C” quality firms, suggesting that these firms are penalized upon entry. How-
ever, I find a positive change in entry payoffs for “B” quality firms, suggesting that these
firms benefit from entering with “B” quality under the grade law. This finding is counter-
intuitive, but could be related to same reasons that operating payoffs with “B” quality do
not significantly change after the grade law. On the other hand, this estimate could also be
subject to the same identification problems as the estimates of operating payoffs.
In both periods it is more expensive to enter with “A” quality, which in the pre-grade
law period is intuitive, as setting up a “A” quality firm is likely to cost the most. However,
the change in “A” quality entry payoffs is slightly negative. Assuming that the costs of
entering with a given quality type do not change with the introduction of the grade law,
the difference between pre-grade law and post-grade law period entry payoffs suggests that
new entrants do not initially benefit from their grade, possibly due to competition from
incumbents. The finding that entry is more expensive with “A” quality both before and
after the grade law could prevent firms from entering with “A” quality and lead to a lower
number of “A” firms in the market, and therefore targeting entry costs may be an important
way of encouraging firms to enter with better hygiene quality. I explore the sensitivity of
the model predictions to the magnitude of these entry payoffs in the counterfactuals below.
Estimated adjustment payoffs are mixed in sign but statistically insignificant in the pre-
grade law period. The estimates therefore are quite noisy, which as discussed above could
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mean they are under-identified due to a lack of variation in the data. In the post-grade
law period, I generally find negative coefficients on all of the adjustment payoff parameters,
though only the payoffs associated with upgrading quality from “B” to “A”, “C” to “B”
or “C” to “A” are significant. As in the pre-grade law period, the negative and significant
coefficients in the post-grade law period show evidence of sunk costs to improving quality.
However, the changes in the payoffs from the pre-grade law period to the post-grade law pe-
riod, which capture the demand response of consumers, are negative, indicating that in the
post-grade law period, firms upgrading from “B” or “C” quality initially are penalized, de-
spite the fact that their quality has improved. This may be because consumers, when using
the new information on product quality, assign greater weight to a firm’s history of having
had lower quality, and are initially skeptical of any quality improvements when the firm is
going from low to high quality. This may also signal that consumers are less responsive, in
general, to the hygiene quality improvements of bagel shops, perhaps because the incremen-
tal cost of a bagel is low in the first place, and so consumers are either content to switch
to the outside good or just accept the lower quality. Nevertheless, the observed increase in
the level of payoffs from higher quality in the post-grade law period may be sufficient to
lead “B” or “C” quality firms to upgrade their quality today in exchange for higher future
payoffs. The other changes in adjustment payoffs from the pre-grade law to post-grade law
period, however, are less intuitive to explain. For example, it is not clear why there is a
negative change in payoffs from going from “A” to “B” quality but a positive change in
payoffs from going from “A” to “C” quality. However, while themselves statistically sig-
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nificant, these changes are based off of comparing two statistically insignificant coefficients,
and so inherently they are noisy predictions. In general, this is my interpretation of the ad-
justment payoffs: it is more likely that they reflect a lack of variation in the data and hence
an inability to identify the parameters of interest, rather than reflecting some inherent de-
mand condition faced by firms making changes to their quality in the post-grade law period.
A main focus of this study is estimating how competition affects quality choice. In the
pre-grade law period, there are few significant relationships between the number of com-
petitors of a certain quality type, and hygiene quality choice, as the results are noisy, which
again could mean these parameters are under-identified. Having “A” quality yields lower
payoffs when operating in markets with more “B” quality firms, and having “B” quality
yields lower payoffs when operating in markets with more “C” quality firms. Because there
is no information on hygiene quality in the pre-grade law period, any differences in the
parameters should be due to costs, and hence these markets may be more expensive to
operate in for firms of those quality types. In the post-grade law period, operating in mar-
kets with more “A” quality firms yields positive payoffs for firms choosing “A” quality, but
negative payoffs for firms choosing “B” or “C” quality. Firms choosing “A” quality are
also better off relative to the pre-grade law period when operating in markets with more
“B” quality firms, though their payoffs are still negative. This suggests that the costs that
make operating in markets with more “B” quality firms unprofitable for firms choosing “A”
quality remain after the grade law, but that the positive change in payoffs suggests that “A”
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firms can steal share from their “B” competitors once information on quality is introduced.
The change in payoffs from the pre-grade law to post-grade law period from operating in
markets with more “C” firms is negative for all quality types, though “B” and “C” firms
are worse off than “A” firms, which suggests that firms are generally worse off from op-
erating in these markets once information on hygiene quality is made available to consumers.
The estimated payoffs from operating in markets with more “A” competitors are different
from those in Table 3.12. In that reduced-form analysis, I found that operating in markets
with more “A” rivals was associated with a lower likelihood of continuing for firms of all
quality types, which is similar to findings such as those in Mazzeo (2002a). The opposite
result from the full dynamic model could be because the estimates reflect current as well as
expected future payoffs, rather than static payoffs, from quality choices. In the short run,
more high quality rivals may discourage operation with high quality, but in the long run,
the positive effects from being in a market with more high quality rivals can dominate, and
a forward-looking firm may choose to have high quality, as opposed to exit, in such market
environments. However, the difference in the results may also be driven by noise, possibly
because there is not enough variation in the number of firms across markets as a result of
most markets being concentrated with a total 3 or fewer incumbent firms in each period.
The results, though sensitive, suggest that there are strategic complementarities to hav-
ing “A” quality when operating in markets with other “A” quality firms in the post-grade
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law period. The positive and statistically significant relationship between the number of
“A” competitors in the market and the payoffs to having an “A” in the post-grade law
period, as well as the positive increase in payoffs from the pre-grade law period, suggests
that the grade law induces a competitive response by incentivizing firms in markets with
more high quality firms to also have high quality. Over time, this can create a positive
feedback loop where firms are choosing high quality to compete with rivals, which increases
the proportion of high quality firms operating across markets. This result supports the idea
that the effects of mandatory disclosure are primarily transmitted through competition.
The positive payoffs to “A” quality firms in these markets suggest that the aforementioned
market size or market share effects dominate a price competition effect.14 Firms with “B”
or “C” quality have lower payoffs when operating in these markets, possibly due to share
stealing by their “A” quality rivals. Furthermore, the change in payoffs to operating with
an “A” in markets with more “B” firms is positive likely because firms with an “A” can
steal share in those markets, though they may also suffer from less consumer traffic as a
result of that market having lower quality firms. The finding that the change in payoffs
for firms with “B” quality operating in markets with more “C” firms is negative suggests
that consumers may not view “B” and “C” quality firms that differently, and therefore “B”
firms may be less able to charge a premium for quality, leading to the price competition
14Due to a lack of data on prices or quantities sold by the bagel firms in my sample, I cannot explore the
relationship between price and quality, and hence cannot explicitly evaluate whether price competition
does occur. Assuming these data could somehow be collected, that would be an area for future research.
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effect dominating any gain in share from competing against the lowest quality firms.
I also find that more competition from non-bagel shops leads to negative payoffs for all
quality types in both periods, meaning that bagel shops likely face competition from other
restaurants in the market. However, the change in payoffs for all quality types is posi-
tive, which could be because the grade law introduces not only information on the bagel
shops but also on non-bagel shops. Interestingly, the magnitude of the change in payoffs is
larger for non-“A” quality firms, suggesting that these firms benefit more from operating
in markets with more non-bagel shops, though their payoffs are still negative. However,
the results are mostly insignificant, which again could signal that the estimates are poorly
identified as they are subject to noise. Supposing that the results were accurate, as this set
of non-bagel shops represents a mix of limited and full-service restaurants, it is possible that
they compete with bagel shops for breakfast and lunch business. It may be that the hygiene
quality at bagel shops is considered less important by consumers because these firms are
already charging low prices, and so consumer demand for bagels may be less sensitive to
low hygiene quality at bagel shops relative to at non-bagel restaurants.15 It is also possible
that the horizontal differentiation of these firms as bagel shops is somewhat enhanced by
the grade law, for example if there is a shift in demand away from sit-down dining at full-
service restaurants towards limited-service restaurants selling on-the-go food for breakfast
or lunch, which could further contribute to the change in payoffs. Along with the results
15However, recall there is a large negative demand response to “C” quality. This effect likely holds more for
firms supplying “B” quality, for my estimates show no significant change in demand.
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from competition with other bagel shops, the findings imply that the extent of differentia-
tion both within and across product markets can have important impacts on payoffs after
the grade law is introduced.
Operating in markets with higher property sales prices is associated with positive payoffs
for “B” and “C” quality firms in both periods, though the net change in payoffs is negative
for “B” firms and positive for “C” firms. It may be that consumers in these markets may
not have as strong preferences for hygiene quality, or may have more inelastic demand for
the bagel shops operating in these markets.16 Operating in such markets may lead to firms
being unwilling to vertically differentiate themselves by providing better hygiene quality;
instead, firms may lower prices or do nothing depending on the preferences of consumers
in these markets for hygiene quality. Therefore, as in Chapter 1, a lack of responsiveness
of demand in certain markets to hygiene quality information may lead to firms profitably
choosing to maintain non-“A” quality levels. However, these markets are clearly better for
“C” quality firms than “B” quality firms, as demand for “B” quality firms appears to fall
in these markets after the grade law. Finally, operating as a firm in unobserved state 2 is
associated with negative payoffs regardless of quality type after the grade law, consistent
with these being firms operating in markets with more demand and more competitor firms
in the post-grade law period, as seen in Table 3.8.
16For example, I find that bagel shops operating in markets with higher property sales prices also more
likely in the data to be operating as a monopoly.
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3.6.2 Model Predictions
Figure 3.3 shows that the model fits the data fairly well, in terms of the average percentage
of firms with each type across markets, though there are areas in which the model un-
derpredicts or overpredicts the data, which could result from the model parameters being
under-identified and hence not fully capturing the underlying variation in the data. Table
3.15 shows how the model predicted quality choices of firms compare to the quality choices
in the data on a year-by-year basis (starting in 2008). The model underpredicts the pro-
portion of firms choosing “A” quality in the pre-grade law period, leading to an overall
overprediction of the improvement in “A” firms as a result of the grade law. Similarly, the
model underpredicts the proportion of firms choosing “B” quality in the post-grade law
period, leading to an overall overprediction of the decline in “B” firms as a result of the
grade law. Table 3.17 shows the differences between the model prediction and data overall,
using the information from Table 3.15.
As in Chapter 1, neither the model nor the data predict full convergence to “A” quality.
Given the results from the dynamic model, it is possible that this lack of convergence is
driven by entry costs, as well as market conditions, than by fixed operating costs or sunk
adjustment costs of improving hygiene quality, though the estimates of the latter parameters
are not fully reliable. I further examine the sensitivity of the model predictions to changes
in the entry costs parameters, as well as the effects of competitions, in the counterfactuals
below. Furthermore, these counterfactuals are estimated both for the overall market, as well
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as broken out by whether the market is initially a monopoly, duopoly, or oligopoly market.
The reason for this is to see how sensitive the results are to the concentration in the market.
Factors such as competition or entry costs may be more or less important, depending on
the number of rival firms. Furthermore, the information available to consumers can also
contribute to the effectiveness of using these channels to promote high quality investment.
Table 3.16 shows that, on average, as well as year-by-year, the model tends to predict
duopoly and oligopoly market structures better than monopoly markets. This could be due
to limited data on monopoly markets, which lowers the precision of the model prediction. I
also show in Table 3.17 that the model prediction is poor for monopoly markets, but that the
predictions for duopoly/oligopoly markets predict better. The model predicts a larger effect
of mandatory disclosure for duopoly and oligopoly markets than for monopoly markets;
however, the actual data show that the effects are more or less similar regardless of previous
period market structure. The consequence of this is that the payoff parameters, in that they
reflect some of these monopoly market structures (which represent nearly 20% of the data
across all periods) may be under-identified as a result of the model’s inability to fit to the
data from these markets. Therefore, the model estimates and subsequent counterfactuals
should be seen as preliminary and interpreted with caution. In future research, I may
incorporate additional normalizations or model adjustments as discussed above that could
better identify the parameters, but lead to different estimates and counterfactual results.
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3.7 Counterfactuals
In the counterfactuals, I explore the sensitivity of the model predictions to changes in the
estimated payoff parameters. Specifically, I focus on alternative scenarios where the policy-
maker could potentially intervene to increase the average proportion of “A” quality firms
across market/years. The purpose of the experiments is to show how entry costs of quality
affect the degree to which mandatory disclosure incentivizes quality improvements, and how
much of the effects of mandatory disclosure can be explained through the competition chan-
nel. All results are presented in Tables 3.18 and 3.19, and show the percentage difference
from the model baseline. I separately estimate the counterfactuals for the pre-grade law
period (starting in 2009) and post-grade law period (starting in 2011). As in Chapter 1,
all experiments involve lump-sum transfers (linear transformations of payoff parameters),
and so are identified according to Kalouptsidi et al. (2015).17 As discussed above, the
counterfactual results should be viewed as preliminary and sensitive to the potential under-
identification of parameter estimates resulting from a lack of variation in the data.
I analyze the outcomes from the experiments both overall as well as broken out into
sub-groups based on the market structure in the starting period. The results may vary
depending on the market structure in which the firms compete, as competitive effects will
be different depending on whether the incumbent firm competes against zero, one, or two
17As in Chapter 1, there could be multiple counterfactual equilibria, and I only present one of possibly many
counterfactual equilibrium results.
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or more other firms of different quality types. Also, the market structure is endogenous as
the experiments can lead to more or less entry and exit than in the baseline model, and
so the experiments can have a different effect depending on the starting market structure.
However, because Table 3.17 shows that the model prediction is poor depending on the
initial market structure, I caveat that any counterfactual results broken out by starting
period market structure reflect permutations to a model that tends to underpredict the
actual effect of the grade law in monopoly markets, and slightly overpredict the actual
effect of the grade law for duopoly/oligopoly markets.
3.7.1 Entry Experiments
In the first set of counterfactuals, I separately target the costs of entry with “A” quality and
the costs of entry with “B” or “C” quality.18 That is, in one set of experiments I subsidize
firms that enter with “A” quality by decreasing entry costs by subsequently higher amounts,
and in another set of experiments, I penalize firms that enter with “B” and “C” quality by
increasing entry costs by subsequently higher amounts.
Table 3.18 and Table 3.19 show that increasing entry costs for low quality firms or lower-
ing entry costs for high quality firms can improve quality both with and without mandatory
disclosure. However, the improvements are larger in the pre-grade law period, suggesting
18These counterfactuals are similar to those conducted in Chapter 1, with the difference that here I present
results of the experiments for both the pre-grade law and post-grade law period. As in Chapter 1, I
assume that the revenues are fixed in either period, and that my counterfactual policies only permute
the cost component of the payoff parameter.
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that the gains from mandatory disclosure (increased value of having high quality and in-
creased penalty of having low quality) somewhat offset the entry costs. The post-grade law
period gain from lowering entry costs may be lower because there is an additional compen-
sating factor to firms from demand response. Importantly, the predicted gain from removing
entry costs of “A” quality firms entirely in the pre-grade law period, 13%, falls short of the
predicted effect of mandatory disclosure (28%), implying that entry costs are not solely
responsible for the predicted outcomes (that is, demand response also has a meaningful
effect, even after removing entry costs).
There are differences in the effectiveness of these entry experiments by initial market
structure. In the pre-grade law period, decreasing entry costs for “A” quality firms does
a better job of increasing the proportion of high quality firms in markets that are initially
oligopolies, while there are similar effects for monopoly and duopoly markets. This may be
because in oligopoly markets, without entry subsidies, competition is more intense, leading
to lower payoffs from entering. Conversely, in the pre-grade law period, increasing entry
costs for “B” and “C” quality firms is most effective in markets that are initially a monopoly.
Again, this may be because, were it not for these policies (i.e. in the model baseline) there
is little to be lost from entering with low quality, both because of the lack of information
disclosure, but also because entry is into markets where there is initially less competition.
In the post-grade law period, increasing entry costs for “B” and “C” quality firms yields
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similar results for all initial market structures, as is the case in the pre-grade law period.
However, a policy that decreases entry costs for “A” quality firms is more effective when
the initial market structure is a monopoly or duopoly, likely because in these markets, with
limited direct competitors, there are fewer benefits from having high quality even under
mandatory disclosure. Targeting entry costs is likely to increase the expected future payoffs
from having “A” quality in these markets relative to a scenario where there was no entry
subsidy, and firms may not expect to achieve the benefits next period from competing in
markets with more high quality firms (as the markets are initially highly concentrated).
3.7.2 Competition Experiments
In the second set of counterfactual experiments, I analyze what the predicted outcome would
be if competitive effects were non-existent, or if they were altered by some policy interven-
tion. First, I analyze the effect of setting the payoffs from operating with “A” quality in a
market with more “A” firms to zero. Second, I analyze the effect of increasing the payoffs
from operating with “A” quality in a market with more “A” firms.19
Table 3.19 shows that the post-grade law period payoffs from competition with high qual-
ity rivals matter a great deal for high quality choice. Overall, removing any payoff from
competition with high quality rivals reverses a large proportion of the gains from mandatory
disclosure. Specifically, the experiment decreases the proportion of firms with “A” quality
19I also estimated experiments targeting the value of “B” and “C” quality in markets with more high quality
firms or more low quality firms, and found they had no effect on the baseline model prediction.
192
Chapter 3 Mandatory Disclosure, Quality Choice, and Competition of Bagel Shops
by over 21%, compared to the baseline model predicted gain from mandatory disclosure of
28%. Conversely, I find that improving high quality payoffs from same-type competition
also can do just as well as removing the costs of “A” quality entry (approximately 9% im-
provement in the proportion of “A” quality firms in both cases). These results show that
the large benefit to “A” quality firms from competition with other “A” quality firms in
the post-grade law period explains a large portion of the increase in the proportion of “A”
quality firms after mandatory disclosure.
However, Table 3.18 shows that unlike for the entry experiments, the results from the
competition experiments only hold for the post-grade law period. In the pre-grade law
period, where there is no information on quality available to consumers, I find little to no
evidence that quality competition with more high quality firms matters for the choice of
“A” quality. Specifically, whether you remove or enhance the payoffs from competition with
more high quality firms, there is little to no change from the baseline. Note that this effect
is largely driven by the fact that the magnitude of the payoffs in the pre-grade law period
are small and both statistically and economically insignificant. However, the increase in
payoffs from the pre-grade law to post-grade law period reflects the benefits derived from
mandatory disclosure. The results of the post-grade law experiments, then, suggest that
the relationship between quality and competition as predicted by the model is entirely due
to a demand-response driven effect triggered by the removal of information asymmetry as a
result of the grade law. The finding supports the theory of Kwok and Studart (2015), that
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the effects of mandatory disclosure are primarily transmitted through competition.
As with the entry experiments, the results of the competition experiments vary by initial
market structure. In the post-grade law period, the effect is lowest for markets that are
initially monopolies, and the highest effect for markets that are initially oligopolies. This
is intuitive, as the payoffs suggest a network effect from being in markets with more high
quality firms, therefore the more firms there are that initially may choose “A” quality, the
higher the payoffs to operating in those markets.
Assuming that consumers prefer markets with more firms (for example because it may
lead to more variety or lower prices), the results suggest that, on this dimension, the grade
law is welfare improving, not just because it gives consumers additional information on
quality, but also because through this information, firms are induced to improve quality
based on the quality choices of their neighbors, and collectively this appears to lead to
markets with more high quality firms and more firms overall. The policymaker, if they
wanted to incentivize even more firms to choose high quality, could target the costs to
operating in markets with more high quality firms, for example through subsidy programs.
This would have the same effect as costs targeting entry, but an important difference is that
these competition experiments would need to be implemented in addition to, rather as an
alternative to, mandatory disclosure.
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3.8 Conclusion
This chapter analyzes how mandatory disclosure incentivizes quality improvements by NYC
bagel shops. Bagel shops on average operate in concentrated markets with few rivals, and
are assumed to not have any alternative quality characteristics valued by consumers prior
to mandatory disclosure. The introduction of the grade law allows firms to vertically dif-
ferentiate, which could impact demand as well as competition on quality.
Many of my estimated results are insignificant, and generally the estimates may be under-
identified due to a lack of variation in the data, which can lead to unstable equilibrium
estimates. Therefore, the results should be interpreted with caution, and are subject to
change depending on future model adjustments that could lead to better identification.
The preliminary findings show evidence of demand response by consumers as a result of the
grade law, where payoffs to having “A” quality increase after the introduction of the grade
law, while payoffs to “B” and “C” quality firms decline. However, I also find evidence of
large entry costs to entering with “A” quality in both periods, which may constrain firms
from entering with “A” quality even if it might otherwise be beneficial. Counterfactual
experiments show that removing these entry costs for “A” quality firms, or increasing them
for “B” or “C” quality firms, would approximate about half of the effect of mandatory dis-
closure, suggesting that the expectation of higher future payoffs from having higher quality
after the grade law matters for potential entrants, as does the future market structure an-
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ticipated by incumbent firms. I also find that the effectiveness of these experiments varies
depending on the initial market structure, which relates to the firms’ expected benefit from
the quality choice in the future.
I contribute to a mixed theoretical and empirical literature by using the model to estimate
the relationship between product quality choice and competition. I find that there is little
relationship between competition and quality in the pre-grade law period, which is consis-
tent with a lack of a competitive response due to a lack of information on quality available
to consumers. Counterfactual experiments further show that increasing or eliminating the
payoffs to operating in markets with more high quality firms in the absence of disclosure is
found to have little or no effect on the proportion of firms choosing high quality. However,
in the post-grade law period, I find a positive and significant relationship between the choice
of “A” quality and the number of “A” quality firms operating in the market, which supports
the hypothesis that a market size or share effect, which in theory could explain a positive
relationship between competition and quality, dominates a price competition effect, which
would predict a negative relationship.
Counterfactual experiments show that removing the effect entirely would significantly
lower the gains from mandatory disclosure, suggesting that, as in Kwok and Studart (2015),
the effects of mandatory disclosure are primarily transmitted through competition. Further-
more, I also show that increasing the payoffs from this complementarity between choice of
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“A” quality and the number of “A” quality firms operating in the market could increase
outcomes by approximately the same amount as eliminating the costs of entering with “A”
quality. The findings also vary depending on the initial market structure, with the largest
benefits accruing to markets that have are more competitive in the starting period. How-
ever, the experiments involving competition parameters are reliant on mandatory disclosure
to be effective, whereas those involving entry costs do not require mandatory disclosure to
incentivize firms to choose high quality.
As noted, the model estimates are preliminary, and I propose future adjustments to the
model or normalizations that may improve identification, but also change the estimated
results. The preliminary estimates presented show that overall, in a setting where there
are few alternative quality characteristics prior to mandatory disclosure, introducing new
information to consumers increases demand for high quality products, allows firms to use
hygiene quality to vertically differentiate, and leads to market competition that incentivizes
firms to improve their qualities. The benefits from choosing high quality when competing
against other high quality firms are crucial, as I find that without these benefits the effects of
information disclosure would be significantly reduced. As in Chapter 1, I find that targeting
entry costs directly can have some effect, with or without mandatory disclosure. However,
removing information disclosure would also remove the benefits from competition in quality,
which may be welfare improving to consumers, especially if the increased competition also
leads to lower prices.
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Figure 3.1: Trends in Grades over Time
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Table 3.1: Evidence on Bagel Shop Startup Costs, Prices, Cash Flow and Margins
Variablea Averageb Std. Dev.
Asking Price for Existing Store $592,729 $219,876
Startup Cost of 1,500 sq. ft. Bagel Store $238,500 $89,011
Price of Bagel $2.01 $0.63
Price of Bagel with Cream Cheese $3.15 $1.43
Annual Sales $1,074,142 $427,866
Annual Cash Flow $221,143 $85,372
Cash Flow Margin 21% 16%
a Internet Sources: Serious Eats, Yelp, US Businesses For Sale, Restaurant
Owners Survey
b All amounts in 2010 dollars
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Table 3.2: Difference of Means: Pre-Grade Law vs. Post-Grade Law
Variable Pre Post Diff. p-value
Avg. Inspection Score 17.97 14.95 -3.01 0
Percentage of “A” firms in market 0.35 0.65 0.3 0
Percentage of “B” firms in market 0.53 0.26 -0.28 0
Percentage of “C” firms in market 0.12 0.09 -0.03 0
Total Bagel Shops Inspected 2.51 3.61 1.09 0
Total Non-Bagel Restaurants Inspected 99.8 175.93 76.14 0
Total Restaurant Revenues in market (millions) 85.27 98.46 13.19 0.01
Avg. Property Sales Price (millions) 1.1 1.12 0.02 0.73
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Table 3.3: Transition probabilities of incumbent firms: Pre-Grade Law
Gradet+1
Gradet Exit A B C
A 21.6% 52.3% 24.2% 2.0%
B 19.3% 17.9% 57.0% 3.9%
C 56.6% 5.7% 9.4% 28.3%
Table 3.4: Transition probabilities of incumbent firms: Post-Grade Law
Gradet+1
Gradet Exit A B C
A 9.1% 72.5% 14.7% 3.6%
B 13.5% 39.9% 36.8% 9.7%
C 29.5% 32.1% 20.5% 17.9%
Table 3.5: Grade at Entry: Pre-Grade Law vs. Post-Grade Law
Grade Pre-Grade Law Post-Grade Law
A 35.8% 59.6%
B 46.7% 27.4%
C 17.5% 13.0%
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Table 3.6: Incumbent Quality Choices by Information Environment and Market
Competition
Incumbent Choice Pre-Grade Post-Grade Diff
Gradet = A
Percentage of “A” rivals in market 40.4% 65.9% 25.5%
Percentage of “B” rivals in market 47.0% 25.1% -21.9%
Percentage of “C” rivals in market 12.6% 9.0% -3.5%
Gradet = B
Percentage of “A” rivals in market 37.6% 63.2% 25.5%
Percentage of “B” rivals in market 47.5% 28.3% -19.2%
Percentage of “C” rivals in market 14.9% 8.5% -6.3%
Gradet = C
Percentage of “A” rivals in market 38.8% 63.4% 24.6%
Percentage of “B” rivals in market 54.6% 27.2% -27.4%
Percentage of “C” rivals in market 6.6% 9.3% 2.7%
Table 3.7: Entrant Quality Choices by Information Environment and Market Competition
Entrant Choice Pre-Grade Post-Grade Diff
Gradet−1 = Out,Gradet = A
Percentage of “A” rivals in market 41.1% 64.4% 23.3%
Percentage of “B” rivals in market 47.5% 25.4% -22.1%
Percentage of “C” rivals in market 11.4% 10.2% -1.2%
Gradet−1 = Out,Gradet = B
Percentage of “A” rivals in market 32.7% 64.8% 32.1%
Percentage of “B” rivals in market 51.8% 30.0% -21.8%
Percentage of “C” rivals in market 15.5% 5.2% -10.3%
Gradet−1 = Out,Gradet = C
Percentage of “A” rivals in market 32.2% 56.9% 24.7%
Percentage of “B” rivals in market 62.6% 32.1% -30.5%
Percentage of “C” rivals in market 5.2% 10.9% 5.8%
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Table 3.8: Difference of Means by Unobserved States: Incumbents
Pre-Grade Law Post-Grade Law
Variable s=1 s=2 Diff. s=1 s=2 Diff.
Choose A 32.0% 34.0% 0.02 58.0% 56.0% -0.02
Choose B 45.0% 43.0% -0.02 20.0% 24.0% 0.04
Choose C 7.0% 7.0% 0.01 6.0% 8.0% 0.02
Total Nbr. As 0.8 0.8 0 1.4 2.0 0.59***
Total Nbr. Bs 1.1 1.0 -0.04 0.7 1.2 0.52***
Total Nbr. Cs 0.3 0.3 0.01 0.2 0.3 0.08***
Log Total Market Revenue 17.6 17.4 -0.16 17.0 18.2 1.22***
Log Sales Price 13.6 13.5 -0.09 13.3 13.8 0.54***
Non-Bagels Inspected 147.6 131.1 -16.52 112.3 254.5 142.18***
N 109 256 390 486
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 3.9: Difference of Means by Unobserved States: Entrants
Pre-Grade Law Post-Grade Law
Variable s=1 s=2 Diff. s=1 s=2 Diff.
Enter A 12.0% 12.0% 0 14.0% 14.0% 0
Enter B 17.0% 16.0% -0.01 7.0% 6.0% -0.01
Enter C 6.0% 6.0% 0 3.0% 3.0% 0
Total Nbr. As 0.6 0.6 0 1.5 2.0 0.48***
Total Nbr. Bs 0.9 0.9 -0.04 0.8 1.2 0.33***
Total Nbr. Cs 0.2 0.2 0.01 0.2 0.3 0.06
Log Total Market Revenue 17.4 17.3 -0.14 16.9 18.1 1.15***
Log Sales Price 13.7 13.6 -0.08 13.2 13.7 0.52***
Non-Bagels Inspected 85.1 75.8 -9.32 91.9 216.7 124.86***
N 183 437 304 311
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.10: Unobserved Heterogeneity Parameters
Dependent variable: P(S=2) Pre-Grade Law Post-Grade Law
Constant 0.933*** -2.5309***
(0.224) (0.547)
Avg. Property Tax Ratet0−1 17.091 5.4068
(20.892) (14.908)
Tot. Firms with less than 20 employeest0−1 -0.0008 0.0109***
(0.0007) (0.0019)
Pˆ (s = 1) 29% 47%
Pˆ (s = 2) 71% 53%
Standard errors are cluster-bootstrapped at the zipcode level, 100 replications
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.11: Multinomial Logit Regressions: Entrant Quality Choice
Pre-Grade Law Post-Grade Law
Dependent variable: Choice at time t− 1 A in t B in t C in t A in t B in t C in t
Constant -5.252** -2.798 -3.102 3.638 3.768 -17.595***
(2.255) (2.158) (2.511) (2.263) (3.157) (5.447)
Tot. “A” neighborst−1 -0.432*** -0.416** -0.208 -0.014 -0.072 -0.11
(0.151) (0.182) (0.204) (0.049) (0.06) (0.125)
Tot. “B” neighborst−1 -0.057 -0.153 -0.305* 0.139* 0.101 0.222
(0.141) (0.138) (0.18) (0.08) (0.181) (0.166)
Tot. “C” neighborst−1 -0.314 -0.002 -0.021 -0.29 -0.382 0.486
(0.517) (0.24) (0.38) (0.249) (0.316) (0.897)
Log Total Market Revenuet−1 0.059 0.435*** 0.364** -0.289* -0.191 0.245
(0.118) (0.112) (0.172) (0.154) (0.182) (0.319)
Log Avg. Property Sales Pricet−1 0.028 -0.515*** -0.415 -0.067 -0.233 0.767*
(0.172) (0.196) (0.259) (0.203) (0.264) (0.466)
Tot. Non-Bagels firmst−1 0.004*** 0.002 0.001 -0.002** -0.001 0.002
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003)
I(s= 2) 2.741*** 1.407*** 0.592** 1.608*** 1.121*** -10.651***
(0.164) (0.147) (0.251) (0.227) (0.329) (0.426)
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.12: Multinomial Logit Regressions: Incumbent Quality Choice
Pre-Grade Law Post-Grade Law
Dependent variable: Choice at time t− 1 A in t B in t C in t A in t B in t C in t
Constant -20.061*** -16.795*** -24.996*** 0.404 -3.165 0.974
(4.395) (3.867) (5.651) (2.954) (2.715) (3.373)
Gradet−1 = A 6.79*** 5.265*** 1.47 1.686*** 0.772*** -0.481
(1.736) (1.158) (3.067) (0.257) (0.262) (0.327)
Gradet−1 = B 7.091*** 7.379*** 3.468*** 0.744*** 1.208*** 0.038
(1.727) (1.096) (0.547) (0.279) (0.322) (0.259)
Tot. “A” neighborst−1 0.376* 0.144 -0.009 -0.153*** -0.214*** -0.194**
(0.198) (0.2) (0.22) (0.059) (0.079) (0.083)
Tot. “B” neighborst−1 -0.348* -0.501*** -0.46 0.036 0.138 0.019
(0.183) (0.175) (0.355) (0.086) (0.089) (0.111)
Tot. “C” neighborst−1 -2.428*** -2.362*** -1.976*** 0.124 0.006 -0.088
(0.356) (0.298) (0.471) (0.168) (0.25) (0.29)
Log Total Market Revenuet−1 2.069*** 1.811*** 1.682*** -0.038 0.272 -0.021
(0.318) (0.301) (0.398) (0.187) (0.209) (0.249)
Log Avg. Property Sales Pricet−1 -1.822*** -1.58*** -1.099* 0.004 -0.142 -0.105
(0.246) (0.242) (0.627) (0.166) (0.191) (0.21)
Tot. Non-Bagels firmst−1 -0.01*** -0.007** -0.01* -0.004*** -0.003 0
(0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
I(s= 2) 9.332*** 7.889*** 13.371*** 2.894*** 1.637*** 1.409***
(0.609) (0.569) (0.988) (0.201) (0.229) (0.349)
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.13: Estimates for the model of Entry, Exit and Investment
Pre-grade Law Post-grade Law
Payoff Parameter Grade Coeff. SE Coeff. SEa
Operating Payoffs (θ1) A −0.049 0.359 1.016 0.848
B −0.208 0.744 −0.324 0.745
C −0.089 1.306 −8.884∗ 2.123
Log Total Market Revenue (θ2) A 0.299 0.358 0.082 0.091
B 0.623 0.419 0.014 0.081
C −2.142 8.446 −1.766 1.551
Total “A” neighbors (θ3) A 0.030 0.356 1.876∗ 0.847
B −0.152 0.730 −0.758 0.745
C 0.851 1.304 −8.981∗ 2.123
Total “B” neighbors (θ4) A −1.534∗ 0.404 −0.421∗ 0.092
B 0.316∗ 0.132 −0.017 0.059
C 0.112 0.296 0.117 0.068
Total “C” neighbors (θ5) A 0.269 0.195 0.065 0.109
B −1.626∗ 0.135 −3.225∗ 0.503
C 0.126 0.419 −0.184 0.256
Total Non-Bagels neighbors (θ6) A −0.313 0.249 −0.032 0.158
B −1.560∗ 0.154 −0.423∗ 0.208
C −0.578 0.477 −0.011 0.328
Log Avg. Property Sales Price (θ7) A 0.278 0.160 −0.160 0.109
B 1.153∗ 0.072 0.314∗ 0.136
C 0.243 0.269 0.865∗ 0.232
Adjustment Payoffs: A to B (θA,B8 ) 0.151 0.222 −0.202 0.204
Adjustment Payoffs: A to C (θA,C8 ) −0.303 0.688 −0.185 0.305
Adjustment Payoffs: B to A (θB,A8 ) 0.481 0.471 −0.544∗ 0.163
Adjustment Payoffs: B to C (θB,C8 ) 0.037 1.059 0.602 0.316
Adjustment Payoffs: C to A (θC,A8 ) −0.937 1.140 −1.430∗ 0.231
Adjustment Payoffs: C to B (θC,B8 ) −0.617 0.845 −0.764∗ 0.299
Entry Payoffs: A (θOut,A8 ) −2.571∗ 0.323 −3.122∗ 0.162
Entry Payoffs: B (θOut,B8 ) −2.499∗ 0.147 −2.603∗ 0.215
Entry Payoffs: C (θOut,C8 ) −1.018 0.724 −2.085∗ 0.282
I(s = 2) A 0.268∗ 0.107 −1.037∗ 0.088
B −0.059 0.111 −0.721∗ 0.132
C 0.189 0.237 −1.458∗ 0.190
Observations 365 876
*:= Statistically significant at the 95% confidence level
a Bootstrap standard errors computed by drawing whole market histories from the set of markets, with
replacement, and repeating the estimation procedure 50 times.
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Table 3.14: Structural Parameters as Percentage of Entry Cost, in dollars
Pre-grade Law Post-grade Law Effect of Grade Law
Payoff Parameter Grade Payoff SE Payoff SE Diff. SE
Operating Payoffs (θ1) A −$4, 541.37 $33, 288.94 $79, 753.07 $66, 500.11 $84, 294.45∗ $2, 843.29
B −$19, 276.76 $68, 993.69 −$25, 393.30 $58, 422.80 −$6, 116.54 $4, 115.56
C −$8, 214.51 $121, 143.45 −$697, 097.23∗ $166, 607.30 −$688, 882.71∗ $8, 479.07
Log Total Market Revenue (θ2) A $27, 782.96 $33, 217.50 $6, 447.56 $7, 110.29 −$21, 335.41∗ $1, 755.20
B $57, 824.51 $38, 829.36 $1, 079.74 $6, 388.33 −$56, 744.77∗ $2, 043.85
C −$198, 706.20 $783, 563.80 −$138, 588.66 $121, 708.94 $60, 117.53 $41, 219.24
Total “A” neighbors (θ3) A $2, 809.72 $33, 039.38 $147, 217.32∗ $66, 493.83 $144, 407.60∗ $2, 835.13
B −$14, 059.46 $67, 681.88 −$59, 474.91 $58, 423.58 −$45, 415.45∗ $4, 055.46
C $78, 911.33 $121, 013.57 −$704, 682.26∗ $166, 607.30 −$783, 593.59∗ $8, 473.99
Total “B” neighbors (θ4) A −$142, 272.28∗ $37, 511.98 −$33, 014.63∗ $7, 236.70 $109, 257.66∗ $1, 978.63
B $29, 297.51∗ $12, 247.01 −$1, 339.65 $4, 637.90 −$30, 637.16∗ $659.91
C $10, 350.36 $27, 424.73 $9, 193.83 $5, 371.33 −$1, 156.53 $1, 446.90
Total “C” neighbors (θ5) A $24, 947.58 $18, 126.99 $5, 134.05 $8, 553.60 −$19, 813.53∗ $991.85
B −$150, 853.63∗ $12, 545.74 −$253, 054.54∗ $39, 437.90 −$102, 200.90∗ $1, 485.51
C $11, 714.35 $38, 836.78 −$14, 449.97 $20, 122.66 −$26, 164.32∗ $2, 143.49
Total Non-Bagels neighbors (θ6) A −$29, 019.81 $23, 105.21 −$2, 519.82 $12, 392.95 $26, 500.00∗ $1, 279.82
B −$144, 737.86∗ $14, 254.63 −$33, 177.85∗ $16, 324.11 $111, 560.01∗ $927.84
C −$53, 583.16 $44, 206.51 −$899.86 $25, 699.25 $52, 683.30∗ $2, 471.43
Log Avg. Property Sales Price (θ7) A $25, 779.15 $14, 834.46 −$12, 573.87 $8, 539.48 −$38, 353.02∗ $828.34
B $107, 011.77∗ $6, 704.55 $24, 670.78∗ $10, 695.73 −$82, 341.00∗ $503.73
C $22, 572.36 $24, 930.99 $67, 854.11∗ $18, 181.41 $45, 281.76∗ $1, 442.30
Adjustment Payoffs: A to B (θA,B8 ) $14, 037.52 $20, 596.61 −$15, 884.25 $16, 033.78 −$29, 921.76∗ $1, 206.53
Adjustment Payoffs: A to C (θA,C8 ) −$28, 099.54 $63, 812.30 −$14, 477.03 $23, 961.23 $13, 622.52∗ $3, 436.80
Adjustment Payoffs: B to A (θB,A8 ) $44, 639.38 $43, 661.00 −$42, 719.10∗ $12, 789.99 −$87, 358.48∗ $2, 325.82
Adjustment Payoffs: B to C (θB,C8 ) $3, 394.01 $98, 219.16 $47, 225.96 $24, 760.01 $43, 831.95∗ $5, 208.64
Adjustment Payoffs: C to A (θC,A8 ) −$86, 919.59 $105, 780.19 −$112, 191.49∗ $18, 154.73 −$25, 271.90∗ $5, 570.66
Adjustment Payoffs: C to B (θC,B8 ) −$57, 274.10 $78, 399.06 −$59, 985.66∗ $23, 451.20 −$2, 711.56 $4, 179.39
Entry Payoffs: A (θOut,A8 ) −$238, 500.00∗ $29, 921.26 −$244, 964.20∗ $12, 687.99 −$6, 464.20∗ $1, 623.76
Entry Payoffs: B (θOut,B8 ) −$231, 822.36∗ $13, 601.50 −$204, 248.70∗ $16, 831.79 $27, 573.66∗ $911.19
Entry Payoffs: C (θOut,C8 ) −$94, 486.82 $67, 128.02 −$163, 630.41∗ $22, 113.35 −$69, 143.58∗ $3, 592.20
I(s = 2) A $24, 858.39∗ $9, 929.53 −$81, 355.21∗ $6, 886.27 −$106, 213.59∗ $569.44
B −$5, 438.25 $10, 276.51 −$56, 570.15∗ $10, 381.08 −$51, 131.90∗ $642.15
C $17, 564.07 $21, 958.53 −$114, 425.06∗ $14, 930.55 −$131, 989.13∗ $1, 255.19
Standard Deviation of Shock: σ $92, 773.36 $78, 466.21 −$14, 307.15
*:= Statistically significant at the 95% confidence level
a Amounts computed by dividing the coefficient associated with a particular grade choice by the absolute value of the coefficient for entry with that
grade choice, and multiplying by the cost of entry with that grade choice.
b Entry with “A” quality calibrated to $238,500 for the pre-grade law period. Entry costs for other quality levels in the pre-grade law period
computed as the ratio between that coefficient and the coefficient for “A” entry, multiplied by the calibrated cost of “A” entry.
c Entry with “A” quality in the post-grade law period computed as being approximately 95% of the cost of entry with “A” quality in the pre-grade
law period, based on a comparison of relative coefficients within each period. Entry costs for other quality levels in the post-grade law period
computed as in the pre-grade law period.
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Table 3.15: Predicted vs. Actual Grade Distribution By Year
Model Data
Year Avg. %A Avg. %B Avg. %C Avg. %A Avg. %B Avg. %C
2008 35% 53% 11% 35% 51% 14%
2009 37% 51% 12% 38% 51% 11%
2010 35% 44% 21% 48% 43% 10%
2010 60% 23% 17% 52% 38% 9%
2011 63% 25% 12% 59% 31% 9%
2012 65% 22% 13% 72% 20% 7%
2013 68% 19% 13% 71% 19% 10%
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Table 3.16: Comparison of Model Predicted Market Structure to Data
Year % Monopoly % Duopoly % Oligopoly
Data
2008 43% 32% 26%
2009 17% 21% 62%
2010 13% 19% 68%
2011 13% 18% 69%
2012 13% 18% 69%
2013 13% 19% 68%
Average 19% 21% 60%
Prediction
2008 39% 35% 27%
2009 16% 26% 57%
2010 12% 12% 76%
2011 8% 23% 69%
2012 7% 19% 74%
2013 8% 22% 70%
Average 15% 23% 62%
Table 3.17: Comparison of Model Prediction to Data, by Previous Period Market
Structure
Effect of Mandatory Disclosure ∆ Avg. Percent As ∆ Avg. Percent Bs ∆ Avg. Percent Cs
Overall
Model 28% -27% -1%
Data 24% -21% -3%
Monopoly
Model 11% -34% 24%
Data 24% -22% -3%
Duopoly
Model 33% -23% -10%
Data 28% -19% -8%
Oligopoly
Model 28% -24% -4%
Data 21% -19% -2%
212
Chapter 3 Mandatory Disclosure, Quality Choice, and Competition of Bagel Shops
Table 3.18: Counterfactual Experiments: Pre-Grade Law
Overall Monopoly Duopoly Oligopoly
Market Evolution by Policy %∆A %∆B %∆C %∆A %∆B %∆C %∆A %∆B %∆C %∆A %∆B %∆C
Entry Experiments
Decrease θ0,A8 by σpre 2.6% -1.1% -1.5% 2.7% -1.9% -0.9% 2.5% -1.4% -1.2% 2.6% -0.3% -2.3%
Decrease θ0,A8 by 2 σpre 8.5% -3.7% -4.7% 8.0% -5.4% -2.6% 7.5% -3.6% -3.9% 9.0% -2.0% -7.0%
Decrease θ0,A8 to 0 13.2% -5.5% -7.6% 11.7% -7.7% -4.0% 11.5% -5.3% -6.2% 14.4% -3.2% -11.2%
Increase θ0,B8 , θ
0,C
8 by σpre 3.7% 1.0% -4.8% 3.7% -0.2% -3.5% 3.6% 1.0% -4.6% 3.9% 1.0% -4.8%
Increase θ0,B8 , θ
0,C
8 by 2σpre 6.3% 0.9% -7.2% 7.2% -1.6% -5.6% 5.8% 0.9% -6.8% 6.1% 1.2% -7.2%
Increase θ0,B8 , θ
0,C
8 by 3σpre 7.8% 0.5% -8.2% 9.8% -3.0% -6.7% 7.0% 0.7% -7.7% 7.1% 1.2% -8.3%
Competition Experiments
Decrease θA3 to 0 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% -0.1% 0.0% 0.0%
Increase θA3 by σpre 1.5% -0.7% -0.8% 0.4% -0.3% -0.1% 1.6% -1.0% -0.6% 2.0% -0.7% -1.4%
i All changes relative to baseline prediction after 5 periods, starting in 2009. Results averaged across 100 simulations for each
market/year.
ii Exogenous market conditions fixed to starting (2009) levels. Other payoff parameters fixed at equilibrium values.
Table 3.19: Counterfactual Experiments: Post-Grade Law
Overall Monopoly Duopoly Oligopoly
Market Evolution by Policy %∆A %∆B %∆C %∆A %∆B %∆C %∆A %∆B %∆C %∆A %∆B %∆C
Entry Experiments
Decrease θ0,A8 by σpost 2.4% -1.2% -1.2% 3.2% -2.6% -0.6% 2.6% -1.4% -1.2% 2.1% -0.7% -1.4%
Decrease θ0,A8 by 2 σpost 4.5% -1.4% -3.1% 5.3% -4.1% -1.2% 5.0% -1.6% -3.4% 4.0% -0.6% -3.4%
Decrease θ0,A8 to 0 9.3% -2.7% -6.6% 9.4% -5.7% -3.7% 10.5% -3.0% -7.5% 8.6% -1.6% -7.0%
Increase θ0,B8 , θ
0,C
8 by σpost 1.9% -0.7% -1.3% 1.9% -1.5% -0.3% 1.9% -1.0% -1.0% 2.0% -0.4% -1.6%
Increase θ0,B8 , θ
0,C
8 by 2σpost 3.0% -1.1% -1.9% 3.1% -2.7% -0.4% 2.9% -1.3% -1.6% 3.0% -0.7% -2.3%
Increase θ0,B8 , θ
0,C
8 by 3σpost 3.5% -1.3% -2.1% 3.8% -3.3% -0.5% 3.4% -1.5% -1.9% 3.4% -0.8% -2.6%
Competition Experiments
Decrease θA3 to 0 -21.4% 4.7% 16.7% -5.5% 3.0% 2.4% -15.3% 2.8% 12.5% -27.4% 4.4% 22.9%
Increase θA3 by σpost 9.0% -1.7% -7.3% 2.7% -1.4% -1.3% 8.3% -1.8% -6.5% 10.3% -1.4% -8.9%
i All changes relative to baseline prediction after 5 periods, starting in 2011. Results averaged across 100 simulations for each mar-
ket/year.
ii Exogenous market conditions fixed to starting (2011) levels. Other payoff parameters fixed at equilibrium values.
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Appendix A
Details on Solving the Dynamic Model
with Unobserved Heterogeneity
A.1 State Transition Functions
Here, I describe transitions of the components of the publicly observed state vector, xt.
Recall from Chapter 1 that xt = (x1t, x2t, . . . , xNt, n
A
t , n
B
t , n
C
t ,Mt,Zt). Due to the size of the
state space, all transition probabilities are parameterized and estimated using parametric
methods.
• Next period quality evolves as xit = ait−1. The estimated CCPs compute the likeli-
hood of each action ait given beliefs about the actions of other firms and the evolution
of state variables.
• Next period distribution of quality type j ∈ {A,B,C}: For each firm, I observe
that firm’s entry and activity status in each period. If all firms observed each others
decisions ait−1 in period t− 1, then the number of firms of each quality type evolves
deterministically as:
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njt =
nt−1∑
i=1
I(ait−1 = j|xit−1 6= 0,xt−1) +
npt−1∑
i=1
I(ait−1 = j|xit−1 = 0,xt−1)
That is, the number of firms of quality type j observed today is equal to the number
of active firms that choose to remain active with quality type j (either by retaining
quality type j or switching to quality type j) plus the number of entrants that choose
quality type j. If all firms observed each other’s decisions, this would be an entirely
deterministic process. However, as quality choice of other firms a−it is not observed
until the next period, firms in the model instead take expectations over the number
of firms of each quality type j in the next period. Since I estimate the individual
likelihoods of each incumbent and potential entrant firm having quality type j in the
form of the CCPs, I can therefore express the likelihood of observing njt firms of type
j given the number of firms in the previous period nt−1 and the number of potential
entrants at time t− 1, npt−1, as:1
P (njt |nt−1, npt−1) =
nt−1∑
i=1
[P (ait−1 = j|xit−1 6= 0,xt−1)− P (ait−1 6= j|xit−1 = j,xt−1)]
+
npt−1∑
i=1
P (ait−1 = j|xit−1 = 0,xt−1)
That is, the likelihood of observing a total number of firms of type j observed today
is equal to the likelihood that a number of active firms from yesterday stay active
and chose quality type j, minus the likelihood that some firms switch away from
1The number of potential entrants is observed in each period as the number of firms who have not yet
entered the market
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quality type j or exit, plus the probability that new entrants choose to enter with
quality type j. Note that nt =
∑
j 6=0 n
j
t . The probabilities above can be entirely
constructed using the estimated CCPs. Specifically, for each firm’s CCP of choosing
to have quality type j in the next period, I simulate a choice-specific shock, j , from
a uniform distribution, and compare the magnitude of the choice probability to the
shock. If the shock is greater than the likelihood of choosing any other quality type,
then the firm will choose that quality type. Since all firms are assumed to know the
distribution of the shocks, this allows us to form an expectation over the number of
firms of each type in the next period.
• Evolution of exogenous market demand and cost conditions is specified as an AR(1)
process: Mt = ρMt−1+ut. Each component of Mt is assumed to evolve independently
of other components, and is estimated with its own AR(1) regression.
• Evolution of exogenous firm characteristics is specified as an AR(1) process: Zit =
φZit−1 + et. Each component of Zit is assumed to evolve independently of other
components, and is estimated with its own AR(1) regression.
Given the specifications on the evolution of the state variables, proceed as follows:
1. Estimate CCPs, Pˆ (ait|xt).
2. Use estimated CCPs to compute predicted next period number of firms of each type,
nˆt
j .
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3. Compute predicted next period exogenous market conditions and firm characteristics,
Zˆit and Mˆt, which have separate means and standard deviations. Note that these
estimates can be computed without needing to first compute estimates of the CCPs;
that is, they can be estimated outside of the model.
4. Construct firm transition probabilities fˆ Pˆ using the estimated state transitions and
the first stage estimates of the CCPs Pˆ . Take draws from the transition distributions,
and simulate the integral as described above.
• Simulations proceed as follows: for a given (exogenous) state variable, Yt, let
Yt = ρYt−1 + ut. Using the predicted value, ρˆ, construct the predicted value of
the state variable, Yˆt. Then take draws from the distribution of ut, where ut
is assumed to be normally distributed with mean 0 and variance σ2, and σ2 is
estimated using the consistent estimator σˆ2 =
∑ (Yt−Yˆt)2
n−k . These draws are used
to simulate new values Yt, the state variable in the next period.
• State variables are assumed to be independent, and so draws are taken indepen-
dently in order to construct the values of each exogenous state variable in the
next period. Once all the draws for each state variable in this simulation round
are complete, I construct the state variable matrix for the next period using the
simulated values.
5. For each simulated value, compute the one-period ahead probability of exit with qual-
ity type j using the reduced-form parameters from the CCP estimates, and construct
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the expression.
The following table presents an example of the transition functions of the exogenous state
variables, estimated using independent AR(1) regressions. These reduced-form transition
functions were used in estimating the future states in Chapter 1. I estimated similar (not
shown) transition functions to estimate the future states in Chapter 3.
Table A.1: State transition function estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
State Variable Non-Zagat firms Potential Meals Avg. Property Sales Price Food Rating Decor Rating Service Rating
Lag Dep. Variable 1.04*** 0.96*** 0.9*** 0.87*** 0.93*** 0.89***
(0.015) (0.22) (0.07) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Adj. R-squared 0.98 0.98 0.74 0.90 0.96 0.86
Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
A.2 EM Algorithm
Here, I describe the implementation of the EM algorithm in the context of the two-stage es-
timation approach originally proposed by Arcidiacono and Miller (2011). Aricidiacono and
Miller (2011) show that one can separately estimate the parameters of the CCP functions
using a reduced-form specification, and using the EM algorithm to uncover the distribution
of the unobserved heterogeneity. These first-stage estimates can then be used to compute
the one-step ahead simulation of states and solve for the dynamic parameters of the model
in a second stage.2
2Specifically, the CCPs used to predict the actions of all firms in the market in the next period are now
adjusted to incorporate unobserved heterogeneity. Additionally, once the ex-ante continuation values are
calculated, weighted maximum likelihood is used to solve for the underlying dynamic parameters, where
the weights are the conditional probabilities of being in each unobserved state.
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Initializing the EM algorithm requires a starting guess for ρ(s), the prior probability of
being in unobserved state s, for each firm, as well as the coefficients of the CCPs. I initialize
the algorithm with ρ(si) = 0.5 for s = 1, 2, and initialize the CCPs using the coefficients
from a reduced-form model without unobserved heterogeneity and a random guess at the
coefficient on the unobserved state s = 2.
Using these starting values, I can calculate the likelihood function. For the sake of
discussion, let X denote the observable variables in the data. The likelihood of firm i with
unobserved state s choosing choice j in market m at time t is specified as:
lijmts =
exp [Xj , s]βj∑J
j
∑S
s exp [Xj , s]βj
Having calculated the likelihood for each firm i and choice j, I can then start the EM
algorithm. The EM algorithm iterates over an “Expectation” (E) step, which updates the
conditional and unconditional probabilities of being in unobserved state s, and a “Maxi-
mization” (M) step, which re-solves for the parameters of interest (in this case, the CCP
parameters). Specifically, the algorithm iterates over the following steps until convergence:
1. Construct the conditional probability of being in state s as:
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qimts =
ρ(si = s)
∏
t
∑
j lijmts
1(dimt=j)∑
s ρ(si = s)
∏
t
∑
j lijmts
1(dimt=j)
2. Update the prior probability of being in state s as:
ρ(si = s) =
1
NT
∑
i
qimts
3. Re-estimate the parameters of the CCP model, θˆCCP .
4. Update the likelihood for each firm i and choice j.
Once the algorithm has run through, check if the difference between the kth iteration value
of the conditional probability, qkimts, and the (k−1)th iteration, qk−1imts, is smaller than a pre-
specified tolerance level (I use 0.00001). If not, repeat the algorithm steps until convergence.
As Arcidiacono and Miller (2011) note, there is an initial conditions problem in the sta-
tionary equilibrium. This is because the distribution of s1 depends on the distribution of
the observed states. However, some of these observed states (such as the number of firms
of each quality type) are endogenously correlated with the value of the unobserved state at
time t0. Since time t0 data are unobserved, an instrument is effectively required to sepa-
rately identify the distribution of permanent unobserved heterogeneity for each firm from
the evolution of the observed state variables.
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I address the initial conditions problem by estimating a logit (separately for the pre-grade
law and post-grade law periods) where the prior probability of being in state s is updated by
weighting a model predicted probability with the likelihood function from the Expectation
step of the EM algorithm. This is an improvement on Step 2 above, which updates the prior
by simply taking the average over the conditional probabilities for each firm. The model
predicted probability specifies the prior as a function of a constant and two “instruments”:
the prevailing market real estate tax rate at the start of the data, and the number of food
and accommodation services firms in the market with less than 20 employees at the start
of the data.3
Both policies represent shifters of the costs faced by firms. The real estate tax rate is
chosen because it is a policy, set by the government, rather than an endogenous choice made
by firms. Firms in markets with higher or lower real estate tax rates may have different
costs of doing business, which may be reflected by their quality choices. I control for this
by including a measure of the average property sales price in the model estimation, but the
tax rate is directly used to identify the prior probability of being in each unobserved state.
Also, I use the number of firms with less than 20 employees as a proxy for market wage
conditions. Brown and Medoff (1989) show a positive correlation between firm size and
wages, and in markets with more workers, an additional worker may have more bargaining
3The real estate tax rate in the post-grade law period is taken as the average real estate taxes in 2009
divided by the average property sales price in 2009. Due to data restrictions, the real estate tax rate in
the pre-grade law period is taken as the average real estate taxes in 2007 divided by the average property
sales price in 2007. Therefore, I implicitly assume that there is no change in the real estate tax rate from
2006 to 2007.
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power over their wages. Therefore, firms operating in or considering entry in markets with
larger firms may face higher wage costs; this helps identify the unobserved state the firm
operates in. I use this method for estimating the models in Chapters 1 and 3. See Table
1.10 and Table 3.10 in the text.
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